diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/coccinelle/xstrdup_or_null.cocci | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/credential/libsecret/Makefile | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/credential/libsecret/git-credential-libsecret.c | 370 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | contrib/long-running-filter/example.pl | 128 |
4 files changed, 530 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/coccinelle/xstrdup_or_null.cocci b/contrib/coccinelle/xstrdup_or_null.cocci new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3fceef132b --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/coccinelle/xstrdup_or_null.cocci @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +@@ +expression E; +expression V; +@@ +- if (E) +- V = xstrdup(E); ++ V = xstrdup_or_null(E); diff --git a/contrib/credential/libsecret/Makefile b/contrib/credential/libsecret/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3e67552cc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/credential/libsecret/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +MAIN:=git-credential-libsecret +all:: $(MAIN) + +CC = gcc +RM = rm -f +CFLAGS = -g -O2 -Wall +PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config + +-include ../../../config.mak.autogen +-include ../../../config.mak + +INCS:=$(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags libsecret-1 glib-2.0) +LIBS:=$(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libsecret-1 glib-2.0) + +SRCS:=$(MAIN).c +OBJS:=$(SRCS:.c=.o) + +%.o: %.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(INCS) -o $@ -c $< + +$(MAIN): $(OBJS) + $(CC) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) + +clean: + @$(RM) $(MAIN) $(OBJS) diff --git a/contrib/credential/libsecret/git-credential-libsecret.c b/contrib/credential/libsecret/git-credential-libsecret.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4c56979d8a --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/credential/libsecret/git-credential-libsecret.c @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 John Szakmeister <john@szakmeister.net> + * 2012 Philipp A. Hartmann <pah@qo.cx> + * 2016 Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +/* + * Credits: + * - GNOME Keyring API handling originally written by John Szakmeister + * - ported to credential helper API by Philipp A. Hartmann + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <glib.h> +#include <libsecret/secret.h> + +/* + * This credential struct and API is simplified from git's credential.{h,c} + */ +struct credential { + char *protocol; + char *host; + unsigned short port; + char *path; + char *username; + char *password; +}; + +#define CREDENTIAL_INIT { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL } + +typedef int (*credential_op_cb)(struct credential *); + +struct credential_operation { + char *name; + credential_op_cb op; +}; + +#define CREDENTIAL_OP_END { NULL, NULL } + +/* ----------------- Secret Service functions ----------------- */ + +static char *make_label(struct credential *c) +{ + if (c->port) + return g_strdup_printf("Git: %s://%s:%hu/%s", + c->protocol, c->host, c->port, c->path ? c->path : ""); + else + return g_strdup_printf("Git: %s://%s/%s", + c->protocol, c->host, c->path ? c->path : ""); +} + +static GHashTable *make_attr_list(struct credential *c) +{ + GHashTable *al = g_hash_table_new_full(g_str_hash, g_str_equal, NULL, g_free); + + if (c->username) + g_hash_table_insert(al, "user", g_strdup(c->username)); + if (c->protocol) + g_hash_table_insert(al, "protocol", g_strdup(c->protocol)); + if (c->host) + g_hash_table_insert(al, "server", g_strdup(c->host)); + if (c->port) + g_hash_table_insert(al, "port", g_strdup_printf("%hu", c->port)); + if (c->path) + g_hash_table_insert(al, "object", g_strdup(c->path)); + + return al; +} + +static int keyring_get(struct credential *c) +{ + SecretService *service = NULL; + GHashTable *attributes = NULL; + GError *error = NULL; + GList *items = NULL; + + if (!c->protocol || !(c->host || c->path)) + return EXIT_FAILURE; + + service = secret_service_get_sync(0, NULL, &error); + if (error != NULL) { + g_critical("could not connect to Secret Service: %s", error->message); + g_error_free(error); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + attributes = make_attr_list(c); + items = secret_service_search_sync(service, + SECRET_SCHEMA_COMPAT_NETWORK, + attributes, + SECRET_SEARCH_LOAD_SECRETS, + NULL, + &error); + g_hash_table_unref(attributes); + if (error != NULL) { + g_critical("lookup failed: %s", error->message); + g_error_free(error); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (items != NULL) { + SecretItem *item; + SecretValue *secret; + const char *s; + + item = items->data; + secret = secret_item_get_secret(item); + attributes = secret_item_get_attributes(item); + + s = g_hash_table_lookup(attributes, "user"); + if (s) { + g_free(c->username); + c->username = g_strdup(s); + } + + s = secret_value_get_text(secret); + if (s) { + g_free(c->password); + c->password = g_strdup(s); + } + + g_hash_table_unref(attributes); + secret_value_unref(secret); + g_list_free_full(items, g_object_unref); + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} + + +static int keyring_store(struct credential *c) +{ + char *label = NULL; + GHashTable *attributes = NULL; + GError *error = NULL; + + /* + * Sanity check that what we are storing is actually sensible. + * In particular, we can't make a URL without a protocol field. + * Without either a host or pathname (depending on the scheme), + * we have no primary key. And without a username and password, + * we are not actually storing a credential. + */ + if (!c->protocol || !(c->host || c->path) || + !c->username || !c->password) + return EXIT_FAILURE; + + label = make_label(c); + attributes = make_attr_list(c); + secret_password_storev_sync(SECRET_SCHEMA_COMPAT_NETWORK, + attributes, + NULL, + label, + c->password, + NULL, + &error); + g_free(label); + g_hash_table_unref(attributes); + + if (error != NULL) { + g_critical("store failed: %s", error->message); + g_error_free(error); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} + +static int keyring_erase(struct credential *c) +{ + GHashTable *attributes = NULL; + GError *error = NULL; + + /* + * Sanity check that we actually have something to match + * against. The input we get is a restrictive pattern, + * so technically a blank credential means "erase everything". + * But it is too easy to accidentally send this, since it is equivalent + * to empty input. So explicitly disallow it, and require that the + * pattern have some actual content to match. + */ + if (!c->protocol && !c->host && !c->path && !c->username) + return EXIT_FAILURE; + + attributes = make_attr_list(c); + secret_password_clearv_sync(SECRET_SCHEMA_COMPAT_NETWORK, + attributes, + NULL, + &error); + g_hash_table_unref(attributes); + + if (error != NULL) { + g_critical("erase failed: %s", error->message); + g_error_free(error); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Table with helper operation callbacks, used by generic + * credential helper main function. + */ +static struct credential_operation const credential_helper_ops[] = { + { "get", keyring_get }, + { "store", keyring_store }, + { "erase", keyring_erase }, + CREDENTIAL_OP_END +}; + +/* ------------------ credential functions ------------------ */ + +static void credential_init(struct credential *c) +{ + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); +} + +static void credential_clear(struct credential *c) +{ + g_free(c->protocol); + g_free(c->host); + g_free(c->path); + g_free(c->username); + g_free(c->password); + + credential_init(c); +} + +static int credential_read(struct credential *c) +{ + char *buf; + size_t line_len; + char *key; + char *value; + + key = buf = g_malloc(1024); + + while (fgets(buf, 1024, stdin)) { + line_len = strlen(buf); + + if (line_len && buf[line_len-1] == '\n') + buf[--line_len] = '\0'; + + if (!line_len) + break; + + value = strchr(buf, '='); + if (!value) { + g_warning("invalid credential line: %s", key); + g_free(buf); + return -1; + } + *value++ = '\0'; + + if (!strcmp(key, "protocol")) { + g_free(c->protocol); + c->protocol = g_strdup(value); + } else if (!strcmp(key, "host")) { + g_free(c->host); + c->host = g_strdup(value); + value = strrchr(c->host, ':'); + if (value) { + *value++ = '\0'; + c->port = atoi(value); + } + } else if (!strcmp(key, "path")) { + g_free(c->path); + c->path = g_strdup(value); + } else if (!strcmp(key, "username")) { + g_free(c->username); + c->username = g_strdup(value); + } else if (!strcmp(key, "password")) { + g_free(c->password); + c->password = g_strdup(value); + while (*value) + *value++ = '\0'; + } + /* + * Ignore other lines; we don't know what they mean, but + * this future-proofs us when later versions of git do + * learn new lines, and the helpers are updated to match. + */ + } + + g_free(buf); + + return 0; +} + +static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value) +{ + if (!value) + return; + fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value); +} + +static void credential_write(const struct credential *c) +{ + /* only write username/password, if set */ + credential_write_item(stdout, "username", c->username); + credential_write_item(stdout, "password", c->password); +} + +static void usage(const char *name) +{ + struct credential_operation const *try_op = credential_helper_ops; + const char *basename = strrchr(name, '/'); + + basename = (basename) ? basename + 1 : name; + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <", basename); + while (try_op->name) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s", (try_op++)->name); + if (try_op->name) + fprintf(stderr, "%s", "|"); + } + fprintf(stderr, "%s", ">\n"); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + + struct credential_operation const *try_op = credential_helper_ops; + struct credential cred = CREDENTIAL_INIT; + + if (!argv[1]) { + usage(argv[0]); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + + g_set_application_name("Git Credential Helper"); + + /* lookup operation callback */ + while (try_op->name && strcmp(argv[1], try_op->name)) + try_op++; + + /* unsupported operation given -- ignore silently */ + if (!try_op->name || !try_op->op) + goto out; + + ret = credential_read(&cred); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* perform credential operation */ + ret = (*try_op->op)(&cred); + + credential_write(&cred); + +out: + credential_clear(&cred); + return ret; +} diff --git a/contrib/long-running-filter/example.pl b/contrib/long-running-filter/example.pl new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..39457055a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/long-running-filter/example.pl @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl +# +# Example implementation for the Git filter protocol version 2 +# See Documentation/gitattributes.txt, section "Filter Protocol" +# +# Please note, this pass-thru filter is a minimal skeleton. No proper +# error handling was implemented. +# + +use strict; +use warnings; + +my $MAX_PACKET_CONTENT_SIZE = 65516; + +sub packet_bin_read { + my $buffer; + my $bytes_read = read STDIN, $buffer, 4; + if ( $bytes_read == 0 ) { + + # EOF - Git stopped talking to us! + exit(); + } + elsif ( $bytes_read != 4 ) { + die "invalid packet: '$buffer'"; + } + my $pkt_size = hex($buffer); + if ( $pkt_size == 0 ) { + return ( 1, "" ); + } + elsif ( $pkt_size > 4 ) { + my $content_size = $pkt_size - 4; + $bytes_read = read STDIN, $buffer, $content_size; + if ( $bytes_read != $content_size ) { + die "invalid packet ($content_size bytes expected; $bytes_read bytes read)"; + } + return ( 0, $buffer ); + } + else { + die "invalid packet size: $pkt_size"; + } +} + +sub packet_txt_read { + my ( $res, $buf ) = packet_bin_read(); + unless ( $buf =~ s/\n$// ) { + die "A non-binary line MUST be terminated by an LF."; + } + return ( $res, $buf ); +} + +sub packet_bin_write { + my $buf = shift; + print STDOUT sprintf( "%04x", length($buf) + 4 ); + print STDOUT $buf; + STDOUT->flush(); +} + +sub packet_txt_write { + packet_bin_write( $_[0] . "\n" ); +} + +sub packet_flush { + print STDOUT sprintf( "%04x", 0 ); + STDOUT->flush(); +} + +( packet_txt_read() eq ( 0, "git-filter-client" ) ) || die "bad initialize"; +( packet_txt_read() eq ( 0, "version=2" ) ) || die "bad version"; +( packet_bin_read() eq ( 1, "" ) ) || die "bad version end"; + +packet_txt_write("git-filter-server"); +packet_txt_write("version=2"); +packet_flush(); + +( packet_txt_read() eq ( 0, "capability=clean" ) ) || die "bad capability"; +( packet_txt_read() eq ( 0, "capability=smudge" ) ) || die "bad capability"; +( packet_bin_read() eq ( 1, "" ) ) || die "bad capability end"; + +packet_txt_write("capability=clean"); +packet_txt_write("capability=smudge"); +packet_flush(); + +while (1) { + my ($command) = packet_txt_read() =~ /^command=([^=]+)$/; + my ($pathname) = packet_txt_read() =~ /^pathname=([^=]+)$/; + + packet_bin_read(); + + my $input = ""; + { + binmode(STDIN); + my $buffer; + my $done = 0; + while ( !$done ) { + ( $done, $buffer ) = packet_bin_read(); + $input .= $buffer; + } + } + + my $output; + if ( $command eq "clean" ) { + ### Perform clean here ### + $output = $input; + } + elsif ( $command eq "smudge" ) { + ### Perform smudge here ### + $output = $input; + } + else { + die "bad command '$command'"; + } + + packet_txt_write("status=success"); + packet_flush(); + while ( length($output) > 0 ) { + my $packet = substr( $output, 0, $MAX_PACKET_CONTENT_SIZE ); + packet_bin_write($packet); + if ( length($output) > $MAX_PACKET_CONTENT_SIZE ) { + $output = substr( $output, $MAX_PACKET_CONTENT_SIZE ); + } + else { + $output = ""; + } + } + packet_flush(); # flush content! + packet_flush(); # empty list, keep "status=success" unchanged! + +} |