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Mark some tests that match "*read-tree*" as passing when git is
compiled with SANITIZE=leak. They'll now be listed as running under
the "GIT_TEST_PASSING_SANITIZE_LEAK=true" test mode (the "linux-leaks"
CI target). We still have around half the tests that match
"*read-tree*" failing, but let's whitelist those that don't.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Probably inspired by HFS' resource streams, NTFS supports "Alternate
Data Streams": by appending `:<stream-name>` to the file name,
information in addition to the file contents can be written and read,
information that is copied together with the file (unless copied to a
non-NTFS location).
These Alternate Data Streams are typically used for things like marking
an executable as having just been downloaded from the internet (and
hence not necessarily being trustworthy).
In addition to a stream name, a stream type can be appended, like so:
`:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`. Unless specified, the default stream
type is `$DATA` for files and `$INDEX_ALLOCATION` for directories. In
other words, `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION` is a valid way to reference the
`.git` directory!
In our work in Git v2.2.1 to protect Git on NTFS drives under
`core.protectNTFS`, we focused exclusively on NTFS short names, unaware
of the fact that NTFS Alternate Data Streams offer a similar attack
vector.
Let's fix this.
Seeing as it is better to be safe than sorry, we simply disallow paths
referring to *any* NTFS Alternate Data Stream of `.git`, not just
`::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. This also simplifies the implementation.
This closes CVE-2019-1352.
Further reading about NTFS Alternate Data Streams:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The point of disallowing ".git" in the index is that we
would never want to accidentally overwrite files in the
repository directory. But this means we need to respect the
filesystem's idea of when two paths are equal. The prior
commit added a helper to make such a comparison for NTFS
and FAT32; let's use it in verify_path().
We make this check optional for two reasons:
1. It restricts the set of allowable filenames, which is
unnecessary for people who are not on NTFS nor FAT32.
In practice this probably doesn't matter, though, as
the restricted names are rather obscure and almost
certainly would never come up in practice.
2. It has a minor performance penalty for every path we
insert into the index.
This patch ties the check to the core.protectNTFS config
option. Though this is expected to be most useful on Windows,
we allow it to be set everywhere, as NTFS may be mounted on
other platforms. The variable does default to on for Windows,
though.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The point of disallowing ".git" in the index is that we
would never want to accidentally overwrite files in the
repository directory. But this means we need to respect the
filesystem's idea of when two paths are equal. The prior
commit added a helper to make such a comparison for HFS+;
let's use it in verify_path.
We make this check optional for two reasons:
1. It restricts the set of allowable filenames, which is
unnecessary for people who are not on HFS+. In practice
this probably doesn't matter, though, as the restricted
names are rather obscure and almost certainly would
never come up in practice.
2. It has a minor performance penalty for every path we
insert into the index.
This patch ties the check to the core.protectHFS config
option. Though this is expected to be most useful on OS X,
we allow it to be set everywhere, as HFS+ may be mounted on
other platforms. The variable does default to on for OS X,
though.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We do not allow ".git" to enter into the index as a path
component, because checking out the result to the working
tree may causes confusion for subsequent git commands.
However, on case-insensitive file systems, ".Git" or ".GIT"
is the same. We should catch and prevent those, too.
Note that technically we could allow this for repos on
case-sensitive filesystems. But there's not much point. It's
unlikely that anybody cares, and it creates a repository
that is unexpectedly non-portable to other systems.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We should prevent nonsense paths from entering the index in
the first place, as they can cause confusing results if they
are ever checked out into the working tree. We already do
so, but we never tested it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
Johannes Schindelin
Jeff King