From 0383bbb9015898cbc79abd7b64316484d7713b44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff King Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2018 03:25:25 -0400 Subject: submodule-config: verify submodule names as paths Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the name (among other things). Let's sanity-check these names to avoid building a path that can be exploited. There are two main decisions: 1. What should the allowed syntax be? It's tempting to reuse verify_path(), since submodule names typically come from in-repo paths. But there are two reasons not to: a. It's technically more strict than what we need, as we really care only about breaking out of the $GIT_DIR/modules/ hierarchy. E.g., having a submodule named "foo/.git" isn't actually dangerous, and it's possible that somebody has manually given such a funny name. b. Since we'll eventually use this checking logic in fsck to prevent downstream repositories, it should be consistent across platforms. Because verify_path() relies on is_dir_sep(), it wouldn't block "foo\..\bar" on a non-Windows machine. 2. Where should we enforce it? These days most of the .gitmodules reads go through submodule-config.c, so I've put it there in the reading step. That should cover all of the C code. We also construct the name for "git submodule add" inside the git-submodule.sh script. This is probably not a big deal for security since the name is coming from the user anyway, but it would be polite to remind them if the name they pick is invalid (and we need to expose the name-checker to the shell anyway for our test scripts). This patch issues a warning when reading .gitmodules and just ignores the related config entry completely. This will generally end up producing a sensible error, as it works the same as a .gitmodules file which is missing a submodule entry (so "submodule update" will barf, but "git clone --recurse-submodules" will print an error but not abort the clone. There is one minor oddity, which is that we print the warning once per malformed config key (since that's how the config subsystem gives us the entries). So in the new test, for example, the user would see three warnings. That's OK, since the intent is that this case should never come up outside of malicious repositories (and then it might even benefit the user to see the message multiple times). Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans. Signed-off-by: Jeff King --- t/t7415-submodule-names.sh | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+) create mode 100755 t/t7415-submodule-names.sh (limited to 't') diff --git a/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh b/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..75fa071c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +test_description='check handling of .. in submodule names + +Exercise the name-checking function on a variety of names, and then give a +real-world setup that confirms we catch this in practice. +' +. ./test-lib.sh + +test_expect_success 'check names' ' + cat >expect <<-\EOF && + valid + valid/with/paths + EOF + + git submodule--helper check-name >actual <<-\EOF && + valid + valid/with/paths + + ../foo + /../foo + ..\foo + \..\foo + foo/.. + foo/../ + foo\.. + foo\..\ + foo/../bar + EOF + + test_cmp expect actual +' + +test_expect_success 'create innocent subrepo' ' + git init innocent && + git -C innocent commit --allow-empty -m foo +' + +test_expect_success 'submodule add refuses invalid names' ' + test_must_fail \ + git submodule add --name ../../modules/evil "$PWD/innocent" evil +' + +test_expect_success 'add evil submodule' ' + git submodule add "$PWD/innocent" evil && + + mkdir modules && + cp -r .git/modules/evil modules && + write_script modules/evil/hooks/post-checkout <<-\EOF && + echo >&2 "RUNNING POST CHECKOUT" + EOF + + git config -f .gitmodules submodule.evil.update checkout && + git config -f .gitmodules --rename-section \ + submodule.evil submodule.../../modules/evil && + git add modules && + git commit -am evil +' + +# This step seems like it shouldn't be necessary, since the payload is +# contained entirely in the evil submodule. But due to the vagaries of the +# submodule code, checking out the evil module will fail unless ".git/modules" +# exists. Adding another submodule (with a name that sorts before "evil") is an +# easy way to make sure this is the case in the victim clone. +test_expect_success 'add other submodule' ' + git submodule add "$PWD/innocent" another-module && + git add another-module && + git commit -am another +' + +test_expect_success 'clone evil superproject' ' + git clone --recurse-submodules . victim >output 2>&1 && + ! grep "RUNNING POST CHECKOUT" output +' + +test_done -- cgit v1.2.3