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We need to trim \r from the output of 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' on
Windows, or we end up calling 'ssh-keygen -Y verify' with a bogus signer
identity. ssh-keygen.c:2841 contains a call to puts(3), which confirms
this hypothesis. Signature verification passes with the fix.
Helped-by: Pedro Martelletto <pedro@yubico.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The cryptographic signing using ssh keys can specify literal keys
for keytypes whose name do not begin with the "ssh-" prefix by
using the "key::" prefix mechanism (e.g. "key::ecdsa-sha2-nistp256").
* fs/ssh-signing-other-keytypes:
ssh signing: make sign/amend test more resilient
ssh signing: support non ssh-* keytypes
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If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.
Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.
- Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
signature_check
- Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
payload type
- Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
ssh-keygen verification calls
- Set the payload type when verifying commits
- Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
outside of key validity as well as within
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.
- Add payload_length to struct signature_check
- Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
- Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
- Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
instead
- Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
populated.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The user.signingKey config for ssh signing supports either a path to a
file containing the key or for the sake of convenience a literal string
with the ssh public key. To differentiate between those two cases we
check if the first few characters contain "ssh-" which is unlikely to be
the start of a path. ssh supports other key types which are not prefixed
with "ssh-" and will currently be treated as a file path and therefore
fail to load. To remedy this we move the prefix check into its own
function and introduce the prefix `key::` for literal ssh keys. This way
we don't need to add new key types when they become available. The
existing `ssh-` prefix is retained for compatibility with current user
configs but removed from the official documentation to discourage its
use.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Fixes to recently added messages.
* jx/message-fixes:
i18n: fix typos found during l10n for git 2.34.0
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If the string "key" we found in the output of ssh-keygen happens to be
located at the very end of the line, then going four characters further
leaves us beyond the end of the string. Explicitly search for the
space after "key" to handle a missing one gracefully.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Acked-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If the output of ssh-keygen starts with "Good \"git\" signature for ",
but is not followed by " with " for some reason, then parse_ssh_output()
uses -1 as the len parameter of xmemdupz(), which in turn will end the
program. Reject the signature and carry on instead in that case.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Acked-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Emir and Jean-Noël reported typos in some i18n messages when preparing
l10n for git 2.34.0.
* Fix unstable spelling of config variable "gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand"
which was introduced in commit fd9e226776 (ssh signing: retrieve a
default key from ssh-agent, 2021-09-10).
* Add missing space between "with" and "--python" which was introduced
in commit bd0708c7eb (ref-filter: add %(raw) atom, 2021-07-26).
* Fix unmatched single quote in 'builtin/index-pack.c' which was
introduced in commit 8737dab346 (index-pack: refactor renaming in
final(), 2021-09-09)
[1] https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po/pull/567
Reported-by: Emir Sarı <bitigchi@me.com>
Reported-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We read stdout from gpg into a strbuf, then split it into a list of
strbufs, pull out one element, and return it. But we don't free either
the original stdout buffer, nor the list returned from strbuf_split().
This patch fixes both. Note that we have to detach the returned string
from its strbuf before calling strbuf_list_free(), as that would
otherwise throw it away.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We xmemdupz() this buffer, but never free it. Let's do so. We'll use a
cleanup label, since there are multiple exits from the function.
Note that it was also declared a "const char *". We could switch that to
"char *" to indicate that it's allocated, but that make it awkward to
use with skip_prefix(). So instead, we'll introduce an extra non-const
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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To verify a ssh signature we first call ssh-keygen -Y find-principal to
look up the signing principal by their public key from the
allowedSignersFile. If the key is found then we do a verify. Otherwise
we only validate the signature but can not verify the signers identity.
Verification uses the gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile (see ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED
SIGNERS") which contains valid public keys and a principal (usually
user@domain). Depending on the environment this file can be managed by
the individual developer or for example generated by the central
repository server from known ssh keys with push access. This file is usually
stored outside the repository, but if the repository only allows signed
commits/pushes, the user might choose to store it in the repository.
To revoke a key put the public key without the principal prefix into
gpg.ssh.revocationKeyring or generate a KRL (see ssh-keygen(1)
"KEY REVOCATION LISTS"). The same considerations about who to trust for
verification as with the allowedSignersFile apply.
Using SSH CA Keys with these files is also possible. Add
"cert-authority" as key option between the principal and the key to mark
it as a CA and all keys signed by it as valid for this CA.
See "CERTIFICATES" in ssh-keygen(1).
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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For ssh the user.signingkey can be a filename/path or even a literal ssh pubkey.
In push certs and textual output we prefer the ssh fingerprint instead.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If user.signingkey is not set and a ssh signature is requested we call
gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand (typically "ssh-add -L") and use the first key we get
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Implements the actual sign_buffer_ssh operation and move some shared
cleanup code into a strbuf function
Set gpg.format = ssh and user.signingkey to either a ssh public key
string (like from an authorized_keys file), or a ssh key file.
If the key file or the config value itself contains only a public key
then the private key needs to be available via ssh-agent.
gpg.ssh.program can be set to an alternative location of ssh-keygen.
A somewhat recent openssh version (8.2p1+) of ssh-keygen is needed for
this feature. Since only ssh-keygen is needed it can this way be
installed seperately without upgrading your system openssh packages.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Openssh v8.2p1 added some new options to ssh-keygen for signature
creation and verification. These allow us to use ssh keys for git
signatures easily.
In our corporate environment we use PIV x509 Certs on Yubikeys for email
signing/encryption and ssh keys which I think is quite common
(at least for the email part). This way we can establish the correct
trust for the SSH Keys without setting up a separate GPG Infrastructure
(which is still quite painful for users) or implementing x509 signing
support for git (which lacks good forwarding mechanisms).
Using ssh agent forwarding makes this feature easily usable in todays
development environments where code is often checked out in remote VMs / containers.
In such a setup the keyring & revocationKeyring can be centrally
generated from the x509 CA information and distributed to the users.
To be able to implement new signing formats this commit:
- makes the sigc structure more generic by renaming "gpg_output" to
"output"
- introduces function pointers in the gpg_format structure to call
format specific signing and verification functions
- moves format detection from verify_signed_buffer into the check_signature
api function and calls the format specific verify
- renames and wraps sign_buffer to handle format specific signing logic
as well
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When we have a multiply signed commit, we need to remove the signature
in the header before verifying the object, since the trailing signature
will not be over both pieces of data. Do so, and verify that we
validate the signature appropriately.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We have a function which parses a buffer with a signature at the end,
parse_signature, and this function is used for signed tags. However,
we'll need to store values for multiple algorithms, and we'll do this by
using a header for the non-default algorithm.
Adjust the parse_signature interface to store the parsed data in two
strbufs and turn the existing function into parse_signed_buffer. The
latter is still used in places where we know we always have a signed
buffer, such as push certs.
Adjust all the callers to deal with this new interface.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Code which split an argv_array call across multiple lines, like:
argv_array_pushl(&args, "one argument",
"another argument", "and more",
NULL);
was recently mechanically renamed to use strvec, which results in
mis-matched indentation like:
strvec_pushl(&args, "one argument",
"another argument", "and more",
NULL);
Let's fix these up to align the arguments with the opening paren. I did
this manually by sifting through the results of:
git jump grep 'strvec_.*,$'
and liberally applying my editor's auto-format. Most of the changes are
of the form shown above, though I also normalized a few that had
originally used a single-tab indentation (rather than our usual style of
aligning with the open paren). I also rewrapped a couple of obvious
cases (e.g., where previously too-long lines became short enough to fit
on one), but I wasn't aggressive about it. In cases broken to three or
more lines, the grouping of arguments is sometimes meaningful, and it
wasn't worth my time or reviewer time to ponder each case individually.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We eventually want to drop the argv_array name and just use strvec
consistently. There's no particular reason we have to do it all at once,
or care about interactions between converted and unconverted bits.
Because of our preprocessor compat layer, the names are interchangeable
to the compiler (so even a definition and declaration using different
names is OK).
This patch converts remaining files from the first half of the alphabet,
to keep the diff to a manageable size.
The conversion was done purely mechanically with:
git ls-files '*.c' '*.h' |
xargs perl -i -pe '
s/ARGV_ARRAY/STRVEC/g;
s/argv_array/strvec/g;
'
and then selectively staging files with "git add '[abcdefghjkl]*'".
We'll deal with any indentation/style fallouts separately.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of
gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns
verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only
invoked internally by check_signature().
There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different
parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification:
verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only
check_signature() is used.
The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate
signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a
non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one
GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature()
that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered.
The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer()
problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the
GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like
a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function
check_signature().
Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to
introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status
lines.
Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry
point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or
additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of
Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of
verification.
[1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git merge signed-tag" while lacking the public key started to say
"No signature", which was utterly wrong. This regression has been
reverted.
* hi/gpg-use-check-signature:
Revert "gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification"
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This reverts commit 72b006f4bfd30b7c5037c163efaf279ab65bea9c, which
breaks the end-user experience when merging a signed tag without
having the public key. We should report "can't check because we
have no public key", but the code with this change claimed that
there was no signature.
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gpg.minTrustLevel configuration variable has been introduced to
tell various signature verification codepaths the required minimum
trust level.
* hi/gpg-mintrustlevel:
gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration option
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Previously, signature verification for merge and pull operations checked
if the key had a trust-level of either TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED in
verify_merge_signature(). If that was the case, the process die()d.
The other code paths that did signature verification relied entirely on
the return code from check_commit_signature(). And signatures made with
a good key, irregardless of its trust level, was considered valid by
check_commit_signature().
This difference in behavior might induce users to erroneously assume
that the trust level of a key in their keyring is always considered by
Git, even for operations where it is not (e.g. during a verify-commit or
verify-tag).
The way it worked was by gpg-interface.c storing the result from the
key/signature status *and* the lowest-two trust levels in the `result`
member of the signature_check structure (the last of these status lines
that were encountered got written to `result`). These are documented in
GPG under the subsection `General status codes` and `Key related`,
respectively [1].
The GPG documentation says the following on the TRUST_ status codes [1]:
"""
These are several similar status codes:
- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]
For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
"""
My interpretation is that the trust level is conceptionally different
from the validity of the key and/or signature. That seems to also have
been the assumption of the old code in check_signature() where a result
of 'G' (as in GOODSIG) and 'U' (as in TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED)
were both considered a success.
The two cases where a result of 'U' had special meaning were in
verify_merge_signature() (where this caused git to die()) and in
format_commit_one() (where it affected the output of the %G? format
specifier).
I think it makes sense to refactor the processing of TRUST_ status lines
such that users can configure a minimum trust level that is enforced
globally, rather than have individual parts of git (e.g. merge) do it
themselves (except for a grace period with backward compatibility).
I also think it makes sense to not store the trust level in the same
struct member as the key/signature status. While the presence of a
TRUST_ status code does imply that the signature is good (see the first
paragraph in the included snippet above), as far as I can tell, the
order of the status lines from GPG isn't well-defined; thus it would
seem plausible that the trust level could be overwritten with the
key/signature status if they were stored in the same member of the
signature_check structure.
This patch introduces a new configuration option: gpg.minTrustLevel. It
consolidates trust-level verification to gpg-interface.c and adds a new
`trust_level` member to the signature_check structure.
Backward-compatibility is maintained by introducing a special case in
verify_merge_signature() such that if no user-configurable
gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then the old behavior of rejecting
TRUST_UNDEFINED and TRUST_NEVER is enforced. If, on the other hand,
gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then that value overrides the old behavior.
Similarly, the %G? format specifier will continue show 'U' for
signatures made with a key that has a trust level of TRUST_UNDEFINED or
TRUST_NEVER, even though the 'U' character no longer exist in the
`result` member of the signature_check structure. A new format
specifier, %GT, is also introduced for users that want to show all
possible trust levels for a signature.
Another approach would have been to simply drop the trust-level
requirement in verify_merge_signature(). This would also have made the
behavior consistent with other parts of git that perform signature
verification. However, requiring a minimum trust level for signing keys
does seem to have a real-world use-case. For example, the build system
used by the Qubes OS project currently parses the raw output from
verify-tag in order to assert a minimum trust level for keys used to
sign git tags [2].
[1] https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/doc/DETAILS;h=bd00006e933ac56719b1edd2478ecd79273eae72;hb=refs/heads/master
[2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/blob/9674c1991deef45b1a1b1c71fddfab14ba50dccf/scripts/verify-git-tag#L43
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of
gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns
verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only
invoked internally by check_signature().
There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different
parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification:
verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only
check_signature() is used.
The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate
signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a
non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one
GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature()
that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered.
The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer()
problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the
GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like
a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function
check_signature().
Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to
introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status
lines.
Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry
point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or
additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of
Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of
verification.
[1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The VALIDSIG status line from GnuPG with --status-fd is documented to
have 9 required and 1 optional fields [1]. The final, and optional,
field is used to specify the fingerprint of the primary key that made
the signature in case it was made by a subkey. However, this field is
only available for OpenPGP signatures; not for CMS/X.509.
If the VALIDSIG status line does not have the optional 10th field, the
current code will continue reading onto the next status line. And this
is the case for non-OpenPGP signatures [1].
The consequence is that a subsequent status line may be considered as
the "primary key" for signatures that does not have an actual primary
key.
Limit the search of these 9 or 10 fields to the single line to avoid
this problem. If the 10th field is missing, report that there is no
primary key fingerprint.
[Reference]
[1] GnuPG Details, General status codes
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/DETAILS;h=6ce340e8c04794add995e84308bb3091450bd28f;hb=HEAD#l483
The documentation says:
VALIDSIG <args>
The args are:
- <fingerprint_in_hex>
- <sig_creation_date>
- <sig-timestamp>
- <expire-timestamp>
- <sig-version>
- <reserved>
- <pubkey-algo>
- <hash-algo>
- <sig-class>
- [ <primary-key-fpr> ]
This status indicates that the signature is cryptographically
valid. [...] PRIMARY-KEY-FPR is the fingerprint of the primary key
or identical to the first argument.
The primary-key-fpr parameter is used for OpenPGP and not available
for CMS signatures. [...]
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Introduce a static replace_cstring() function to simplify repeated
pattern of free-and-xmemdupz() for GPG status line parsing.
This also helps us avoid potential memleaks if parsing of new status
lines are introduced in the future.
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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If the GPG output ends with trailing blank lines, after skipping
them over inside the loop to find the terminating NUL at the end,
the loop ends up looking for the next line, starting past the end.
Signed-off-by: Steven Roberts <sroberts@fenderq.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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New "--pretty=format:" placeholders %GF and %GP that show the GPG
key fingerprints have been invented.
* mg/gpg-fingerprint:
gpg-interface.c: obtain primary key fingerprint as well
gpg-interface.c: support getting key fingerprint via %GF format
gpg-interface.c: use flags to determine key/signer info presence
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Detect and reject a signature block that has more than one GPG
signature.
* mg/gpg-parse-tighten:
gpg-interface.c: detect and reject multiple signatures on commits
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Obtain the primary key fingerprint off VALIDSIG status message,
and expose it via %GP format.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Support processing VALIDSIG status that provides additional information
for valid signatures. Use this information to propagate signing key
fingerprint and expose it via %GF pretty format. This format can be
used to build safer key verification systems that verify the key via
complete fingerprint rather than short/long identifier provided by %GK.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Replace the logic used to determine whether key and signer information
is present to use explicit flags in sigcheck_gpg_status[] array. This
is more future-proof, since it makes it possible to add additional
statuses without having to explicitly update the conditions.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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GnuPG supports creating signatures consisting of multiple signature
packets. If such a signature is verified, it outputs all the status
messages for each signature separately. However, git currently does not
account for such scenario and gets terribly confused over getting
multiple *SIG statuses.
For example, if a malicious party alters a signed commit and appends
a new untrusted signature, git is going to ignore the original bad
signature and report untrusted commit instead. However, %GK and %GS
format strings may still expand to the data corresponding
to the original signature, potentially tricking the scripts into
trusting the malicious commit.
Given that the use of multiple signatures is quite rare, git does not
support creating them without jumping through a few hoops, and finally
supporting them properly would require extensive API improvement, it
seems reasonable to just reject them at the moment.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git verify-tag" and "git verify-commit" have been taught to use
the exit status of underlying "gpg --verify" to signal bad or
untrusted signature they found.
* jc/gpg-status:
gpg-interface: propagate exit status from gpg back to the callers
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When gpg-interface API unified support for signature verification
codepaths for signed tags and signed commits in mid 2015 at around
v2.6.0-rc0~114, we accidentally loosened the GPG signature
verification.
Before that change, signed commits were verified by looking for
"G"ood signature from GPG, while ignoring the exit status of "gpg
--verify" process, while signed tags were verified by simply passing
the exit status of "gpg --verify" through. The unified code we
currently have ignores the exit status of "gpg --verify" and returns
successful verification when the signature matches an unexpired key
regardless of the trust placed on the key (i.e. in addition to "G"ood
ones, we accept "U"ntrusted ones).
Make these commands signal failure with their exit status when
underlying "gpg --verify" (or the custom command specified by
"gpg.program" configuration variable) does so. This essentially
changes their behaviour in a backward incompatible way to reject
signatures that have been made with untrusted keys even if they
correctly verify, as that is how "gpg --verify" behaves.
Note that the code still overrides a zero exit status obtained from
"gpg" (or gpg.program) if the output does not say the signature is
good or computes correctly but made with untrusted keys, to catch
a poorly written wrapper around "gpg" the user may give us.
We could exclude "U"ntrusted support from this fallback code, but
that would be making two backward incompatible changes in a single
commit, so let's avoid that for now. A follow-up change could do so
if desired.
Helped-by: Vojtech Myslivec <vojtech.myslivec@nic.cz>
Helped-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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This commit allows git to create and check x509 type signatures using
gpgsm.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Supporting multiple signing formats we will have the need to configure a
custom program each. Add a new config value to cater for that.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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gnupg does print the keyid followed by a space and the signer comes
next. The same pattern is also used in gpgsm, but there the key length
would be 40 instead of 16. Instead of hardcoding the expected length,
find the first space and calculate it.
Input that does not match the expected format will be ignored now,
before we jumped to found+17 which might have been behind the end of an
unexpected string.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Create a struct that holds the format details for the supported formats.
At the moment that is still just "openpgp". This commit prepares for the
introduction of more formats, that might use other programs and match
other signatures.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Add "gpg.format" where the user can specify which type of signature to
use for commits. At the moment only "openpgp" is supported and the value is
not even used. This commit prepares for a new types of signatures.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Turn parse_gpg_output into a static function, the only outside user was
migrated in an earlier commit.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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A signed tag has a detached signature like this:
object ...
[...more header...]
This is the tag body.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
[opaque gpg data]
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Our parser finds the _first_ line that appears to start a
PGP signature block, meaning we may be confused by a
signature (or a signature-like line) in the actual body.
Let's keep parsing and always find the final block, which
should be the detached signature over all of the preceding
content.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Let's separate the actual line-by-line parsing of signatures
from the notion of "is this a gpg signature line". That will
make it easier to do more refactoring of this loop in future
patches.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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We accidentally shed the "const" of our buffer by passing it
through memchr. Let's fix that, and while we're at it, move
our variable declaration inside the loop, which is the only
place that uses it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Even though our object sizes (from which these buffers would
come) are typically "unsigned long", this is something we'd
like to eventually fix (since it's only 32-bits even on
64-bit Windows). It makes more sense to use size_t when
taking an in-memory buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Let's drop "extern" from our declarations, which brings us
in line with our modern style guidelines. While we're
here, let's wrap some of the overly long lines, and move
docstrings for public functions to their declarations, since
they document the interface.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The config handler for user.signingkey does not check for a
boolean value, and thus:
git -c user.signingkey tag
will segfault. We could fix this and even shorten the code
by using git_config_string(). But our set_signing_key()
helper is used by other code outside of gpg-interface.c, so
we must keep it (and we may as well use it, because unlike
git_config_string() it does not leak when we overwrite an
old value).
Ironically, the handler for gpg.program just below _could_
use git_config_string() but doesn't. But since we're going
to touch that in a future patch, we'll leave it alone for
now. We will add some whitespace and returns in preparation
for adding more config keys, though.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The previous commit taught the tempfile code to give up
ownership over tempfiles that have been renamed or deleted.
That makes it possible to use a stack variable like this:
struct tempfile t;
create_tempfile(&t, ...);
...
if (!err)
rename_tempfile(&t, ...);
else
delete_tempfile(&t);
But doing it this way has a high potential for creating
memory errors. The tempfile we pass to create_tempfile()
ends up on a global linked list, and it's not safe for it to
go out of scope until we've called one of those two
deactivation functions.
Imagine that we add an early return from the function that
forgets to call delete_tempfile(). With a static or heap
tempfile variable, the worst case is that the tempfile hangs
around until the program exits (and some functions like
setup_shallow_temporary rely on this intentionally, creating
a tempfile and then leaving it for later cleanup).
But with a stack variable as above, this is a serious memory
error: the variable goes out of scope and may be filled with
garbage by the time the tempfile code looks at it. Let's
see if we can make it harder to get this wrong.
Since many callers need to allocate arbitrary numbers of
tempfiles, we can't rely on static storage as a general
solution. So we need to turn to the heap. We could just ask
all callers to pass us a heap variable, but that puts the
burden on them to call free() at the right time.
Instead, let's have the tempfile code handle the heap
allocation _and_ the deallocation (when the tempfile is
deactivated and removed from the list).
This changes the return value of all of the creation
functions. For the cleanup functions (delete and rename),
we'll add one extra bit of safety: instead of taking a
tempfile pointer, we'll take a pointer-to-pointer and set it
to NULL after freeing the object. This makes it safe to
double-call functions like delete_tempfile(), as the second
call treats the NULL input as a noop. Several callsites
follow this pattern.
The resulting patch does have a fair bit of noise, as each
caller needs to be converted to handle:
1. Storing a pointer instead of the struct itself.
2. Passing the pointer instead of taking the struct
address.
3. Handling a "struct tempfile *" return instead of a file
descriptor.
We could play games to make this less noisy. For example, by
defining the tempfile like this:
struct tempfile {
struct heap_allocated_part_of_tempfile {
int fd;
...etc
} *actual_data;
}
Callers would continue to have a "struct tempfile", and it
would be "active" only when the inner pointer was non-NULL.
But that just makes things more awkward in the long run.
There aren't that many callers, so we can simply bite
the bullet and adjust all of them. And the compiler makes it
easy for us to find them all.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Fabian Stelzer
Junio C Hamano
René Scharfe
Jiang Xin
Jeff King
brian m. carlson
Hans Jerry Illikainen
Steven Roberts
Michał Górny
Henning Schild