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Since 898b14c (pack-objects: rework check_delta_limit usage,
2007-04-16), we check the delta depth limit only when
figuring out whether we should make a new delta. We don't
consider it at all when reusing deltas, which means that
packing once with --depth=250, and then again with
--depth=50, the second pack may still contain chains larger
than 50.
This is generally considered a feature, as the results of
earlier high-depth repacks are carried forward, used for
serving fetches, etc. However, since we started using
cross-pack deltas in c9af708b1 (pack-objects: use mru list
when iterating over packs, 2016-08-11), we are no longer
bounded by the length of an existing delta chain in a single
pack.
Here's one particular pathological case: a sequence of N
packs, each with 2 objects, the base of which is stored as a
delta in a previous pack. If we chain all the deltas
together, we have a cycle of length N. We break the cycle,
but the tip delta is still at depth N-1.
This is less unlikely than it might sound. See the included
test for a reconstruction based on real-world actions. I
ran into such a case in the wild, where a client was rapidly
sending packs, and we had accumulated 10,000 before doing a
server-side repack. The pack that "git repack" tried to
generate had a very deep chain, which caused pack-objects to
run out of stack space in the recursive write_one().
This patch bounds the length of delta chains in the output
pack based on --depth, regardless of whether they are caused
by cross-pack deltas or existed in the input packs. This
fixes the problem, but does have two possible downsides:
1. High-depth aggressive repacks followed by "normal"
repacks will throw away the high-depth chains.
In the long run this is probably OK; investigation
showed that high-depth repacks aren't actually
beneficial, and we dropped the aggressive depth default
to match the normal case in 07e7dbf0d (gc: default
aggressive depth to 50, 2016-08-11).
2. If you really do want to store high-depth deltas on
disk, they may be discarded and new delta computed when
serving a fetch, unless you set pack.depth to match
your high-depth size.
The implementation uses the existing search for delta
cycles. That lets us compute the depth of any node based on
the depth of its base, because we know the base is DFS_DONE
by the time we look at it (modulo any cycles in the graph,
but we know there cannot be any because we break them as we
see them).
There is some subtlety worth mentioning, though. We record
the depth of each object as we compute it. It might seem
like we could save the per-object storage space by just
keeping track of the depth of our traversal (i.e., have
break_delta_chains() report how deep it went). But we may
visit an object through multiple delta paths, and on
subsequent paths we want to know its depth immediately,
without having to walk back down to its final base (doing so
would make our graph walk quadratic rather than linear).
Likewise, one could try to record the depth not from the
base, but from our starting point (i.e., start
recursion_depth at 0, and pass "recursion_depth + 1" to each
invocation of break_delta_chains()). And then when
recursion_depth gets too big, we know that we must cut the
delta chain. But that technique is wrong if we do not visit
the nodes in topological order. In a chain A->B->C, it
if we visit "C", then "B", then "A", we will never recurse
deeper than 1 link (because we see at each node that we have
already visited it).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Doc update.
* ls/filter-process:
t0021: fix flaky test
docs: warn about possible '=' in clean/smudge filter process values
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Code cleanup.
* sb/t3600-cleanup:
t3600: slightly modernize style
t3600: remove useless redirect
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* sb/unpack-trees-grammofix:
unpack-trees: fix grammar for untracked files in directories
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* ls/t0021-fixup:
t0021: minor filter process test cleanup
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Test code clean-up.
* ak/lazy-prereq-mktemp:
t7610: clean up foo.XXXXXX tmpdir
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When the http server gives an incomplete response to a smart-http
rpc call, it could lead to client waiting for a full response that
will never come. Teach the client side to notice this condition
and abort the transfer.
An improvement counterproposal has failed.
cf. <20161114194049.mktpsvgdhex2f4zv@sigill.intra.peff.net>
* dt/smart-http-detect-server-going-away:
upload-pack: optionally allow fetching any sha1
remote-curl: don't hang when a server dies before any output
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"git p4" that tracks multile p4 paths imported a single changelist
that touches files in these multiple paths as one commit, followed
by many empty commits. This has been fixed.
* gv/p4-multi-path-commit-fix:
git-p4: fix multi-path changelist empty commits
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"git p4" misbehaved when swapping a directory and a symbolic link.
* ld/p4-compare-dir-vs-symlink:
git-p4: avoid crash adding symlinked directory
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A lazy "git push" without refspec did not internally use a fully
specified refspec to perform 'current', 'simple', or 'upstream'
push, causing unnecessary "ambiguous ref" errors.
* jc/push-default-explicit:
push: test pushing ambiguously named branches
push: do not use potentially ambiguous default refspec
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"git index-pack --stdin" needs an access to an existing repository,
but "git index-pack file.pack" to generate an .idx file that
corresponds to a packfile does not.
* jk/index-pack-wo-repo-from-stdin:
index-pack: skip collision check when not in repository
t: use nongit() function where applicable
index-pack: complain when --stdin is used outside of a repo
t5000: extract nongit function to test-lib-functions.sh
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A recent update to receive-pack to make it easier to drop garbage
objects made it clear that GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES cannot
have a pathname with a colon in it (no surprise!), and this in turn
made it impossible to push into a repository at such a path. This
has been fixed by introducing a quoting mechanism used when
appending such a path to the colon-separated list.
* jk/quote-env-path-list-component:
t5615-alternate-env: double-quotes in file names do not work on Windows
t5547-push-quarantine: run the path separator test on Windows, too
tmp-objdir: quote paths we add to alternates
alternates: accept double-quoted paths
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Unlike "git am --abort", "git cherry-pick --abort" moved HEAD back
to where cherry-pick started while picking multiple changes, when
the cherry-pick stopped to ask for help from the user, and the user
did "git reset --hard" to a different commit in order to re-attempt
the operation.
* sb/sequencer-abort-safety:
Revert "sequencer: remove useless get_dir() function"
sequencer: remove useless get_dir() function
sequencer: make sequencer abort safer
t3510: test that cherry-pick --abort does not unsafely change HEAD
am: change safe_to_abort()'s not rewinding error into a warning
am: fix filename in safe_to_abort() error message
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"git pull --rebase", when there is no new commits on our side since
we forked from the upstream, should be able to fast-forward without
invoking "git rebase", but it didn't.
* jc/pull-rebase-ff:
pull: fast-forward "pull --rebase=true"
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"git commit --allow-empty --only" (no pathspec) with dirty index
ought to be an acceptable way to create a new commit that does not
change any paths, but it was forbidden, perhaps because nobody
needed it so far.
* ak/commit-only-allow-empty:
commit: remove 'Clever' message for --only --amend
commit: make --only --allow-empty work without paths
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"git difftool --dir-diff" had a minor regression when started from
a subdirectory, which has been fixed.
* da/difftool-dir-diff-fix:
difftool: fix dir-diff index creation when in a subdirectory
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"git diff --no-index" did not take "--no-abbrev" option.
* jb/diff-no-index-no-abbrev:
diff: handle --no-abbrev in no-index case
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When diff.renames configuration is on (and with Git 2.9 and later,
it is enabled by default, which made it worse), "git stash"
misbehaved if a file is removed and another file with a very
similar content is added.
* jk/stash-disable-renames-internally:
stash: prefer plumbing over git-diff
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Update the error messages from the dumb-http client when it fails
to obtain loose objects; we used to give sensible error message
only upon 404 but we now forbid unexpected redirects that needs to
be reported with something sensible.
* jk/http-walker-limit-redirect:
http-walker: complain about non-404 loose object errors
http: treat http-alternates like redirects
http: make redirects more obvious
remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable
http: always update the base URL for redirects
http: simplify update_url_from_redirect
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Fix a corner case in merge-recursive regression that crept in
during 2.10 development cycle.
* jc/renormalize-merge-kill-safer-crlf:
convert: git cherry-pick -Xrenormalize did not work
merge-recursive: handle NULL in add_cacheinfo() correctly
cherry-pick: demonstrate a segmentation fault
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"git p4" LFS support was broken when LFS stores an empty blob.
* ls/p4-empty-file-on-lfs:
git-p4: fix empty file processing for large file system backend GitLFS
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The output from "git worktree list" was made in readdir() order,
and was unstable.
* nd/worktree-list-fixup:
worktree list: keep the list sorted
worktree.c: get_worktrees() takes a new flag argument
get_worktrees() must return main worktree as first item even on error
worktree: reorder an if statement
worktree.c: zero new 'struct worktree' on allocation
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"git push --dry-run --recurse-submodule=on-demand" wasn't
"--dry-run" in the submodules.
* bw/push-dry-run:
push: fix --dry-run to not push submodules
push: --dry-run updates submodules when --recurse-submodules=on-demand
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An empty directory in a working tree that can simply be nuked used
to interfere while merging or cherry-picking a change to create a
submodule directory there, which has been fixed..
* dt/empty-submodule-in-merge:
submodules: allow empty working-tree dirs in merge/cherry-pick
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"git rev-parse --symbolic" failed with a more recent notation like
"HEAD^-1" and "HEAD^!".
* jk/rev-parse-symbolic-parents-fix:
rev-parse: fix parent shorthands with --symbolic
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Protect a recently added test case with !MINGW.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When importing from multiple perforce paths - we may attempt to
import a changelist that contains files from two (or more) of these
depot paths. Currently, this results in multiple git commits - one
containing the changes, and the other(s) as empty commit(s). This
behavior was introduced in commit 1f90a64891 ("git-p4: reduce number
of server queries for fetches", 2015-12-19).
Reproduction Steps:
1. Have a git repo cloned from a perforce repo using multiple
depot paths (e.g. //depot/foo and //depot/bar).
2. Submit a single change to the perforce repo that makes changes
in both //depot/foo and //depot/bar.
3. Run "git p4 sync" to sync the change from #2.
Change is synced as multiple commits, one for each depot path that
was affected.
Using a set, instead of a list inside p4ChangesForPaths() ensures
that each changelist is unique to the returned list, and therefore
only a single commit is generated for each changelist.
Reported-by: James Farwell <jfarwell@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: George Vanburgh <gvanburgh@bloomberg.net>
Reviewed-by: Luke Diamand <luke@diamand.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When submitting to P4, if git-p4 came across a symlinked
directory, then during the generation of the submit diff, it would
try to open it as a normal file and fail.
Spot symlinks (of any type) and output a description of the symlink
instead.
Add a test case.
Signed-off-by: Luke Diamand <luke@diamand.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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t0021.15 creates files, adds them to the index, and commits them. All
this usually happens in a test run within the same second and Git cannot
know if the files have been changed between `add` and `commit`. Thus,
Git has to run the clean filter in both operations. Sometimes these
invocations spread over two different seconds and Git can infer that the
files were not changed between `add` and `commit` based on their
modification timestamp. The test would fail as it expects the filter
invocation. Remove this expectation to make the test stable.
Signed-off-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Many tests want to run a command outside of any git repo;
with the nongit() function this is now a one-liner. It saves
a few lines, but more importantly, it's immediately obvious
what the code is trying to accomplish.
This doesn't convert every such case in the test suite; it
just covers those that want to do a one-off command. Other
cases, such as the ones in t4035, are part of a larger
scheme of outside-repo files, and it's less confusing for
them to stay consistent with the surrounding tests.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The index-pack builtin is marked as RUN_SETUP_GENTLY,
because it's perfectly fine to index a pack in the
filesystem outside of any repository. However, --stdin mode
will write the result to the object database, which does not
make sense outside of a repository. Doing so creates a bogus
".git" directory with nothing in it except the newly-created
pack and its index.
Instead, let's flag this as an error and abort.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This function abstracts the idea of running a command
outside of any repository (which is slightly awkward to do
because even if you make a non-repo directory, git may keep
walking up outside of the trash directory). There are
several scripts that use the same technique, so let's make
the function available for everyone.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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To perform the test case on Windows in a way that corresponds to the
POSIX version, inject the semicolon in a directory name.
Typically, an absolute POSIX style path, such as the one in $PWD, is
translated into a Windows style path by bash when it invokes git.exe.
However, the presence of the semicolon suppresses this translation;
but the untranslated POSIX style path is useless for git.exe.
Therefore, instead of $PWD pass the Windows style path that $(pwd)
produces.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Remove the space between redirection and file name.
Also remove unnecessary invocations of subshells, such as
(cd submod &&
echo X >untracked
) &&
as there is no point of having the shell for functional purposes.
In case of a single Git command use the `-C` option to let Git cd into
the directory.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Beller <sbeller@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 722ff7f87 (receive-pack: quarantine objects until
pre-receive accepts, 2016-10-03) regressed pushes to
repositories with colon (or semi-colon in Windows in them)
because it adds the repository's main object directory to
GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES. The receiver interprets
the colon as a delimiter, not as part of the path, and
index-pack is unable to find objects which it needs to
resolve deltas.
The previous commit introduced a quoting mechanism for the
alternates list; let's use it here to cover this case. We'll
avoid quoting when we can, though. This alternate setup is
also used when calling hooks, so it's possible that the user
may call older git implementations which don't understand
the quoting mechanism. By quoting only when necessary, this
setup will continue to work unless the user _also_ has a
repository whose path contains the delimiter.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We read lists of alternates from objects/info/alternates
files (delimited by newline), as well as from the
GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES environment variable
(delimited by colon or semi-colon, depending on the
platform).
There's no mechanism for quoting the delimiters, so it's
impossible to specify an alternate path that contains a
colon in the environment, or one that contains a newline in
a file. We've lived with that restriction for ages because
both alternates and filenames with colons are relatively
rare, and it's only a problem when the two meet. But since
722ff7f87 (receive-pack: quarantine objects until
pre-receive accepts, 2016-10-03), which builds on the
alternates system, every push causes the receiver to set
GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES internally.
It would be convenient to have some way to quote the
delimiter so that we can represent arbitrary paths.
The simplest thing would be an escape character before a
quoted delimiter (e.g., "\:" as a literal colon). But that
creates a backwards compatibility problem: any path which
uses that escape character is now broken, and we've just
shifted the problem. We could choose an unlikely escape
character (e.g., something from the non-printable ASCII
range), but that's awkward to use.
Instead, let's treat names as unquoted unless they begin
with a double-quote, in which case they are interpreted via
our usual C-stylke quoting rules. This also breaks
backwards-compatibility, but in a smaller way: it only
matters if your file has a double-quote as the very _first_
character in the path (whereas an escape character is a
problem anywhere in the path). It's also consistent with
many other parts of git, which accept either a bare pathname
or a double-quoted one, and the sender can choose to quote
or not as required.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* jk/alt-odb-cleanup:
alternates: re-allow relative paths from environment
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In contrast to "git am --abort", a sequencer abort did not check
whether the current HEAD is the one that is expected. This can lead
to loss of work (when not spotted and resolved using reflog before
the garbage collector chimes in).
This behavior is now changed by mimicking "git am --abort". The
abortion is done but HEAD is not changed when the current HEAD is
not the expected HEAD.
A new file "sequencer/abort-safety" is added to save the expected
HEAD.
The new behavior is only active when --abort is invoked on multiple
picks. The problem does not occur for the single-pick case because
it is handled differently.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Beyer <s-beyer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Stephan Beyer <s-beyer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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There are two different places where the --no-abbrev option is parsed,
and two different places where SHA-1s are abbreviated. We normally parse
--no-abbrev with setup_revisions(), but in the no-index case, "git diff"
calls diff_opt_parse() directly, and diff_opt_parse() didn't handle
--no-abbrev until now. (It did handle --abbrev, however.) We normally
abbreviate SHA-1s with find_unique_abbrev(), but commit 4f03666 ("diff:
handle sha1 abbreviations outside of repository, 2016-10-20) recently
introduced a special case when you run "git diff" outside of a
repository.
setup_revisions() does also call diff_opt_parse(), but not for --abbrev
or --no-abbrev, which it handles itself. setup_revisions() sets
rev_info->abbrev, and later copies that to diff_options->abbrev. It
handles --no-abbrev by setting abbrev to zero. (This change doesn't
touch that.)
Setting abbrev to zero was broken in the outside-of-a-repository special
case, which until now resulted in a truly zero-length SHA-1, rather than
taking zero to mean do not abbreviate. The only way to trigger this bug,
however, was by running "git diff --raw" without either the --abbrev or
--no-abbrev options, because 1) without --raw it doesn't respect abbrev
(which is bizarre, but has been that way forever), 2) we silently clamp
--abbrev=0 to MINIMUM_ABBREV, and 3) --no-abbrev wasn't handled until
now.
The outside-of-a-repository case is one of three no-index cases. The
other two are when one of the files you're comparing is outside of the
repository you're in, and the --no-index option.
Signed-off-by: Jack Bates <jack@nottheoilrig.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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9ec26e7977 (difftool: fix argument handling in subdirs, 2016-07-18)
corrected how path arguments are handled in a subdirectory, but
it introduced a regression in how entries outside of the
subdirectory are handled by dir-diff.
When preparing the right-side of the diff we only include the
changed paths in the temporary area.
The left side of the diff is constructed from a temporary
index that is built from the same set of changed files, but it
was being constructed from within the subdirectory. This is a
problem because the indexed paths are toplevel-relative, and
thus they were not getting added to the index.
Teach difftool to chdir to the toplevel of the repository before
preparing its temporary indexes. This ensures that all of the
toplevel-relative paths are valid.
Add test cases to more thoroughly exercise this scenario.
Reported-by: Frank Becker <fb@mooflu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Aguilar <davvid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When creating a stash, we need to look at the diff between
the working tree and HEAD, and do so using the git-diff
porcelain. Because git-diff enables porcelain config like
renames by default, this causes at least one problem. The
--name-only format will not mention the source side of a
rename, meaning we will fail to stash a deletion that is
part of a rename.
We could fix that case by passing --no-renames, but this is
a symptom of a larger problem. We should be using the
diff-index plumbing here, which does not have renames
enabled by default, and also does not respect any
potentially confusing config options.
Reported-by: Matthew Patey <matthew.patey2167@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The previous commit made HTTP redirects more obvious and
tightened up the default behavior. However, there's another
way for a server to ask a git client to fetch arbitrary
content: by having an http-alternates file (or a regular
alternates file, which is used as a backup).
Similar to the HTTP redirect case, a malicious server can
claim to have refs pointing at object X, return a 404 when
the client asks for X, but point to some other URL via
http-alternates, which the client will transparently fetch.
The end result is that it looks from the user's perspective
like the objects came from the malicious server, as the
other URL is not mentioned at all.
Worse, because we feed the new URL to curl ourselves, the
usual protocol restrictions do not kick in (neither curl's
default of disallowing file://, nor the protocol
whitelisting in f4113cac0 (http: limit redirection to
protocol-whitelist, 2015-09-22).
Let's apply the same rules here as we do for HTTP redirects.
Namely:
- unless http.followRedirects is set to "always", we will
not follow remote redirects from http-alternates (or
alternates) at all
- set CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS alongside CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS
restrict ourselves to a known-safe set and respect any
user-provided whitelist.
- mention alternate object stores on stderr so that the
user is aware another source of objects may be involved
The first item may prove to be too restrictive. The most
common use of alternates is to point to another path on the
same server. While it's possible for a single-server
redirect to be an attack, it takes a fairly obscure setup
(victim and evil repository on the same host, host speaks
dumb http, and evil repository has access to edit its own
http-alternates file).
So we could make the checks more specific, and only cover
cross-server redirects. But that means parsing the URLs
ourselves, rather than letting curl handle them. This patch
goes for the simpler approach. Given that they are only used
with dumb http, http-alternates are probably pretty rare.
And there's an escape hatch: the user can allow redirects on
a specific server by setting http.<url>.followRedirects to
"always".
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We instruct curl to always follow HTTP redirects. This is
convenient, but it creates opportunities for malicious
servers to create confusing situations. For instance,
imagine Alice is a git user with access to a private
repository on Bob's server. Mallory runs her own server and
wants to access objects from Bob's repository.
Mallory may try a few tricks that involve asking Alice to
clone from her, build on top, and then push the result:
1. Mallory may simply redirect all fetch requests to Bob's
server. Git will transparently follow those redirects
and fetch Bob's history, which Alice may believe she
got from Mallory. The subsequent push seems like it is
just feeding Mallory back her own objects, but is
actually leaking Bob's objects. There is nothing in
git's output to indicate that Bob's repository was
involved at all.
The downside (for Mallory) of this attack is that Alice
will have received Bob's entire repository, and is
likely to notice that when building on top of it.
2. If Mallory happens to know the sha1 of some object X in
Bob's repository, she can instead build her own history
that references that object. She then runs a dumb http
server, and Alice's client will fetch each object
individually. When it asks for X, Mallory redirects her
to Bob's server. The end result is that Alice obtains
objects from Bob, but they may be buried deep in
history. Alice is less likely to notice.
Both of these attacks are fairly hard to pull off. There's a
social component in getting Mallory to convince Alice to
work with her. Alice may be prompted for credentials in
accessing Bob's repository (but not always, if she is using
a credential helper that caches). Attack (1) requires a
certain amount of obliviousness on Alice's part while making
a new commit. Attack (2) requires that Mallory knows a sha1
in Bob's repository, that Bob's server supports dumb http,
and that the object in question is loose on Bob's server.
But we can probably make things a bit more obvious without
any loss of functionality. This patch does two things to
that end.
First, when we encounter a whole-repo redirect during the
initial ref discovery, we now inform the user on stderr,
making attack (1) much more obvious.
Second, the decision to follow redirects is now
configurable. The truly paranoid can set the new
http.followRedirects to false to avoid any redirection
entirely. But for a more practical default, we will disallow
redirects only after the initial ref discovery. This is
enough to thwart attacks similar to (2), while still
allowing the common use of redirects at the repository
level. Since c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28) we re-root all further requests from
the redirect destination, which should generally mean that
no further redirection is necessary.
As an escape hatch, in case there really is a server that
needs to redirect individual requests, the user can set
http.followRedirects to "true" (and this can be done on a
per-server basis via http.*.followRedirects config).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If a malicious server redirects the initial ref
advertisement, it may be able to leak sha1s from other,
unrelated servers that the client has access to. For
example, imagine that Alice is a git user, she has access to
a private repository on a server hosted by Bob, and Mallory
runs a malicious server and wants to find out about Bob's
private repository.
Mallory asks Alice to clone an unrelated repository from her
over HTTP. When Alice's client contacts Mallory's server for
the initial ref advertisement, the server issues an HTTP
redirect for Bob's server. Alice contacts Bob's server and
gets the ref advertisement for the private repository. If
there is anything to fetch, she then follows up by asking
the server for one or more sha1 objects. But who is the
server?
If it is still Mallory's server, then Alice will leak the
existence of those sha1s to her.
Since commit c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28), the client usually rewrites the base
URL such that all further requests will go to Bob's server.
But this is done by textually matching the URL. If we were
originally looking for "http://mallory/repo.git/info/refs",
and we got pointed at "http://bob/other.git/info/refs", then
we know that the right root is "http://bob/other.git".
If the redirect appears to change more than just the root,
we punt and continue to use the original server. E.g.,
imagine the redirect adds a URL component that Bob's server
will ignore, like "http://bob/other.git/info/refs?dummy=1".
We can solve this by aborting in this case rather than
silently continuing to use Mallory's server. In addition to
protecting from sha1 leakage, it's arguably safer and more
sane to refuse a confusing redirect like that in general.
For example, part of the motivation in c93c92f30 is
avoiding accidentally sending credentials over clear http,
just to get a response that says "try again over https". So
even in a non-malicious case, we'd prefer to err on the side
of caution.
The downside is that it's possible this will break a
legitimate but complicated server-side redirection scheme.
The setup given in the newly added test does work, but it's
convoluted enough that we don't need to care about it. A
more plausible case would be a server which redirects a
request for "info/refs?service=git-upload-pack" to just
"info/refs" (because it does not do smart HTTP, and for some
reason really dislikes query parameters). Right now we
would transparently downgrade to dumb-http, but with this
patch, we'd complain (and the user would have to set
GIT_SMART_HTTP=0 to fetch).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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A pathname value in a clean/smudge filter process "key=value" pair can
contain the '=' character (introduced in edcc858). Make the user aware
of this issue in the docs, add a corresponding test case, and fix the
issue in filter process value parser of the example implementation in
contrib.
Signed-off-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Remove superfluous .gitignore pattern and invalid '.' in `git commit`
calls.
Signed-off-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If git-p4 tried to store an empty file in GitLFS then it crashed while
parsing the pointer file:
oid = re.search(r'^oid \w+:(\w+)', pointerFile, re.MULTILINE).group(1)
AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'group'
This happens because GitLFS does not create a pointer file for an empty
file. Teach git-p4 this behavior to fix the problem and add a test case.
Signed-off-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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--only is implied when paths are present, and required
them unless --amend. But with --allow-empty it should
be allowed as well - it is the only way to create an
empty commit in the presence of staged changes.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Krey <a.krey@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In the next line the `actual` is overwritten again, so no need to redirect
the output of checkout into that file.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Beller <sbeller@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Jeff King
Junio C Hamano
Johannes Sixt
George Vanburgh
Luke Diamand
Lars Schneider
Stefan Beller
Stephan Beyer
Jack Bates
David Aguilar
Andreas Krey