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This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
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This merges up the security fix from v2.17.5.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
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Until "credential: refuse to operate when missing host or protocol",
Git's credential handling code interpreted URLs with empty scheme to
mean "give me credentials matching this host for any protocol".
Luckily libcurl does not recognize such URLs (it tries to look for a
protocol named "" and fails). Just in case that changes, let's reject
them within Git as well. This way, credential_from_url is guaranteed to
always produce a "struct credential" with protocol and host set.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
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libcurl permits making requests without a URL scheme specified. In
this case, it guesses the URL from the hostname, so I can run
git ls-remote http::ftp.example.com/path/to/repo
and it would make an FTP request.
Any user intentionally using such a URL is likely to have made a typo.
Unfortunately, credential_from_url is not able to determine the host and
protocol in order to determine appropriate credentials to send, and
until "credential: refuse to operate when missing host or protocol",
this resulted in another host's credentials being leaked to the named
host.
Teach credential_from_url_gently to consider such a URL to be invalid
so that fsck can detect and block gitmodules files with such URLs,
allowing server operators to avoid serving them to downstream users
running older versions of Git.
This also means that when such URLs are passed on the command line, Git
will print a clearer error so affected users can switch to the simpler
URL that explicitly specifies the host and protocol they intend.
One subtlety: .gitmodules files can contain relative URLs, representing
a URL relative to the URL they were cloned from. The relative URL
resolver used for .gitmodules can follow ".." components out of the path
part and past the host part of a URL, meaning that such a relative URL
can be used to traverse from a https://foo.example.com/innocent
superproject to a https::attacker.example.com/exploit submodule.
Fortunately a leading ':' in the first path component after a series of
leading './' and '../' components is unlikely to show up in other
contexts, so we can catch this by detecting that pattern.
Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
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Test framework update to more robustly clean up leftover files and
processes after tests are done.
* sg/test-atexit:
t9811-git-p4-label-import: fix pipeline negation
git p4 test: disable '-x' tracing in the p4d watchdog loop
git p4 test: simplify timeout handling
git p4 test: clean up the p4d cleanup functions
git p4 test: use 'test_atexit' to kill p4d and the watchdog process
t0301-credential-cache: use 'test_atexit' to stop the credentials helper
tests: use 'test_atexit' to stop httpd
git-daemon: use 'test_atexit` to stop 'git-daemon'
test-lib: introduce 'test_atexit'
t/lib-git-daemon: make sure to kill the 'git-daemon' process
test-lib: fix interrupt handling with 'dash' and '--verbose-log -x'
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If the dumb-http walker encounters a 404 when fetching a loose object,
it then looks at any http-alternates for the object. The 404 check is
implemented by missing_target(), which checks not only the http code,
but also that we got an http error from the CURLcode.
That broke when we stopped using CURLOPT_FAILONERROR in 17966c0a63
(http: avoid disconnecting on 404s for loose objects, 2016-07-11), since
our CURLcode will now be CURLE_OK. As a result, fetching over dumb-http
from a repository with alternates could result in Git printing "Unable
to find abcd1234..." and aborting.
We could probably fix this just by loosening missing_target(). However,
there's other code which looks at the curl result, and it would have to
be tweaked as well. Instead, let's just normalize the result the same
way the smart-http code does.
There's a similar case in processing the alternates (where we failover
from "info/http-alternates" to "info/alternates"). We'll give it the
same treatment.
After this patch, we should be hitting all code paths that need this
normalization (notably absent here is the http_pack_request path, but it
does not use FAILONERROR, nor missing_target()).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Use 'test_atexit' to run cleanup commands to stop httpd at the end of
the test script or upon interrupt or failure, as it is shorter,
simpler, and more robust than registering such cleanup commands in the
trap on EXIT in the test scripts.
Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This is a follow-up to a6c786fce8 (Mark http-fetch without -a as
deprecated, 2011-08-23). For more than six years, we have been warning
when `-a` is not provided, and the documentation has been saying that
`-a` will become the default.
It is a bit unclear what "default" means here. There is no such thing as
`http-fetch --no-a`. But according to my searches, no-one has been
asking on the mailing list how they should silence the warning and
prepare for overriding the flipped default. So let's assume that
everybody is happy with `-a`. They should be, since not using it may
break the repo in such a way that Git itself is unable to fix it.
Always behave as if `-a` was given. Since `-a` implies `-c` (get commit
objects) and `-t` (get trees), all three options are now unnecessary.
Document all of these as historical artefacts that have no effect.
Leave no-op code for handling these options in http-fetch.c. The
options-handling is currently rather loose. If someone tightens it, we
will not want these ignored options to accidentally turn into hard
errors.
Since `-a` was the only safe and sane usage and we have been pushing
people towards it for a long time, refrain from warning when it is used
"unnecessarily" now. Similarly, do not add anything scary-looking to the
man-page about how it will be removed in the future. We can always do so
later. (It is not like we are in desperate need of freeing up
one-letter arguments.)
Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The post-update hooks created in t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh is missing the
"!#/bin/sh" line which can cause issues with portability. Instead
create the hook using the 'write_script' function which includes the
proper "#!" line.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When a redirected http transport gets an error during the
redirected request, we ignored the error we got from the server,
and ended up giving a not-so-useful error message.
* jt/http-base-url-update-upon-redirect:
http: attempt updating base URL only if no error
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http.c supports HTTP redirects of the form
http://foo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack
-> http://anything
-> http://bar/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack
(that is to say, as long as the Git part of the path and the query
string is preserved in the final redirect destination, the intermediate
steps can have any URL). However, if one of the intermediate steps
results in an HTTP exception, a confusing "unable to update url base
from redirection" message is printed instead of a Curl error message
with the HTTP exception code.
This was introduced by 2 commits. Commit c93c92f ("http: update base
URLs when we see redirects", 2013-09-28) introduced a best-effort
optimization that required checking if only the "base" part of the URL
differed between the initial request and the final redirect destination,
but it performed the check before any HTTP status checking was done. If
something went wrong, the normal code path was still followed, so this
did not cause any confusing error messages until commit 6628eb4 ("http:
always update the base URL for redirects", 2016-12-06), which taught
http to die if the non-"base" part of the URL differed.
Therefore, teach http to check the HTTP status before attempting to
check if only the "base" part of the URL differed. This commit teaches
http_request_reauth to return early without updating options->base_url
upon an error; the only invoker of this function that passes a non-NULL
"options" is remote-curl.c (through "http_get_strbuf"), which only uses
options->base_url for an informational message in the situations that
this commit cares about (that is, when the return value is not HTTP_OK).
The included test checks that the redirect scheme at the beginning of
this commit message works, and that returning a 502 in the middle of the
redirect scheme produces the correct result. Note that this is different
from the test in commit 6628eb4 ("http: always update the base URL for
redirects", 2016-12-06) in that this commit tests that a Git-shaped URL
(http://.../info/refs?service=git-upload-pack) works, whereas commit
6628eb4 tests that a non-Git-shaped URL
(http://.../info/refs/foo?service=git-upload-pack) does not work (even
though Git is processing that URL) and is an error that is fatal, not
silently swallowed.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Tan <jonathantanmy@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git ls-remote" and "git archive --remote" are designed to work
without being in a directory under Git's control. However, recent
updates revealed that we randomly look into a directory called
.git/ without actually doing necessary set-up when working in a
repository. Stop doing so.
* jn/remote-helpers-with-git-dir:
remote helpers: avoid blind fall-back to ".git" when setting GIT_DIR
remote: avoid reading $GIT_DIR config in non-repo
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To push from or fetch to the current repository, remote helpers need
to know what repository that is. Accordingly, Git sets the GIT_DIR
environment variable to the path to the current repository when
invoking remote helpers.
There is a special case it does not handle: "git ls-remote" and "git
archive --remote" can be run to inspect a remote repository without
being run from any local repository. GIT_DIR is not useful in this
scenario:
- if we are not in a repository, we don't need to set GIT_DIR to
override an existing GIT_DIR value from the environment. If GIT_DIR
is present then we would be in a repository if it were valid and
would have called die() if it weren't.
- not setting GIT_DIR may cause a helper to do the usual discovery
walk to find the repository. But we know we're not in one, or we
would have found it ourselves. So in the worst case it may expend
a little extra effort to try to find a repository and fail (for
example, remote-curl would do this to try to find repository-level
configuration).
So leave GIT_DIR unset in this case. This makes GIT_DIR easier to
understand for remote helper authors and makes transport code less of
a special case for repository discovery.
Noticed using b1ef400e (setup_git_env: avoid blind fall-back to
".git", 2016-10-20) from 'next':
$ cd /tmp
$ git ls-remote https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/git/git
fatal: BUG: setup_git_env called without repository
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Update the error messages from the dumb-http client when it fails
to obtain loose objects; we used to give sensible error message
only upon 404 but we now forbid unexpected redirects that needs to
be reported with something sensible.
* jk/http-walker-limit-redirect:
http-walker: complain about non-404 loose object errors
http: treat http-alternates like redirects
http: make redirects more obvious
remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable
http: always update the base URL for redirects
http: simplify update_url_from_redirect
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Finer-grained control of what protocols are allowed for transports
during clone/fetch/push have been enabled via a new configuration
mechanism.
* bw/transport-protocol-policy:
http: respect protocol.*.allow=user for http-alternates
transport: add from_user parameter to is_transport_allowed
http: create function to get curl allowed protocols
transport: add protocol policy config option
http: always warn if libcurl version is too old
lib-proto-disable: variable name fix
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Transport with dumb http can be fooled into following foreign URLs
that the end user does not intend to, especially with the server
side redirects and http-alternates mechanism, which can lead to
security issues. Tighten the redirection and make it more obvious
to the end user when it happens.
* jk/http-walker-limit-redirect-2.9:
http: treat http-alternates like redirects
http: make redirects more obvious
remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable
http: always update the base URL for redirects
http: simplify update_url_from_redirect
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The http-walker may fetch the http-alternates (or
alternates) file from a remote in order to find more
objects. This should count as a "not from the user" use of
the protocol. But because we implement the redirection
ourselves and feed the new URL to curl, it will use the
CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS rules, not the more restrictive
CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS.
The ideal solution would be for each curl request we make to
know whether or not is directly from the user or part of an
alternates redirect, and then set CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS as
appropriate. However, that would require plumbing that
information through all of the various layers of the http
code.
Instead, let's check the protocol at the source: when we are
parsing the remote http-alternates file. The only downside
is that if there's any mismatch between what protocol we
think it is versus what curl thinks it is, it could violate
the policy.
To address this, we'll make the parsing err on the picky
side, and only allow protocols that it can parse
definitively. So for example, you can't elude the "http"
policy by asking for "HTTP://", even though curl might
handle it; we would reject it as unknown. The only unsafe
case would be if you have a URL that starts with "http://"
but curl interprets as another protocol. That seems like an
unlikely failure mode (and we are still protected by our
base CURLOPT_PROTOCOL setting, so the worst you could do is
trigger one of https, ftp, or ftps).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Williams <bmwill@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The previous commit made HTTP redirects more obvious and
tightened up the default behavior. However, there's another
way for a server to ask a git client to fetch arbitrary
content: by having an http-alternates file (or a regular
alternates file, which is used as a backup).
Similar to the HTTP redirect case, a malicious server can
claim to have refs pointing at object X, return a 404 when
the client asks for X, but point to some other URL via
http-alternates, which the client will transparently fetch.
The end result is that it looks from the user's perspective
like the objects came from the malicious server, as the
other URL is not mentioned at all.
Worse, because we feed the new URL to curl ourselves, the
usual protocol restrictions do not kick in (neither curl's
default of disallowing file://, nor the protocol
whitelisting in f4113cac0 (http: limit redirection to
protocol-whitelist, 2015-09-22).
Let's apply the same rules here as we do for HTTP redirects.
Namely:
- unless http.followRedirects is set to "always", we will
not follow remote redirects from http-alternates (or
alternates) at all
- set CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS alongside CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS
restrict ourselves to a known-safe set and respect any
user-provided whitelist.
- mention alternate object stores on stderr so that the
user is aware another source of objects may be involved
The first item may prove to be too restrictive. The most
common use of alternates is to point to another path on the
same server. While it's possible for a single-server
redirect to be an attack, it takes a fairly obscure setup
(victim and evil repository on the same host, host speaks
dumb http, and evil repository has access to edit its own
http-alternates file).
So we could make the checks more specific, and only cover
cross-server redirects. But that means parsing the URLs
ourselves, rather than letting curl handle them. This patch
goes for the simpler approach. Given that they are only used
with dumb http, http-alternates are probably pretty rare.
And there's an escape hatch: the user can allow redirects on
a specific server by setting http.<url>.followRedirects to
"always".
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We instruct curl to always follow HTTP redirects. This is
convenient, but it creates opportunities for malicious
servers to create confusing situations. For instance,
imagine Alice is a git user with access to a private
repository on Bob's server. Mallory runs her own server and
wants to access objects from Bob's repository.
Mallory may try a few tricks that involve asking Alice to
clone from her, build on top, and then push the result:
1. Mallory may simply redirect all fetch requests to Bob's
server. Git will transparently follow those redirects
and fetch Bob's history, which Alice may believe she
got from Mallory. The subsequent push seems like it is
just feeding Mallory back her own objects, but is
actually leaking Bob's objects. There is nothing in
git's output to indicate that Bob's repository was
involved at all.
The downside (for Mallory) of this attack is that Alice
will have received Bob's entire repository, and is
likely to notice that when building on top of it.
2. If Mallory happens to know the sha1 of some object X in
Bob's repository, she can instead build her own history
that references that object. She then runs a dumb http
server, and Alice's client will fetch each object
individually. When it asks for X, Mallory redirects her
to Bob's server. The end result is that Alice obtains
objects from Bob, but they may be buried deep in
history. Alice is less likely to notice.
Both of these attacks are fairly hard to pull off. There's a
social component in getting Mallory to convince Alice to
work with her. Alice may be prompted for credentials in
accessing Bob's repository (but not always, if she is using
a credential helper that caches). Attack (1) requires a
certain amount of obliviousness on Alice's part while making
a new commit. Attack (2) requires that Mallory knows a sha1
in Bob's repository, that Bob's server supports dumb http,
and that the object in question is loose on Bob's server.
But we can probably make things a bit more obvious without
any loss of functionality. This patch does two things to
that end.
First, when we encounter a whole-repo redirect during the
initial ref discovery, we now inform the user on stderr,
making attack (1) much more obvious.
Second, the decision to follow redirects is now
configurable. The truly paranoid can set the new
http.followRedirects to false to avoid any redirection
entirely. But for a more practical default, we will disallow
redirects only after the initial ref discovery. This is
enough to thwart attacks similar to (2), while still
allowing the common use of redirects at the repository
level. Since c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28) we re-root all further requests from
the redirect destination, which should generally mean that
no further redirection is necessary.
As an escape hatch, in case there really is a server that
needs to redirect individual requests, the user can set
http.followRedirects to "true" (and this can be done on a
per-server basis via http.*.followRedirects config).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git fetch http::/site/path" did not die correctly and segfaulted
instead.
* jk/fix-remote-curl-url-wo-proto:
remote-curl: handle URLs without protocol
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Generally remote-curl would never see a URL that did not
have "proto:" at the beginning, as that is what tells git to
run the "git-remote-proto" helper (and git-remote-http, etc,
are aliases for git-remote-curl).
However, the special syntax "proto::something" will run
git-remote-proto with only "something" as the URL. So a
malformed URL like:
http::/example.com/repo.git
will feed the URL "/example.com/repo.git" to
git-remote-http. The resulting URL has no protocol, but the
code added by 372370f (http: use credential API to handle
proxy authentication, 2016-01-26) does not handle this case
and segfaults.
For the purposes of this code, we don't really care what the
exact protocol; only whether or not it is https. So let's
just assume that a missing protocol is not, and curl will
handle the real error (which is that the URL is nonsense).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Use the new GIT_TRACE_CURL environment variable instead
of the deprecated GIT_CURL_VERBOSE.
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Before 14111fc (git: submodule honor -c credential.* from
command line, 2016-02-29), it was sufficient for code which
spawned a process in a submodule to just set the child
process's "env" field to "local_repo_env" to clear the
environment of any repo-specific variables.
That commit introduced a more complicated procedure, in
which we clear most variables but allow through sanitized
config. For C code, we used that procedure only for cloning,
but not for any of the programs spawned by submodule.c. As a
result, things like "git fetch --recurse-submodules" behave
differently than "git clone --recursive"; the former will
not pass through the sanitized config.
We can fix this by using prepare_submodule_repo_env()
everywhere in submodule.c.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 14111fc (git: submodule honor -c credential.* from
command line, 2016-02-29) taught git-submodule.sh to save
the sanitized value of $GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS when clearing
the environment for a submodule. However, it failed to
export the result, meaning that it had no effect for any
sub-programs.
We didn't catch this in our initial tests because we checked
only the "clone" case, which does not go through the shell
script at all. Provoking "git submodule update" to do a
fetch demonstrates the bug.
Noticed-by: Lars Schneider <larsxschneider@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Right now we test only the cloning case, but there are other
interesting cases (e.g., fetching). Let's pull the setup
bits into their own test, which will make things flow more
logically once we start adding more tests which use the
setup.
Let's also introduce some whitespace to the clone-test to
split the two parts: making sure it fails without our
cmdline config, and that it succeeds with it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Commit 14111fc (git: submodule honor -c credential.* from
command line, 2016-02-29) accidentally wrote $HTTP_URL. It
happened to work because we ended up with "credential..helper",
which we treat the same as "credential.helper", applying it
to all URLs.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Due to the way that the git-submodule code works, it clears all local
git environment variables before entering submodules. This is normally
a good thing since we want to clear settings such as GIT_WORKTREE and
other variables which would affect the operation of submodule commands.
However, GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS is special, and we actually do want to
preserve these settings. However, we do not want to preserve all
configuration as many things should be left specific to the parent
project.
Add a git submodule--helper function, sanitize-config, which shall be
used to sanitize GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS, removing all key/value pairs
except a small subset that are known to be safe and necessary.
Replace all the calls to clear_local_git_env with a wrapped function
that filters GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS using the new helper and then
restores it to the filtered subset after clearing the rest of the
environment.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.keller@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The Git CodingGuidelines prefer the $(...) construct for command
substitution instead of using the backquotes `...`.
The backquoted form is the traditional method for command
substitution, and is supported by POSIX. However, all but the
simplest uses become complicated quickly. In particular, embedded
command substitutions and/or the use of double quotes require
careful escaping with the backslash character.
The patch was generated by:
for _f in $(find . -name "*.sh")
do
perl -i -pe 'BEGIN{undef $/;} s/`(.+?)`/\$(\1)/smg' "${_f}"
done
and then carefully proof-read.
Signed-off-by: Elia Pinto <gitter.spiros@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Test clean-up.
* jk/skip-http-tests-under-no-curl:
tests: skip dav http-push tests under NO_EXPAT=NoThanks
t/lib-httpd.sh: skip tests if NO_CURL is defined
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If we built git without curl, we can't actually test against
an http server. In fact, all of the test scripts which
include lib-httpd.sh already perform this check, with one
exception: t5540. For those scripts, this is a noop, and for
t5540, this is a bugfix (it used to fail when built with
NO_CURL, though it could go unnoticed if you had a stale
git-remote-https in your build directory).
Noticed-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Some tests run diff or grep to produce an output, and then
compare the output to an expected value. We know the exit
code we expect these processes to have (e.g., grep yields 0
if it produced output and 1 otherwise), so it would not make
the test wrong to look for it. But the difference between
their output and the expected output (e.g., shown by
test_cmp) is much more useful to somebody debugging the test
than the test just bailing out.
These tests break the &&-chain to skip the exit-code check
of the process. However, we can get the same effect by using
test_might_fail. Note that in some cases the test did use
"|| return 1", which meant the test was not wrong, but it
did fool --chain-lint.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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These are tests which are missing a link in their &&-chain,
but during a setup phase. We may fail to notice failure in
commands that build the test environment, but these are
typically not expected to fail at all (but it's still good
to double-check that our test environment is what we
expect).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Using environment variable LANGUAGE and friends on the client side,
HTTP-based transports now send Accept-Language when making requests.
* ye/http-accept-language:
http: add Accept-Language header if possible
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A broken pack .idx file in the receiving repository prevented the
dumb http transport from fetching a good copy of it from the other
side.
* jk/dumb-http-idx-fetch-fix:
dumb-http: do not pass NULL path to parse_pack_index
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Add an Accept-Language header which indicates the user's preferred
languages defined by $LANGUAGE, $LC_ALL, $LC_MESSAGES and $LANG.
Examples:
LANGUAGE= -> ""
LANGUAGE=ko:en -> "Accept-Language: ko, en;q=0.9, *;q=0.1"
LANGUAGE=ko LANG=en_US.UTF-8 -> "Accept-Language: ko, *;q=0.1"
LANGUAGE= LANG=en_US.UTF-8 -> "Accept-Language: en-US, *;q=0.1"
This gives git servers a chance to display remote error messages in
the user's preferred language.
Limit the number of languages to 1,000 because q-value must not be
smaller than 0.001, and limit the length of Accept-Language header to
4,000 bytes for some HTTP servers which cannot accept such long header.
Signed-off-by: Yi EungJun <eungjun.yi@navercorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Once upon a time, dumb http always fetched .idx files
directly into their final location, and then checked their
validity with parse_pack_index. This was refactored in
commit 750ef42 (http-fetch: Use temporary files for
pack-*.idx until verified, 2010-04-19), which uses the
following logic:
1. If we have the idx already in place, see if it's
valid (using parse_pack_index). If so, use it.
2. Otherwise, fetch the .idx to a tempfile, check
that, and if so move it into place.
3. Either way, fetch the pack itself if necessary.
However, it got step 1 wrong. We pass a NULL path parameter
to parse_pack_index, so an existing .idx file always looks
broken. Worse, we do not treat this broken .idx as an
opportunity to re-fetch, but instead return an error,
ignoring the pack entirely. This can lead to a dumb-http
fetch failing to retrieve the necessary objects.
This doesn't come up much in practice, because it must be a
packfile that we found out about (and whose .idx we stored)
during an earlier dumb-http fetch, but whose packfile we
_didn't_ fetch. I.e., we did a partial clone of a
repository, didn't need some packfiles, and now a followup
fetch needs them.
Discovery and tests by Charles Bailey <charles@hashpling.org>.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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extract_content_type() could not extract a charset parameter if the
parameter is not the first one and there is a whitespace and a following
semicolon just before the parameter. For example:
text/plain; format=fixed ;charset=utf-8
And it also could not handle correctly some other cases, such as:
text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=fixed
text/plain; some-param="a long value with ;semicolons;"; charset=utf-8
Thanks-to: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Yi EungJun <eungjun.yi@navercorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We currently recognize an error message with a content-type
"text/plain; charset=utf-16" as text, but we ignore the
charset parameter entirely. Let's encode it to
log_output_encoding, which is presumably something the
user's terminal can handle.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When we get a content-type from curl, we get the whole
header line, including any parameters, and without any
normalization (like downcasing or whitespace) applied.
If we later try to match it with strcmp() or even
strcasecmp(), we may get false negatives.
This could cause two visible behaviors:
1. We might fail to recognize a smart-http server by its
content-type.
2. We might fail to relay text/plain error messages to
users (especially if they contain a charset parameter).
This patch teaches the http code to extract and normalize
just the type/subtype portion of the string. This is
technically passing out less information to the callers, who
can no longer see the parameters. But none of the current
callers cares, and a future patch will add back an
easier-to-use method for accessing those parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Since commit 426e70d (remote-curl: show server content on
http errors, 2013-04-05), we relay any text/plain error
messages from the remote server to the user. However, we
never tested it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Make clear which one is for dumb protocol, which one is for smart from
their file name.
Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Jonathan Nieder
Junio C Hamano
Jeff King
SZEDER Gábor
Martin Ågren
Brandon Williams
Jonathan Tan
Elia Pinto
Jacob Keller
Yi EungJun
Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy