diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'path.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | path.c | 79 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 33 deletions
@@ -122,39 +122,43 @@ char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...) return cleanup_path(pathname); } - -/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */ -int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template) +char *git_path_submodule(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...) { - const char *tmp; - size_t n; - - tmp = getenv("TMPDIR"); - if (!tmp) - tmp = "/tmp"; - n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template); - if (len <= n) { - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; - } - return mkstemp(path); -} + char *pathname = get_pathname(); + struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; + const char *git_dir; + va_list args; + unsigned len; -/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */ -int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len) -{ - const char *tmp; - size_t n; - - tmp = getenv("TMPDIR"); - if (!tmp) - tmp = "/tmp"; - n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template); - if (len <= n) { - errno = ENAMETOOLONG; - return -1; + len = strlen(path); + if (len > PATH_MAX-100) + return bad_path; + + strbuf_addstr(&buf, path); + if (len && path[len-1] != '/') + strbuf_addch(&buf, '/'); + strbuf_addstr(&buf, ".git"); + + git_dir = read_gitfile_gently(buf.buf); + if (git_dir) { + strbuf_reset(&buf); + strbuf_addstr(&buf, git_dir); } - return mkstemps(path, suffix_len); + strbuf_addch(&buf, '/'); + + if (buf.len >= PATH_MAX) + return bad_path; + memcpy(pathname, buf.buf, buf.len + 1); + + strbuf_release(&buf); + len = strlen(pathname); + + va_start(args, fmt); + len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if (len >= PATH_MAX) + return bad_path; + return cleanup_path(pathname); } int validate_headref(const char *path) @@ -237,6 +241,8 @@ char *expand_user_path(const char *path) size_t username_len = first_slash - username; if (username_len == 0) { const char *home = getenv("HOME"); + if (!home) + goto return_null; strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home)); } else { struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len); @@ -336,7 +342,7 @@ char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict) if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 && validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) { - setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1); + set_git_dir("."); check_repository_format(); return path; } @@ -391,7 +397,7 @@ int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode) return 0; } -const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base) +const char *relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base) { static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1]; int i = 0, j = 0; @@ -610,7 +616,7 @@ int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p) /* * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo() - * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations. + * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization. * * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening @@ -649,3 +655,10 @@ int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p) } } } + +int offset_1st_component(const char *path) +{ + if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path)) + return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]); + return is_dir_sep(path[0]); +} |