diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'compat')
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/linux/procinfo.c | 176 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/mmap.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c | 179 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/stub/procinfo.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/terminal.c | 75 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/terminal.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/vcbuild/README | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | compat/win32/lazyload.h | 14 |
10 files changed, 438 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/compat/linux/procinfo.c b/compat/linux/procinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc2f9382a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/compat/linux/procinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +#include "cache.h" + +#include "strbuf.h" +#include "strvec.h" +#include "trace2.h" + +/* + * We need more complex parsing in stat_parent_pid() and + * parse_proc_stat() below than a dumb fscanf(). That's because while + * the statcomm field is surrounded by parentheses, the process itself + * is free to insert any arbitrary byte sequence its its name. That + * can include newlines, spaces, closing parentheses etc. + * + * See do_task_stat() in fs/proc/array.c in linux.git, this is in + * contrast with the escaped version of the name found in + * /proc/%d/status. + * + * So instead of using fscanf() we'll read N bytes from it, look for + * the first "(", and then the last ")", anything in-between is our + * process name. + * + * How much N do we need? On Linux /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max is 2^15 by + * default, but it can be raised set to values of up to 2^22. So + * that's 7 digits for a PID. We have 2 PIDs in the first four fields + * we're interested in, so 2 * 7 = 14. + * + * We then have 3 spaces between those four values, and we'd like to + * get to the space between the 4th and the 5th (the "pgrp" field) to + * make sure we read the entire "ppid" field. So that brings us up to + * 14 + 3 + 1 = 18. Add the two parentheses around the "comm" value + * and it's 20. The "state" value itself is then one character (now at + * 21). + * + * Finally the maximum length of the "comm" name itself is 15 + * characters, e.g. a setting of "123456789abcdefg" will be truncated + * to "123456789abcdef". See PR_SET_NAME in prctl(2). So all in all + * we'd need to read 21 + 15 = 36 bytes. + * + * Let's just read 2^6 (64) instead for good measure. If PID_MAX ever + * grows past 2^22 we'll be future-proof. We'll then anchor at the + * last ")" we find to locate the parent PID. + */ +#define STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N 64 + +static int parse_proc_stat(struct strbuf *sb, struct strbuf *name, + int *statppid) +{ + const char *comm_lhs = strchr(sb->buf, '('); + const char *comm_rhs = strrchr(sb->buf, ')'); + const char *ppid_lhs, *ppid_rhs; + char *p; + pid_t ppid; + + if (!comm_lhs || !comm_rhs) + goto bad_kernel; + + /* + * We're at the ")", that's followed by " X ", where X is a + * single "state" character. So advance by 4 bytes. + */ + ppid_lhs = comm_rhs + 4; + + /* + * Read until the space between the "ppid" and "pgrp" fields + * to make sure we're anchored after the untruncated "ppid" + * field.. + */ + ppid_rhs = strchr(ppid_lhs, ' '); + if (!ppid_rhs) + goto bad_kernel; + + ppid = strtol(ppid_lhs, &p, 10); + if (ppid_rhs == p) { + const char *comm = comm_lhs + 1; + size_t commlen = comm_rhs - comm; + + strbuf_add(name, comm, commlen); + *statppid = ppid; + + return 0; + } + +bad_kernel: + /* + * We were able to read our STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N bytes from + * /proc/%d/stat, but the content is bad. Broken kernel? + * Should not happen, but handle it gracefully. + */ + return -1; +} + +static int stat_parent_pid(pid_t pid, struct strbuf *name, int *statppid) +{ + struct strbuf procfs_path = STRBUF_INIT; + struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT; + FILE *fp; + int ret = -1; + + /* try to use procfs if it's present. */ + strbuf_addf(&procfs_path, "/proc/%d/stat", pid); + fp = fopen(procfs_path.buf, "r"); + if (!fp) + goto cleanup; + + /* + * We could be more strict here and assert that we read at + * least STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N. My reading of procfs(5) is + * that on any modern kernel (at least since 2.6.0 released in + * 2003) even if all the mandatory numeric fields were zero'd + * out we'd get at least 100 bytes, but let's just check that + * we got anything at all and trust the parse_proc_stat() + * function to handle its "Bad Kernel?" error checking. + */ + if (!strbuf_fread(&sb, STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N, fp)) + goto cleanup; + if (parse_proc_stat(&sb, name, statppid) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + if (fp) + fclose(fp); + strbuf_release(&procfs_path); + strbuf_release(&sb); + + return ret; +} + +static void push_ancestry_name(struct strvec *names, pid_t pid) +{ + struct strbuf name = STRBUF_INIT; + int ppid; + + if (stat_parent_pid(pid, &name, &ppid) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + strvec_push(names, name.buf); + + /* + * Both errors and reaching the end of the process chain are + * reported as fields of 0 by proc(5) + */ + if (ppid) + push_ancestry_name(names, ppid); +cleanup: + strbuf_release(&name); + + return; +} + +void trace2_collect_process_info(enum trace2_process_info_reason reason) +{ + struct strvec names = STRVEC_INIT; + + if (!trace2_is_enabled()) + return; + + switch (reason) { + case TRACE2_PROCESS_INFO_EXIT: + /* + * The Windows version of this calls its + * get_peak_memory_info() here. We may want to insert + * similar process-end statistics here in the future. + */ + break; + case TRACE2_PROCESS_INFO_STARTUP: + push_ancestry_name(&names, getppid()); + + if (names.nr) + trace2_cmd_ancestry(names.v); + strvec_clear(&names); + break; + } + + return; +} diff --git a/compat/mmap.c b/compat/mmap.c index 14d31010df..8d6c02d4bc 100644 --- a/compat/mmap.c +++ b/compat/mmap.c @@ -7,7 +7,12 @@ void *git_mmap(void *start, size_t length, int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t of if (start != NULL || flags != MAP_PRIVATE || prot != PROT_READ) die("Invalid usage of mmap when built with NO_MMAP"); - start = xmalloc(length); + if (length == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return MAP_FAILED; + } + + start = malloc(length); if (start == NULL) { errno = ENOMEM; return MAP_FAILED; diff --git a/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c b/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c index 1cc31c3502..edb438a777 100644 --- a/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c +++ b/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c @@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static void threadcache_free(nedpool *p, threadcache *tc, int mymspace, void *me assert(idx<=THREADCACHEMAXBINS); if(tck==*binsptr) { - fprintf(stderr, "Attempt to free already freed memory block %p - aborting!\n", tck); + fprintf(stderr, "Attempt to free already freed memory block %p - aborting!\n", (void *)tck); abort(); } #ifdef FULLSANITYCHECKS diff --git a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c index 1927e6ef4b..4e28857a0a 100644 --- a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c +++ b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ void ipc_client_close_connection(struct ipc_client_connection *connection) int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection( struct ipc_client_connection *connection, - const char *message, struct strbuf *answer) + const char *message, size_t message_len, + struct strbuf *answer) { int ret = 0; @@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection( trace2_region_enter("ipc-client", "send-command", NULL); - if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, strlen(message), + if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, message_len, connection->fd) < 0 || packet_flush_gently(connection->fd) < 0) { ret = error(_("could not send IPC command")); @@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ done: int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path, const struct ipc_client_connect_options *options, - const char *message, struct strbuf *answer) + const char *message, size_t message_len, + struct strbuf *answer) { int ret = -1; enum ipc_active_state state; @@ -208,7 +210,9 @@ int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path, if (state != IPC_STATE__LISTENING) return ret; - ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, message, answer); + ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, + message, message_len, + answer); ipc_client_close_connection(connection); @@ -503,7 +507,7 @@ static int worker_thread__do_io( if (ret >= 0) { ret = worker_thread_data->server_data->application_cb( worker_thread_data->server_data->application_data, - buf.buf, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data); + buf.buf, buf.len, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data); packet_flush_gently(reply_data.fd); } diff --git a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c index 8dc7bda087..20ea7b65e0 100644 --- a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c +++ b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ #include "strbuf.h" #include "pkt-line.h" #include "thread-utils.h" +#include "accctrl.h" +#include "aclapi.h" #ifndef SUPPORTS_SIMPLE_IPC /* @@ -49,6 +51,9 @@ static enum ipc_active_state get_active_state(wchar_t *pipe_path) if (GetLastError() == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) return IPC_STATE__PATH_NOT_FOUND; + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "getstate/waitpipe/gle", + (intmax_t)GetLastError()); + return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR; } @@ -109,9 +114,15 @@ static enum ipc_active_state connect_to_server( t_start_ms = (DWORD)(getnanotime() / 1000000); if (!WaitNamedPipeW(wpath, timeout_ms)) { - if (GetLastError() == ERROR_SEM_TIMEOUT) + DWORD gleWait = GetLastError(); + + if (gleWait == ERROR_SEM_TIMEOUT) return IPC_STATE__NOT_LISTENING; + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, + "connect/waitpipe/gle", + (intmax_t)gleWait); + return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR; } @@ -133,17 +144,31 @@ static enum ipc_active_state connect_to_server( break; /* try again */ default: + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, + "connect/createfile/gle", + (intmax_t)gle); + return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR; } } if (!SetNamedPipeHandleState(hPipe, &mode, NULL, NULL)) { + gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, + "connect/setpipestate/gle", + (intmax_t)gle); + CloseHandle(hPipe); return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR; } *pfd = _open_osfhandle((intptr_t)hPipe, O_RDWR|O_BINARY); if (*pfd < 0) { + gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, + "connect/openosfhandle/gle", + (intmax_t)gle); + CloseHandle(hPipe); return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR; } @@ -208,7 +233,8 @@ void ipc_client_close_connection(struct ipc_client_connection *connection) int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection( struct ipc_client_connection *connection, - const char *message, struct strbuf *answer) + const char *message, size_t message_len, + struct strbuf *answer) { int ret = 0; @@ -216,7 +242,7 @@ int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection( trace2_region_enter("ipc-client", "send-command", NULL); - if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, strlen(message), + if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, message_len, connection->fd) < 0 || packet_flush_gently(connection->fd) < 0) { ret = error(_("could not send IPC command")); @@ -239,7 +265,8 @@ done: int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path, const struct ipc_client_connect_options *options, - const char *message, struct strbuf *response) + const char *message, size_t message_len, + struct strbuf *response) { int ret = -1; enum ipc_active_state state; @@ -250,7 +277,9 @@ int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path, if (state != IPC_STATE__LISTENING) return ret; - ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, message, response); + ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, + message, message_len, + response); ipc_client_close_connection(connection); @@ -458,7 +487,7 @@ static int do_io(struct ipc_server_thread_data *server_thread_data) if (ret >= 0) { ret = server_thread_data->server_data->application_cb( server_thread_data->server_data->application_data, - buf.buf, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data); + buf.buf, buf.len, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data); packet_flush_gently(reply_data.fd); @@ -565,11 +594,132 @@ finished: return NULL; } +/* + * We need to build a Windows "SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES" object and use it + * to apply an ACL when we create the initial instance of the Named + * Pipe. The construction is somewhat involved and consists of + * several sequential steps and intermediate objects. + * + * We use this structure to hold these intermediate pointers so that + * we can free them as a group. (It is unclear from the docs whether + * some of these intermediate pointers can be freed before we are + * finished using the "lpSA" member.) + */ +struct my_sa_data +{ + PSID pEveryoneSID; + PACL pACL; + PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD; + LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpSA; +}; + +static void init_sa(struct my_sa_data *d) +{ + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); +} + +static void release_sa(struct my_sa_data *d) +{ + if (d->pEveryoneSID) + FreeSid(d->pEveryoneSID); + if (d->pACL) + LocalFree(d->pACL); + if (d->pSD) + LocalFree(d->pSD); + if (d->lpSA) + LocalFree(d->lpSA); + + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); +} + +/* + * Create SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES to apply to the initial named pipe. The + * creator of the first server instance gets to set the ACLs on it. + * + * We allow the well-known group `EVERYONE` to have read+write access + * to the named pipe so that clients can send queries to the daemon + * and receive the response. + * + * Normally, this is not necessary since the daemon is usually + * automatically started by a foreground command like `git status`, + * but in those cases where an elevated Git command started the daemon + * (such that the daemon itself runs with elevation), we need to add + * the ACL so that non-elevated commands can write to it. + * + * The following document was helpful: + * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/creating-a-security-descriptor-for-a-new-object-in-c-- + * + * Returns d->lpSA set to a SA or NULL. + */ +static LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES get_sa(struct my_sa_data *d) +{ + SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sid_auth_world = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY; +#define NR_EA (1) + EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[NR_EA]; + DWORD dwResult; + + if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sid_auth_world, 1, + SECURITY_WORLD_RID, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0, + &d->pEveryoneSID)) { + DWORD gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "alloc-world-sid/gle", + (intmax_t)gle); + goto fail; + } + + memset(ea, 0, NR_EA * sizeof(EXPLICIT_ACCESS)); + + ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE; + ea[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS; + ea[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE; + ea[0].Trustee.MultipleTrusteeOperation = NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE; + ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID; + ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP; + ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)d->pEveryoneSID; + + dwResult = SetEntriesInAcl(NR_EA, ea, NULL, &d->pACL); + if (dwResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) { + DWORD gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-acl-entry/gle", + (intmax_t)gle); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-acl-entry/dw", + (intmax_t)dwResult); + goto fail; + } + + d->pSD = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)LocalAlloc( + LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH); + if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(d->pSD, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) { + DWORD gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "init-sd/gle", (intmax_t)gle); + goto fail; + } + + if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(d->pSD, TRUE, d->pACL, FALSE)) { + DWORD gle = GetLastError(); + trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-sd-dacl/gle", (intmax_t)gle); + goto fail; + } + + d->lpSA = (LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)LocalAlloc(LPTR, sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)); + d->lpSA->nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES); + d->lpSA->lpSecurityDescriptor = d->pSD; + d->lpSA->bInheritHandle = FALSE; + + return d->lpSA; + +fail: + release_sa(d); + return NULL; +} + static HANDLE create_new_pipe(wchar_t *wpath, int is_first) { HANDLE hPipe; DWORD dwOpenMode, dwPipeMode; - LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpsa = NULL; + struct my_sa_data my_sa_data; + + init_sa(&my_sa_data); dwOpenMode = PIPE_ACCESS_INBOUND | PIPE_ACCESS_OUTBOUND | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED; @@ -585,20 +735,15 @@ static HANDLE create_new_pipe(wchar_t *wpath, int is_first) * set the ACL / Security Attributes on the named * pipe; subsequent instances inherit and cannot * change them. - * - * TODO Should we allow the application layer to - * specify security attributes, such as `LocalService` - * or `LocalSystem`, when we create the named pipe? - * This question is probably not important when the - * daemon is started by a foreground user process and - * only needs to talk to the current user, but may be - * if the daemon is run via the Control Panel as a - * System Service. */ + get_sa(&my_sa_data); } hPipe = CreateNamedPipeW(wpath, dwOpenMode, dwPipeMode, - PIPE_UNLIMITED_INSTANCES, 1024, 1024, 0, lpsa); + PIPE_UNLIMITED_INSTANCES, 1024, 1024, 0, + my_sa_data.lpSA); + + release_sa(&my_sa_data); return hPipe; } diff --git a/compat/stub/procinfo.c b/compat/stub/procinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12c0a23c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/compat/stub/procinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#include "git-compat-util.h" + +#include "trace2.h" + +/* + * Stub. See sample implementations in compat/linux/procinfo.c and + * compat/win32/trace2_win32_process_info.c. + */ +void trace2_collect_process_info(enum trace2_process_info_reason reason) +{ +} diff --git a/compat/terminal.c b/compat/terminal.c index 43b73ddc75..5b903e7c7e 100644 --- a/compat/terminal.c +++ b/compat/terminal.c @@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ #if defined(HAVE_DEV_TTY) || defined(GIT_WINDOWS_NATIVE) -static void restore_term(void); - static void restore_term_on_signal(int sig) { restore_term(); @@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ static void restore_term_on_signal(int sig) static int term_fd = -1; static struct termios old_term; -static void restore_term(void) +void restore_term(void) { if (term_fd < 0) return; @@ -35,15 +33,22 @@ static void restore_term(void) term_fd = -1; } +int save_term(int full_duplex) +{ + if (term_fd < 0) + term_fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); + + return (term_fd < 0) ? -1 : tcgetattr(term_fd, &old_term); +} + static int disable_bits(tcflag_t bits) { struct termios t; - term_fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); - if (tcgetattr(term_fd, &t) < 0) + if (save_term(0) < 0) goto error; - old_term = t; + t = old_term; sigchain_push_common(restore_term_on_signal); t.c_lflag &= ~bits; @@ -75,9 +80,10 @@ static int enable_non_canonical(void) static int use_stty = 1; static struct string_list stty_restore = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP; static HANDLE hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; -static DWORD cmode; +static HANDLE hconout = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; +static DWORD cmode_in, cmode_out; -static void restore_term(void) +void restore_term(void) { if (use_stty) { int i; @@ -97,9 +103,42 @@ static void restore_term(void) if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return; - SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode); + SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode_in); + CloseHandle(hconin); + if (cmode_out) { + assert(hconout != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); + SetConsoleMode(hconout, cmode_out); + CloseHandle(hconout); + } + + hconin = hconout = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; +} + +int save_term(int full_duplex) +{ + hconin = CreateFileA("CONIN$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, + FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); + if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + return -1; + + if (full_duplex) { + hconout = CreateFileA("CONOUT$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, + FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, + FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); + if (hconout == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + goto error; + + GetConsoleMode(hconout, &cmode_out); + } + + GetConsoleMode(hconin, &cmode_in); + use_stty = 0; + return 0; +error: CloseHandle(hconin); hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + return -1; } static int disable_bits(DWORD bits) @@ -135,15 +174,11 @@ static int disable_bits(DWORD bits) use_stty = 0; } - hconin = CreateFile("CONIN$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, - FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, - FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL); - if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + if (save_term(0) < 0) return -1; - GetConsoleMode(hconin, &cmode); sigchain_push_common(restore_term_on_signal); - if (!SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode & ~bits)) { + if (!SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode_in & ~bits)) { CloseHandle(hconin); hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; return -1; @@ -361,6 +396,16 @@ int read_key_without_echo(struct strbuf *buf) #else +int save_term(int full_duplex) +{ + /* full_duplex == 1, but no support available */ + return -full_duplex; +} + +void restore_term(void) +{ +} + char *git_terminal_prompt(const char *prompt, int echo) { return getpass(prompt); diff --git a/compat/terminal.h b/compat/terminal.h index a9d52b8464..e1770c575b 100644 --- a/compat/terminal.h +++ b/compat/terminal.h @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ #ifndef COMPAT_TERMINAL_H #define COMPAT_TERMINAL_H +int save_term(int full_duplex); +void restore_term(void); + char *git_terminal_prompt(const char *prompt, int echo); /* Read a single keystroke, without echoing it to the terminal */ diff --git a/compat/vcbuild/README b/compat/vcbuild/README index 51fb083dbb..29ec1d0f10 100644 --- a/compat/vcbuild/README +++ b/compat/vcbuild/README @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ The Steps of Build Git with VS2008 the git operations. 3. Inside Git's directory run the command: - make command-list.h config-list.h + make generated-hdrs to generate the header file needed to compile git. 4. Then either build Git with the GNU Make Makefile in the Git projects diff --git a/compat/win32/lazyload.h b/compat/win32/lazyload.h index 9e631c8593..2b3637135f 100644 --- a/compat/win32/lazyload.h +++ b/compat/win32/lazyload.h @@ -15,10 +15,12 @@ * source, target); */ +typedef void (*FARVOIDPROC)(void); + struct proc_addr { const char *const dll; const char *const function; - FARPROC pfunction; + FARVOIDPROC pfunction; unsigned initialized : 1; }; @@ -26,7 +28,8 @@ struct proc_addr { #define DECLARE_PROC_ADDR(dll, rettype, function, ...) \ static struct proc_addr proc_addr_##function = \ { #dll, #function, NULL, 0 }; \ - static rettype (WINAPI *function)(__VA_ARGS__) + typedef rettype (WINAPI *proc_type_##function)(__VA_ARGS__); \ + static proc_type_##function function /* * Loads a function from a DLL (once-only). @@ -35,9 +38,9 @@ struct proc_addr { * This function is not thread-safe. */ #define INIT_PROC_ADDR(function) \ - (function = get_proc_addr(&proc_addr_##function)) + (function = (proc_type_##function)get_proc_addr(&proc_addr_##function)) -static inline void *get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc) +static inline FARVOIDPROC get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc) { /* only do this once */ if (!proc->initialized) { @@ -46,7 +49,8 @@ static inline void *get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc) hnd = LoadLibraryExA(proc->dll, NULL, LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32); if (hnd) - proc->pfunction = GetProcAddress(hnd, proc->function); + proc->pfunction = (FARVOIDPROC)GetProcAddress(hnd, + proc->function); } /* set ENOSYS if DLL or function was not found */ if (!proc->pfunction) |