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2021-02-10gpg-interface: improve interface for parsing tagsLibravatar brian m. carlson1-1/+8
We have a function which parses a buffer with a signature at the end, parse_signature, and this function is used for signed tags. However, we'll need to store values for multiple algorithms, and we'll do this by using a header for the non-default algorithm. Adjust the parse_signature interface to store the parsed data in two strbufs and turn the existing function into parse_signed_buffer. The latter is still used in places where we know we always have a signed buffer, such as push certs. Adjust all the callers to deal with this new interface. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2020-03-15gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verificationLibravatar Hans Jerry Illikainen1-9/+0
This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only invoked internally by check_signature(). There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification: verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only check_signature() is used. The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature() that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered. The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer() problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function check_signature(). Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status lines. Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of verification. [1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2020-03-05Merge branch 'hi/gpg-use-check-signature'Libravatar Junio C Hamano1-0/+9
"git merge signed-tag" while lacking the public key started to say "No signature", which was utterly wrong. This regression has been reverted. * hi/gpg-use-check-signature: Revert "gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification"
2020-02-28Revert "gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification"Libravatar Junio C Hamano1-0/+9
This reverts commit 72b006f4bfd30b7c5037c163efaf279ab65bea9c, which breaks the end-user experience when merging a signed tag without having the public key. We should report "can't check because we have no public key", but the code with this change claimed that there was no signature.
2020-01-30Merge branch 'hi/gpg-mintrustlevel'Libravatar Junio C Hamano1-1/+9
gpg.minTrustLevel configuration variable has been introduced to tell various signature verification codepaths the required minimum trust level. * hi/gpg-mintrustlevel: gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration option
2020-01-15gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration optionLibravatar Hans Jerry Illikainen1-1/+9
Previously, signature verification for merge and pull operations checked if the key had a trust-level of either TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED in verify_merge_signature(). If that was the case, the process die()d. The other code paths that did signature verification relied entirely on the return code from check_commit_signature(). And signatures made with a good key, irregardless of its trust level, was considered valid by check_commit_signature(). This difference in behavior might induce users to erroneously assume that the trust level of a key in their keyring is always considered by Git, even for operations where it is not (e.g. during a verify-commit or verify-tag). The way it worked was by gpg-interface.c storing the result from the key/signature status *and* the lowest-two trust levels in the `result` member of the signature_check structure (the last of these status lines that were encountered got written to `result`). These are documented in GPG under the subsection `General status codes` and `Key related`, respectively [1]. The GPG documentation says the following on the TRUST_ status codes [1]: """ These are several similar status codes: - TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token> - TRUST_NEVER <error_token> - TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]] - TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]] For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature. The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm. """ My interpretation is that the trust level is conceptionally different from the validity of the key and/or signature. That seems to also have been the assumption of the old code in check_signature() where a result of 'G' (as in GOODSIG) and 'U' (as in TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED) were both considered a success. The two cases where a result of 'U' had special meaning were in verify_merge_signature() (where this caused git to die()) and in format_commit_one() (where it affected the output of the %G? format specifier). I think it makes sense to refactor the processing of TRUST_ status lines such that users can configure a minimum trust level that is enforced globally, rather than have individual parts of git (e.g. merge) do it themselves (except for a grace period with backward compatibility). I also think it makes sense to not store the trust level in the same struct member as the key/signature status. While the presence of a TRUST_ status code does imply that the signature is good (see the first paragraph in the included snippet above), as far as I can tell, the order of the status lines from GPG isn't well-defined; thus it would seem plausible that the trust level could be overwritten with the key/signature status if they were stored in the same member of the signature_check structure. This patch introduces a new configuration option: gpg.minTrustLevel. It consolidates trust-level verification to gpg-interface.c and adds a new `trust_level` member to the signature_check structure. Backward-compatibility is maintained by introducing a special case in verify_merge_signature() such that if no user-configurable gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then the old behavior of rejecting TRUST_UNDEFINED and TRUST_NEVER is enforced. If, on the other hand, gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then that value overrides the old behavior. Similarly, the %G? format specifier will continue show 'U' for signatures made with a key that has a trust level of TRUST_UNDEFINED or TRUST_NEVER, even though the 'U' character no longer exist in the `result` member of the signature_check structure. A new format specifier, %GT, is also introduced for users that want to show all possible trust levels for a signature. Another approach would have been to simply drop the trust-level requirement in verify_merge_signature(). This would also have made the behavior consistent with other parts of git that perform signature verification. However, requiring a minimum trust level for signing keys does seem to have a real-world use-case. For example, the build system used by the Qubes OS project currently parses the raw output from verify-tag in order to assert a minimum trust level for keys used to sign git tags [2]. [1] https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/doc/DETAILS;h=bd00006e933ac56719b1edd2478ecd79273eae72;hb=refs/heads/master [2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/9674c1991deef45b1a1b1c71fddfab14ba50dccf/scripts/verify-git-tag#L43 Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2019-11-30gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verificationLibravatar Hans Jerry Illikainen1-9/+0
This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only invoked internally by check_signature(). There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification: verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only check_signature() is used. The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature() that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered. The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer() problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function check_signature(). Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status lines. Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of verification. [1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-10-23gpg-interface.c: obtain primary key fingerprint as wellLibravatar Michał Górny1-0/+1
Obtain the primary key fingerprint off VALIDSIG status message, and expose it via %GP format. Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-10-23gpg-interface.c: support getting key fingerprint via %GF formatLibravatar Michał Górny1-0/+1
Support processing VALIDSIG status that provides additional information for valid signatures. Use this information to propagate signing key fingerprint and expose it via %GF pretty format. This format can be used to build safer key verification systems that verify the key via complete fingerprint rather than short/long identifier provided by %GK. Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-08-15Add missing includes and forward declarationsLibravatar Elijah Newren1-0/+2
I looped over the toplevel header files, creating a temporary two-line C program for each consisting of #include "git-compat-util.h" #include $HEADER This patch is the result of manually fixing errors in compiling those tiny programs. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-07-11gpg-interface: make parse_gpg_output static and remove from interface headerLibravatar Henning Schild1-2/+0
Turn parse_gpg_output into a static function, the only outside user was migrated in an earlier commit. Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-04-16gpg-interface: use size_t for signature buffer sizeLibravatar Jeff King1-1/+1
Even though our object sizes (from which these buffers would come) are typically "unsigned long", this is something we'd like to eventually fix (since it's only 32-bits even on 64-bit Windows). It makes more sense to use size_t when taking an in-memory buffer. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2018-04-16gpg-interface: modernize function declarationsLibravatar Jeff King1-11/+38
Let's drop "extern" from our declarations, which brings us in line with our modern style guidelines. While we're here, let's wrap some of the overly long lines, and move docstrings for public functions to their declarations, since they document the interface. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2017-01-17gpg-interface, tag: add GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS flagLibravatar Lukas Puehringer1-2/+3
Functions that print git object information may require that the gpg-interface functions be silent. Add GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS flag and prevent print_signature_buffer from being called if flag is set. Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer <luk.puehringer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-06-22verify-commit: add option to print raw gpg status informationLibravatar brian m. carlson1-0/+1
verify-commit by default displays human-readable output on standard error. However, it can also be useful to get access to the raw gpg status information, which is machine-readable, allowing automated implementation of signing policy. Add a --raw option to make verify-commit produce the gpg status information on standard error instead of the human-readable format. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-06-22gpg: centralize printing signature buffersLibravatar brian m. carlson1-0/+3
The code to handle printing of signature data from a struct signature_check is very similar between verify-commit and verify-tag. Place this in a single function. verify-tag retains its special case behavior of printing the tag even when no valid signature is found. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-06-22gpg: centralize signature checkLibravatar brian m. carlson1-1/+1
verify-commit and verify-tag both share a central codepath for verifying commits: check_signature. However, verify-tag exited successfully for untrusted signature, while verify-commit exited unsuccessfully. Centralize this signature check and make verify-commit adopt the older verify-tag behavior. This behavior is more logical anyway, as the signature is in fact valid, whether or not there's a path of trust to the author. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2015-06-22verify-tag: share code with verify-commitLibravatar brian m. carlson1-0/+2
verify-tag was executing an entirely different codepath than verify-commit, except for the underlying verify_signed_buffer. Move much of the code from check_commit_signature to a generic check_signature function and adjust both codepaths to call it. Update verify-tag to explicitly output the signature text, as we now call verify_signed_buffer with strbufs to catch the output, which prevents it from being printed automatically. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-15gpg-interface: move parse_signature() to where it should beLibravatar Junio C Hamano1-0/+1
Our signed-tag objects set the standard format used by Git to store GPG-signed payload (i.e. the payload followed by its detached signature) [*1*], and it made sense to have a helper to find the boundary between the payload and its signature in tag.c back then. Newer code added later to parse other kinds of objects that learned to use the same format to store GPG-signed payload (e.g. signed commits), however, kept using the helper from the same location. Move it to gpg-interface; the helper is no longer about signed tag, but it is how our code and data interact with GPG. [Reference] *1* http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/297998/focus=1383 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-15gpg-interface: move parse_gpg_output() to where it should beLibravatar Junio C Hamano1-5/+11
Earlier, ffb6d7d5 (Move commit GPG signature verification to commit.c, 2013-03-31) moved this helper that used to be in pretty.c (i.e. the output code path) to commit.c for better reusability. It was a good first step in the right direction, but still suffers from a myopic view that commits will be the only thing we would ever want to sign---we would actually want to be able to reuse it even wider. The function interprets what GPG said; gpg-interface is obviously a better place. Move it there. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-06-23gpg-interface: provide access to the payloadLibravatar Michael J Gruber1-0/+1
In contrast to tag signatures, commit signatures are put into the header, that is between the other header parts and commit messages. Provide access to the commit content sans the signature, which is the payload that is actually signed. Commit signature verification does the parsing anyways, and callers may wish to act on or display the commit object sans the signature. Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-06-23gpg-interface: provide clear helper for struct signature_checkLibravatar Michael J Gruber1-0/+1
The struct has been growing members whose malloced memory needs to be freed. Do this with one helper function so that no malloced memory shall be left unfreed. Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-31merge/pull Check for untrusted good GPG signaturesLibravatar Sebastian Götte1-0/+1
When --verify-signatures is specified, abort the merge in case a good GPG signature from an untrusted key is encountered. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Götte <jaseg@physik-pool.tu-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-03-31Move commit GPG signature verification to commit.cLibravatar Sebastian Götte1-0/+11
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Götte <jaseg@physik-pool.tu-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-02-14gpg_interface: allow to request status returnLibravatar Michael J Gruber1-1/+1
Currently, verify_signed_buffer() returns the user facing output only. Allow callers to request the status output also. Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2011-11-04Split GPG interface into its own helper libraryLibravatar Junio C Hamano1-0/+10
This mostly moves existing code from builtin/tag.c (for signing) and builtin/verify-tag.c (for verifying) to a new gpg-interface.c file to provide a more generic library interface. - sign_buffer() takes a payload strbuf, a signature strbuf, and a signing key, runs "gpg" to produce a detached signature for the payload, and appends it to the signature strbuf. The contents of a signed tag that concatenates the payload and the detached signature can be produced by giving the same strbuf as payload and signature strbuf. - verify_signed_buffer() takes a payload and a detached signature as <ptr, len> pairs, and runs "gpg --verify" to see if the payload matches the signature. It can optionally capture the output from GPG to allow the callers to pretty-print it in a way more suitable for their contexts. "verify-tag" (aka "tag -v") used to save the whole tag contents as if it is a detached signature, and fed gpg the payload part of the tag. It relied on gpg to fail when the given tag is not signed but just is annotated. The updated run_gpg_verify() function detects the lack of detached signature in the input, and errors out without bothering "gpg". Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>