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-rw-r--r--path.c666
1 files changed, 666 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/path.c b/path.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6f71d1086
--- /dev/null
+++ b/path.c
@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+/*
+ * I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
+ * file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
+ * interface for paths.
+ *
+ * It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
+ * useful for doing things like
+ *
+ * f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
+ *
+ * which is what it's designed for.
+ */
+#include "cache.h"
+#include "strbuf.h"
+
+static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
+
+static char *get_pathname(void)
+{
+ static char pathname_array[4][PATH_MAX];
+ static int index;
+ return pathname_array[3 & ++index];
+}
+
+static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
+{
+ /* Clean it up */
+ if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
+ path += 2;
+ while (*path == '/')
+ path++;
+ }
+ return path;
+}
+
+char *mksnpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(buf, n, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= n) {
+ strlcpy(buf, bad_path, n);
+ return buf;
+ }
+ return cleanup_path(buf);
+}
+
+static char *git_vsnpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+ const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = strlen(git_dir);
+ if (n < len + 1)
+ goto bad;
+ memcpy(buf, git_dir, len);
+ if (len && !is_dir_sep(git_dir[len-1]))
+ buf[len++] = '/';
+ len += vsnprintf(buf + len, n - len, fmt, args);
+ if (len >= n)
+ goto bad;
+ return cleanup_path(buf);
+bad:
+ strlcpy(buf, bad_path, n);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+char *git_snpath(char *buf, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ (void)git_vsnpath(buf, n, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+char *git_pathdup(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ va_list args;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ (void)git_vsnpath(path, sizeof(path), fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ return xstrdup(path);
+}
+
+char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ return cleanup_path(pathname);
+}
+
+char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ len = strlen(git_dir);
+ if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
+ return bad_path;
+ memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
+ if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
+ pathname[len++] = '/';
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ return cleanup_path(pathname);
+}
+
+char *git_path_submodule(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
+ struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *git_dir;
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ len = strlen(path);
+ if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
+ return bad_path;
+
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, path);
+ if (len && path[len-1] != '/')
+ strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, ".git");
+
+ git_dir = read_gitfile(buf.buf);
+ if (git_dir) {
+ strbuf_reset(&buf);
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, git_dir);
+ }
+ strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+
+ if (buf.len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ memcpy(pathname, buf.buf, buf.len + 1);
+
+ strbuf_release(&buf);
+ len = strlen(pathname);
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ return cleanup_path(pathname);
+}
+
+int validate_headref(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *buf, buffer[256];
+ unsigned char sha1[20];
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
+ if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
+ len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
+ return 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
+ */
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+ len = read_in_full(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ close(fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Is it a symbolic ref?
+ */
+ if (len < 4)
+ return -1;
+ if (!memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4)) {
+ buf = buffer + 4;
+ len -= 4;
+ while (len && isspace(*buf))
+ buf++, len--;
+ if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Is this a detached HEAD?
+ */
+ if (!get_sha1_hex(buffer, sha1))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static struct passwd *getpw_str(const char *username, size_t len)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *username_z = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ memcpy(username_z, username, len);
+ username_z[len] = '\0';
+ pw = getpwnam(username_z);
+ free(username_z);
+ return pw;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a string with ~ and ~user expanded via getpw*. If buf != NULL,
+ * then it is a newly allocated string. Returns NULL on getpw failure or
+ * if path is NULL.
+ */
+char *expand_user_path(const char *path)
+{
+ struct strbuf user_path = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *first_slash = strchrnul(path, '/');
+ const char *to_copy = path;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ goto return_null;
+ if (path[0] == '~') {
+ const char *username = path + 1;
+ size_t username_len = first_slash - username;
+ if (username_len == 0) {
+ const char *home = getenv("HOME");
+ if (!home)
+ goto return_null;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home));
+ } else {
+ struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len);
+ if (!pw)
+ goto return_null;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
+ }
+ to_copy = first_slash;
+ }
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, to_copy, strlen(to_copy));
+ return strbuf_detach(&user_path, NULL);
+return_null:
+ strbuf_release(&user_path);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
+ *
+ * (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
+ * done. Otherwise:
+ * (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
+ * (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
+ * (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
+ * (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
+ *
+ * Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
+ * "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
+ * what we try.
+ *
+ * Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
+ *
+ * Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
+ * Upon failure, we return NULL.
+ *
+ * If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
+ * before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
+ * links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
+ * except DWIM suffixing.
+ */
+const char *enter_repo(const char *path, int strict)
+{
+ static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
+ static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (!path)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!strict) {
+ static const char *suffix[] = {
+ ".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
+ };
+ const char *gitfile;
+ int len = strlen(path);
+ int i;
+ while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/'))
+ len--;
+
+ if (PATH_MAX <= len)
+ return NULL;
+ strncpy(used_path, path, len); used_path[len] = 0 ;
+ strcpy(validated_path, used_path);
+
+ if (used_path[0] == '~') {
+ char *newpath = expand_user_path(used_path);
+ if (!newpath || (PATH_MAX - 10 < strlen(newpath))) {
+ free(newpath);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Copy back into the static buffer. A pity
+ * since newpath was not bounded, but other
+ * branches of the if are limited by PATH_MAX
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ strcpy(used_path, newpath); free(newpath);
+ }
+ else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
+ return NULL;
+ len = strlen(used_path);
+ for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
+ strcpy(used_path + len, suffix[i]);
+ if (!access(used_path, F_OK)) {
+ strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!suffix[i])
+ return NULL;
+ gitfile = read_gitfile(used_path) ;
+ if (gitfile)
+ strcpy(used_path, gitfile);
+ if (chdir(used_path))
+ return NULL;
+ path = validated_path;
+ }
+ else if (chdir(path))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
+ validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
+ set_git_dir(".");
+ check_repository_format();
+ return path;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ int tweak, shared, orig_mode;
+
+ if (!shared_repository) {
+ if (mode)
+ return chmod(path, mode & ~S_IFMT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!mode) {
+ if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ mode = st.st_mode;
+ orig_mode = mode;
+ } else
+ orig_mode = 0;
+ if (shared_repository < 0)
+ shared = -shared_repository;
+ else
+ shared = shared_repository;
+ tweak = shared;
+
+ if (!(mode & S_IWUSR))
+ tweak &= ~0222;
+ if (mode & S_IXUSR)
+ /* Copy read bits to execute bits */
+ tweak |= (tweak & 0444) >> 2;
+ if (shared_repository < 0)
+ mode = (mode & ~0777) | tweak;
+ else
+ mode |= tweak;
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+ /* Copy read bits to execute bits */
+ mode |= (shared & 0444) >> 2;
+ mode |= FORCE_DIR_SET_GID;
+ }
+
+ if (((shared_repository < 0
+ ? (orig_mode & (FORCE_DIR_SET_GID | 0777))
+ : (orig_mode & mode)) != mode) &&
+ chmod(path, (mode & ~S_IFMT)) < 0)
+ return -2;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base)
+{
+ static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
+ int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+ if (!base || !base[0])
+ return abs;
+ while (base[i]) {
+ if (is_dir_sep(base[i])) {
+ if (!is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ return abs;
+ while (is_dir_sep(base[i]))
+ i++;
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ continue;
+ } else if (abs[j] != base[i]) {
+ return abs;
+ }
+ i++;
+ j++;
+ }
+ if (
+ /* "/foo" is a prefix of "/foo" */
+ abs[j] &&
+ /* "/foo" is not a prefix of "/foobar" */
+ !is_dir_sep(base[i-1]) && !is_dir_sep(abs[j])
+ )
+ return abs;
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ if (!abs[j])
+ strcpy(buf, ".");
+ else
+ strcpy(buf, abs + j);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * It is okay if dst == src, but they should not overlap otherwise.
+ *
+ * Performs the following normalizations on src, storing the result in dst:
+ * - Ensures that components are separated by '/' (Windows only)
+ * - Squashes sequences of '/'.
+ * - Removes "." components.
+ * - Removes ".." components, and the components the precede them.
+ * Returns failure (non-zero) if a ".." component appears as first path
+ * component anytime during the normalization. Otherwise, returns success (0).
+ *
+ * Note that this function is purely textual. It does not follow symlinks,
+ * verify the existence of the path, or make any system calls.
+ */
+int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src)
+{
+ char *dst0;
+
+ if (has_dos_drive_prefix(src)) {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ }
+ dst0 = dst;
+
+ if (is_dir_sep(*src)) {
+ *dst++ = '/';
+ while (is_dir_sep(*src))
+ src++;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ char c = *src;
+
+ /*
+ * A path component that begins with . could be
+ * special:
+ * (1) "." and ends -- ignore and terminate.
+ * (2) "./" -- ignore them, eat slash and continue.
+ * (3) ".." and ends -- strip one and terminate.
+ * (4) "../" -- strip one, eat slash and continue.
+ */
+ if (c == '.') {
+ if (!src[1]) {
+ /* (1) */
+ src++;
+ } else if (is_dir_sep(src[1])) {
+ /* (2) */
+ src += 2;
+ while (is_dir_sep(*src))
+ src++;
+ continue;
+ } else if (src[1] == '.') {
+ if (!src[2]) {
+ /* (3) */
+ src += 2;
+ goto up_one;
+ } else if (is_dir_sep(src[2])) {
+ /* (4) */
+ src += 3;
+ while (is_dir_sep(*src))
+ src++;
+ goto up_one;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* copy up to the next '/', and eat all '/' */
+ while ((c = *src++) != '\0' && !is_dir_sep(c))
+ *dst++ = c;
+ if (is_dir_sep(c)) {
+ *dst++ = '/';
+ while (is_dir_sep(c))
+ c = *src++;
+ src--;
+ } else if (!c)
+ break;
+ continue;
+
+ up_one:
+ /*
+ * dst0..dst is prefix portion, and dst[-1] is '/';
+ * go up one level.
+ */
+ dst--; /* go to trailing '/' */
+ if (dst <= dst0)
+ return -1;
+ /* Windows: dst[-1] cannot be backslash anymore */
+ while (dst0 < dst && dst[-1] != '/')
+ dst--;
+ }
+ *dst = '\0';
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * path = Canonical absolute path
+ * prefix_list = Colon-separated list of absolute paths
+ *
+ * Determines, for each path in prefix_list, whether the "prefix" really
+ * is an ancestor directory of path. Returns the length of the longest
+ * ancestor directory, excluding any trailing slashes, or -1 if no prefix
+ * is an ancestor. (Note that this means 0 is returned if prefix_list is
+ * "/".) "/foo" is not considered an ancestor of "/foobar". Directories
+ * are not considered to be their own ancestors. path must be in a
+ * canonical form: empty components, or "." or ".." components are not
+ * allowed. prefix_list may be null, which is like "".
+ */
+int longest_ancestor_length(const char *path, const char *prefix_list)
+{
+ char buf[PATH_MAX+1];
+ const char *ceil, *colon;
+ int len, max_len = -1;
+
+ if (prefix_list == NULL || !strcmp(path, "/"))
+ return -1;
+
+ for (colon = ceil = prefix_list; *colon; ceil = colon+1) {
+ for (colon = ceil; *colon && *colon != PATH_SEP; colon++);
+ len = colon - ceil;
+ if (len == 0 || len > PATH_MAX || !is_absolute_path(ceil))
+ continue;
+ strlcpy(buf, ceil, len+1);
+ if (normalize_path_copy(buf, buf) < 0)
+ continue;
+ len = strlen(buf);
+ if (len > 0 && buf[len-1] == '/')
+ buf[--len] = '\0';
+
+ if (!strncmp(path, buf, len) &&
+ path[len] == '/' &&
+ len > max_len) {
+ max_len = len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return max_len;
+}
+
+/* strip arbitrary amount of directory separators at end of path */
+static inline int chomp_trailing_dir_sep(const char *path, int len)
+{
+ while (len && is_dir_sep(path[len - 1]))
+ len--;
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If path ends with suffix (complete path components), returns the
+ * part before suffix (sans trailing directory separators).
+ * Otherwise returns NULL.
+ */
+char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix)
+{
+ int path_len = strlen(path), suffix_len = strlen(suffix);
+
+ while (suffix_len) {
+ if (!path_len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1])) {
+ if (!is_dir_sep(suffix[suffix_len - 1]))
+ return NULL;
+ path_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len);
+ suffix_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(suffix, suffix_len);
+ }
+ else if (path[--path_len] != suffix[--suffix_len])
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (path_len && !is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1]))
+ return NULL;
+ return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len));
+}
+
+int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
+{
+ int sl, ndot;
+
+ /*
+ * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
+ * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
+ * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization.
+ *
+ * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
+ * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
+ * non-dot character.
+ */
+ if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
+ return -1;
+ sl = 1; ndot = 0;
+ p++;
+
+ while (1) {
+ char ch = *p++;
+ if (sl) {
+ if (ch == '.')
+ ndot++;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ if (ndot < 3)
+ /* reject //, /./ and /../ */
+ return -1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0) {
+ if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
+ /* reject /.$ and /..$ */
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ sl = ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ sl = 1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int offset_1st_component(const char *path)
+{
+ if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
+ return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]);
+ return is_dir_sep(path[0]);
+}