summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/compat
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'compat')
-rw-r--r--compat/linux/procinfo.c176
-rw-r--r--compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c2
-rw-r--r--compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c36
-rw-r--r--compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c179
-rw-r--r--compat/stub/procinfo.c11
-rw-r--r--compat/terminal.c75
-rw-r--r--compat/terminal.h3
-rw-r--r--compat/unsetenv.c4
-rw-r--r--compat/vcbuild/README2
-rw-r--r--compat/win32/lazyload.h14
10 files changed, 457 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/compat/linux/procinfo.c b/compat/linux/procinfo.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc2f9382a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compat/linux/procinfo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+#include "cache.h"
+
+#include "strbuf.h"
+#include "strvec.h"
+#include "trace2.h"
+
+/*
+ * We need more complex parsing in stat_parent_pid() and
+ * parse_proc_stat() below than a dumb fscanf(). That's because while
+ * the statcomm field is surrounded by parentheses, the process itself
+ * is free to insert any arbitrary byte sequence its its name. That
+ * can include newlines, spaces, closing parentheses etc.
+ *
+ * See do_task_stat() in fs/proc/array.c in linux.git, this is in
+ * contrast with the escaped version of the name found in
+ * /proc/%d/status.
+ *
+ * So instead of using fscanf() we'll read N bytes from it, look for
+ * the first "(", and then the last ")", anything in-between is our
+ * process name.
+ *
+ * How much N do we need? On Linux /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max is 2^15 by
+ * default, but it can be raised set to values of up to 2^22. So
+ * that's 7 digits for a PID. We have 2 PIDs in the first four fields
+ * we're interested in, so 2 * 7 = 14.
+ *
+ * We then have 3 spaces between those four values, and we'd like to
+ * get to the space between the 4th and the 5th (the "pgrp" field) to
+ * make sure we read the entire "ppid" field. So that brings us up to
+ * 14 + 3 + 1 = 18. Add the two parentheses around the "comm" value
+ * and it's 20. The "state" value itself is then one character (now at
+ * 21).
+ *
+ * Finally the maximum length of the "comm" name itself is 15
+ * characters, e.g. a setting of "123456789abcdefg" will be truncated
+ * to "123456789abcdef". See PR_SET_NAME in prctl(2). So all in all
+ * we'd need to read 21 + 15 = 36 bytes.
+ *
+ * Let's just read 2^6 (64) instead for good measure. If PID_MAX ever
+ * grows past 2^22 we'll be future-proof. We'll then anchor at the
+ * last ")" we find to locate the parent PID.
+ */
+#define STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N 64
+
+static int parse_proc_stat(struct strbuf *sb, struct strbuf *name,
+ int *statppid)
+{
+ const char *comm_lhs = strchr(sb->buf, '(');
+ const char *comm_rhs = strrchr(sb->buf, ')');
+ const char *ppid_lhs, *ppid_rhs;
+ char *p;
+ pid_t ppid;
+
+ if (!comm_lhs || !comm_rhs)
+ goto bad_kernel;
+
+ /*
+ * We're at the ")", that's followed by " X ", where X is a
+ * single "state" character. So advance by 4 bytes.
+ */
+ ppid_lhs = comm_rhs + 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Read until the space between the "ppid" and "pgrp" fields
+ * to make sure we're anchored after the untruncated "ppid"
+ * field..
+ */
+ ppid_rhs = strchr(ppid_lhs, ' ');
+ if (!ppid_rhs)
+ goto bad_kernel;
+
+ ppid = strtol(ppid_lhs, &p, 10);
+ if (ppid_rhs == p) {
+ const char *comm = comm_lhs + 1;
+ size_t commlen = comm_rhs - comm;
+
+ strbuf_add(name, comm, commlen);
+ *statppid = ppid;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+bad_kernel:
+ /*
+ * We were able to read our STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N bytes from
+ * /proc/%d/stat, but the content is bad. Broken kernel?
+ * Should not happen, but handle it gracefully.
+ */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int stat_parent_pid(pid_t pid, struct strbuf *name, int *statppid)
+{
+ struct strbuf procfs_path = STRBUF_INIT;
+ struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
+ FILE *fp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* try to use procfs if it's present. */
+ strbuf_addf(&procfs_path, "/proc/%d/stat", pid);
+ fp = fopen(procfs_path.buf, "r");
+ if (!fp)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /*
+ * We could be more strict here and assert that we read at
+ * least STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N. My reading of procfs(5) is
+ * that on any modern kernel (at least since 2.6.0 released in
+ * 2003) even if all the mandatory numeric fields were zero'd
+ * out we'd get at least 100 bytes, but let's just check that
+ * we got anything at all and trust the parse_proc_stat()
+ * function to handle its "Bad Kernel?" error checking.
+ */
+ if (!strbuf_fread(&sb, STAT_PARENT_PID_READ_N, fp))
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (parse_proc_stat(&sb, name, statppid) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ret = 0;
+cleanup:
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ strbuf_release(&procfs_path);
+ strbuf_release(&sb);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void push_ancestry_name(struct strvec *names, pid_t pid)
+{
+ struct strbuf name = STRBUF_INIT;
+ int ppid;
+
+ if (stat_parent_pid(pid, &name, &ppid) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ strvec_push(names, name.buf);
+
+ /*
+ * Both errors and reaching the end of the process chain are
+ * reported as fields of 0 by proc(5)
+ */
+ if (ppid)
+ push_ancestry_name(names, ppid);
+cleanup:
+ strbuf_release(&name);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+void trace2_collect_process_info(enum trace2_process_info_reason reason)
+{
+ struct strvec names = STRVEC_INIT;
+
+ if (!trace2_is_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ switch (reason) {
+ case TRACE2_PROCESS_INFO_EXIT:
+ /*
+ * The Windows version of this calls its
+ * get_peak_memory_info() here. We may want to insert
+ * similar process-end statistics here in the future.
+ */
+ break;
+ case TRACE2_PROCESS_INFO_STARTUP:
+ push_ancestry_name(&names, getppid());
+
+ if (names.nr)
+ trace2_cmd_ancestry(names.v);
+ strvec_clear(&names);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c b/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c
index 1cc31c3502..edb438a777 100644
--- a/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c
+++ b/compat/nedmalloc/nedmalloc.c
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static void threadcache_free(nedpool *p, threadcache *tc, int mymspace, void *me
assert(idx<=THREADCACHEMAXBINS);
if(tck==*binsptr)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "Attempt to free already freed memory block %p - aborting!\n", tck);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Attempt to free already freed memory block %p - aborting!\n", (void *)tck);
abort();
}
#ifdef FULLSANITYCHECKS
diff --git a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c
index 1927e6ef4b..28a79289d4 100644
--- a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c
+++ b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-unix-socket.c
@@ -35,6 +35,28 @@ enum ipc_active_state ipc_get_active_state(const char *path)
}
}
+#ifdef __CYGWIN__
+ /*
+ * Cygwin emulates Unix sockets by writing special-crafted files whose
+ * `system` bit is set.
+ *
+ * If we are too fast, Cygwin might still be in the process of marking
+ * the underlying file as a system file. Until then, we will not see a
+ * Unix socket here, but a plain file instead. Just in case that this
+ * is happening, wait a little and try again.
+ */
+ {
+ static const int delay[] = { 1, 10, 20, 40, -1 };
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && delay[i] > 0; i++) {
+ sleep_millisec(delay[i]);
+ if (lstat(path, &st) == -1)
+ return IPC_STATE__INVALID_PATH;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* also complain if a plain file is in the way */
if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFSOCK)
return IPC_STATE__INVALID_PATH;
@@ -168,7 +190,8 @@ void ipc_client_close_connection(struct ipc_client_connection *connection)
int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(
struct ipc_client_connection *connection,
- const char *message, struct strbuf *answer)
+ const char *message, size_t message_len,
+ struct strbuf *answer)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -176,7 +199,7 @@ int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(
trace2_region_enter("ipc-client", "send-command", NULL);
- if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, strlen(message),
+ if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, message_len,
connection->fd) < 0 ||
packet_flush_gently(connection->fd) < 0) {
ret = error(_("could not send IPC command"));
@@ -197,7 +220,8 @@ done:
int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path,
const struct ipc_client_connect_options *options,
- const char *message, struct strbuf *answer)
+ const char *message, size_t message_len,
+ struct strbuf *answer)
{
int ret = -1;
enum ipc_active_state state;
@@ -208,7 +232,9 @@ int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path,
if (state != IPC_STATE__LISTENING)
return ret;
- ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, message, answer);
+ ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection,
+ message, message_len,
+ answer);
ipc_client_close_connection(connection);
@@ -503,7 +529,7 @@ static int worker_thread__do_io(
if (ret >= 0) {
ret = worker_thread_data->server_data->application_cb(
worker_thread_data->server_data->application_data,
- buf.buf, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data);
+ buf.buf, buf.len, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data);
packet_flush_gently(reply_data.fd);
}
diff --git a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c
index 8dc7bda087..20ea7b65e0 100644
--- a/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c
+++ b/compat/simple-ipc/ipc-win32.c
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#include "strbuf.h"
#include "pkt-line.h"
#include "thread-utils.h"
+#include "accctrl.h"
+#include "aclapi.h"
#ifndef SUPPORTS_SIMPLE_IPC
/*
@@ -49,6 +51,9 @@ static enum ipc_active_state get_active_state(wchar_t *pipe_path)
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND)
return IPC_STATE__PATH_NOT_FOUND;
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "getstate/waitpipe/gle",
+ (intmax_t)GetLastError());
+
return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR;
}
@@ -109,9 +114,15 @@ static enum ipc_active_state connect_to_server(
t_start_ms = (DWORD)(getnanotime() / 1000000);
if (!WaitNamedPipeW(wpath, timeout_ms)) {
- if (GetLastError() == ERROR_SEM_TIMEOUT)
+ DWORD gleWait = GetLastError();
+
+ if (gleWait == ERROR_SEM_TIMEOUT)
return IPC_STATE__NOT_LISTENING;
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL,
+ "connect/waitpipe/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gleWait);
+
return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR;
}
@@ -133,17 +144,31 @@ static enum ipc_active_state connect_to_server(
break; /* try again */
default:
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL,
+ "connect/createfile/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gle);
+
return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR;
}
}
if (!SetNamedPipeHandleState(hPipe, &mode, NULL, NULL)) {
+ gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL,
+ "connect/setpipestate/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gle);
+
CloseHandle(hPipe);
return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR;
}
*pfd = _open_osfhandle((intptr_t)hPipe, O_RDWR|O_BINARY);
if (*pfd < 0) {
+ gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL,
+ "connect/openosfhandle/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gle);
+
CloseHandle(hPipe);
return IPC_STATE__OTHER_ERROR;
}
@@ -208,7 +233,8 @@ void ipc_client_close_connection(struct ipc_client_connection *connection)
int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(
struct ipc_client_connection *connection,
- const char *message, struct strbuf *answer)
+ const char *message, size_t message_len,
+ struct strbuf *answer)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -216,7 +242,7 @@ int ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(
trace2_region_enter("ipc-client", "send-command", NULL);
- if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, strlen(message),
+ if (write_packetized_from_buf_no_flush(message, message_len,
connection->fd) < 0 ||
packet_flush_gently(connection->fd) < 0) {
ret = error(_("could not send IPC command"));
@@ -239,7 +265,8 @@ done:
int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path,
const struct ipc_client_connect_options *options,
- const char *message, struct strbuf *response)
+ const char *message, size_t message_len,
+ struct strbuf *response)
{
int ret = -1;
enum ipc_active_state state;
@@ -250,7 +277,9 @@ int ipc_client_send_command(const char *path,
if (state != IPC_STATE__LISTENING)
return ret;
- ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection, message, response);
+ ret = ipc_client_send_command_to_connection(connection,
+ message, message_len,
+ response);
ipc_client_close_connection(connection);
@@ -458,7 +487,7 @@ static int do_io(struct ipc_server_thread_data *server_thread_data)
if (ret >= 0) {
ret = server_thread_data->server_data->application_cb(
server_thread_data->server_data->application_data,
- buf.buf, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data);
+ buf.buf, buf.len, do_io_reply_callback, &reply_data);
packet_flush_gently(reply_data.fd);
@@ -565,11 +594,132 @@ finished:
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * We need to build a Windows "SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES" object and use it
+ * to apply an ACL when we create the initial instance of the Named
+ * Pipe. The construction is somewhat involved and consists of
+ * several sequential steps and intermediate objects.
+ *
+ * We use this structure to hold these intermediate pointers so that
+ * we can free them as a group. (It is unclear from the docs whether
+ * some of these intermediate pointers can be freed before we are
+ * finished using the "lpSA" member.)
+ */
+struct my_sa_data
+{
+ PSID pEveryoneSID;
+ PACL pACL;
+ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD;
+ LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpSA;
+};
+
+static void init_sa(struct my_sa_data *d)
+{
+ memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
+}
+
+static void release_sa(struct my_sa_data *d)
+{
+ if (d->pEveryoneSID)
+ FreeSid(d->pEveryoneSID);
+ if (d->pACL)
+ LocalFree(d->pACL);
+ if (d->pSD)
+ LocalFree(d->pSD);
+ if (d->lpSA)
+ LocalFree(d->lpSA);
+
+ memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES to apply to the initial named pipe. The
+ * creator of the first server instance gets to set the ACLs on it.
+ *
+ * We allow the well-known group `EVERYONE` to have read+write access
+ * to the named pipe so that clients can send queries to the daemon
+ * and receive the response.
+ *
+ * Normally, this is not necessary since the daemon is usually
+ * automatically started by a foreground command like `git status`,
+ * but in those cases where an elevated Git command started the daemon
+ * (such that the daemon itself runs with elevation), we need to add
+ * the ACL so that non-elevated commands can write to it.
+ *
+ * The following document was helpful:
+ * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/creating-a-security-descriptor-for-a-new-object-in-c--
+ *
+ * Returns d->lpSA set to a SA or NULL.
+ */
+static LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES get_sa(struct my_sa_data *d)
+{
+ SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sid_auth_world = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY;
+#define NR_EA (1)
+ EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea[NR_EA];
+ DWORD dwResult;
+
+ if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sid_auth_world, 1,
+ SECURITY_WORLD_RID, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
+ &d->pEveryoneSID)) {
+ DWORD gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "alloc-world-sid/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gle);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ memset(ea, 0, NR_EA * sizeof(EXPLICIT_ACCESS));
+
+ ea[0].grfAccessPermissions = GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE;
+ ea[0].grfAccessMode = SET_ACCESS;
+ ea[0].grfInheritance = NO_INHERITANCE;
+ ea[0].Trustee.MultipleTrusteeOperation = NO_MULTIPLE_TRUSTEE;
+ ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_SID;
+ ea[0].Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_WELL_KNOWN_GROUP;
+ ea[0].Trustee.ptstrName = (LPTSTR)d->pEveryoneSID;
+
+ dwResult = SetEntriesInAcl(NR_EA, ea, NULL, &d->pACL);
+ if (dwResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+ DWORD gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-acl-entry/gle",
+ (intmax_t)gle);
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-acl-entry/dw",
+ (intmax_t)dwResult);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ d->pSD = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)LocalAlloc(
+ LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
+ if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(d->pSD, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) {
+ DWORD gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "init-sd/gle", (intmax_t)gle);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(d->pSD, TRUE, d->pACL, FALSE)) {
+ DWORD gle = GetLastError();
+ trace2_data_intmax("ipc-debug", NULL, "set-sd-dacl/gle", (intmax_t)gle);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ d->lpSA = (LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)LocalAlloc(LPTR, sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES));
+ d->lpSA->nLength = sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES);
+ d->lpSA->lpSecurityDescriptor = d->pSD;
+ d->lpSA->bInheritHandle = FALSE;
+
+ return d->lpSA;
+
+fail:
+ release_sa(d);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static HANDLE create_new_pipe(wchar_t *wpath, int is_first)
{
HANDLE hPipe;
DWORD dwOpenMode, dwPipeMode;
- LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpsa = NULL;
+ struct my_sa_data my_sa_data;
+
+ init_sa(&my_sa_data);
dwOpenMode = PIPE_ACCESS_INBOUND | PIPE_ACCESS_OUTBOUND |
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED;
@@ -585,20 +735,15 @@ static HANDLE create_new_pipe(wchar_t *wpath, int is_first)
* set the ACL / Security Attributes on the named
* pipe; subsequent instances inherit and cannot
* change them.
- *
- * TODO Should we allow the application layer to
- * specify security attributes, such as `LocalService`
- * or `LocalSystem`, when we create the named pipe?
- * This question is probably not important when the
- * daemon is started by a foreground user process and
- * only needs to talk to the current user, but may be
- * if the daemon is run via the Control Panel as a
- * System Service.
*/
+ get_sa(&my_sa_data);
}
hPipe = CreateNamedPipeW(wpath, dwOpenMode, dwPipeMode,
- PIPE_UNLIMITED_INSTANCES, 1024, 1024, 0, lpsa);
+ PIPE_UNLIMITED_INSTANCES, 1024, 1024, 0,
+ my_sa_data.lpSA);
+
+ release_sa(&my_sa_data);
return hPipe;
}
diff --git a/compat/stub/procinfo.c b/compat/stub/procinfo.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12c0a23c9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compat/stub/procinfo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#include "git-compat-util.h"
+
+#include "trace2.h"
+
+/*
+ * Stub. See sample implementations in compat/linux/procinfo.c and
+ * compat/win32/trace2_win32_process_info.c.
+ */
+void trace2_collect_process_info(enum trace2_process_info_reason reason)
+{
+}
diff --git a/compat/terminal.c b/compat/terminal.c
index 43b73ddc75..5b903e7c7e 100644
--- a/compat/terminal.c
+++ b/compat/terminal.c
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
#if defined(HAVE_DEV_TTY) || defined(GIT_WINDOWS_NATIVE)
-static void restore_term(void);
-
static void restore_term_on_signal(int sig)
{
restore_term();
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ static void restore_term_on_signal(int sig)
static int term_fd = -1;
static struct termios old_term;
-static void restore_term(void)
+void restore_term(void)
{
if (term_fd < 0)
return;
@@ -35,15 +33,22 @@ static void restore_term(void)
term_fd = -1;
}
+int save_term(int full_duplex)
+{
+ if (term_fd < 0)
+ term_fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+
+ return (term_fd < 0) ? -1 : tcgetattr(term_fd, &old_term);
+}
+
static int disable_bits(tcflag_t bits)
{
struct termios t;
- term_fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
- if (tcgetattr(term_fd, &t) < 0)
+ if (save_term(0) < 0)
goto error;
- old_term = t;
+ t = old_term;
sigchain_push_common(restore_term_on_signal);
t.c_lflag &= ~bits;
@@ -75,9 +80,10 @@ static int enable_non_canonical(void)
static int use_stty = 1;
static struct string_list stty_restore = STRING_LIST_INIT_DUP;
static HANDLE hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
-static DWORD cmode;
+static HANDLE hconout = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+static DWORD cmode_in, cmode_out;
-static void restore_term(void)
+void restore_term(void)
{
if (use_stty) {
int i;
@@ -97,9 +103,42 @@ static void restore_term(void)
if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return;
- SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode);
+ SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode_in);
+ CloseHandle(hconin);
+ if (cmode_out) {
+ assert(hconout != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+ SetConsoleMode(hconout, cmode_out);
+ CloseHandle(hconout);
+ }
+
+ hconin = hconout = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+}
+
+int save_term(int full_duplex)
+{
+ hconin = CreateFileA("CONIN$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
+ FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
+ FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
+ if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (full_duplex) {
+ hconout = CreateFileA("CONOUT$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
+ FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
+ FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
+ if (hconout == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ goto error;
+
+ GetConsoleMode(hconout, &cmode_out);
+ }
+
+ GetConsoleMode(hconin, &cmode_in);
+ use_stty = 0;
+ return 0;
+error:
CloseHandle(hconin);
hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+ return -1;
}
static int disable_bits(DWORD bits)
@@ -135,15 +174,11 @@ static int disable_bits(DWORD bits)
use_stty = 0;
}
- hconin = CreateFile("CONIN$", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
- FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING,
- FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
- if (hconin == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+ if (save_term(0) < 0)
return -1;
- GetConsoleMode(hconin, &cmode);
sigchain_push_common(restore_term_on_signal);
- if (!SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode & ~bits)) {
+ if (!SetConsoleMode(hconin, cmode_in & ~bits)) {
CloseHandle(hconin);
hconin = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
return -1;
@@ -361,6 +396,16 @@ int read_key_without_echo(struct strbuf *buf)
#else
+int save_term(int full_duplex)
+{
+ /* full_duplex == 1, but no support available */
+ return -full_duplex;
+}
+
+void restore_term(void)
+{
+}
+
char *git_terminal_prompt(const char *prompt, int echo)
{
return getpass(prompt);
diff --git a/compat/terminal.h b/compat/terminal.h
index a9d52b8464..e1770c575b 100644
--- a/compat/terminal.h
+++ b/compat/terminal.h
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
#ifndef COMPAT_TERMINAL_H
#define COMPAT_TERMINAL_H
+int save_term(int full_duplex);
+void restore_term(void);
+
char *git_terminal_prompt(const char *prompt, int echo);
/* Read a single keystroke, without echoing it to the terminal */
diff --git a/compat/unsetenv.c b/compat/unsetenv.c
index bf5fd7063b..b9d34af613 100644
--- a/compat/unsetenv.c
+++ b/compat/unsetenv.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#include "../git-compat-util.h"
-void gitunsetenv (const char *name)
+int gitunsetenv(const char *name)
{
#if !defined(__MINGW32__)
extern char **environ;
@@ -24,4 +24,6 @@ void gitunsetenv (const char *name)
++dst;
}
environ[dst] = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/compat/vcbuild/README b/compat/vcbuild/README
index 51fb083dbb..29ec1d0f10 100644
--- a/compat/vcbuild/README
+++ b/compat/vcbuild/README
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ The Steps of Build Git with VS2008
the git operations.
3. Inside Git's directory run the command:
- make command-list.h config-list.h
+ make generated-hdrs
to generate the header file needed to compile git.
4. Then either build Git with the GNU Make Makefile in the Git projects
diff --git a/compat/win32/lazyload.h b/compat/win32/lazyload.h
index 9e631c8593..2b3637135f 100644
--- a/compat/win32/lazyload.h
+++ b/compat/win32/lazyload.h
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@
* source, target);
*/
+typedef void (*FARVOIDPROC)(void);
+
struct proc_addr {
const char *const dll;
const char *const function;
- FARPROC pfunction;
+ FARVOIDPROC pfunction;
unsigned initialized : 1;
};
@@ -26,7 +28,8 @@ struct proc_addr {
#define DECLARE_PROC_ADDR(dll, rettype, function, ...) \
static struct proc_addr proc_addr_##function = \
{ #dll, #function, NULL, 0 }; \
- static rettype (WINAPI *function)(__VA_ARGS__)
+ typedef rettype (WINAPI *proc_type_##function)(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ static proc_type_##function function
/*
* Loads a function from a DLL (once-only).
@@ -35,9 +38,9 @@ struct proc_addr {
* This function is not thread-safe.
*/
#define INIT_PROC_ADDR(function) \
- (function = get_proc_addr(&proc_addr_##function))
+ (function = (proc_type_##function)get_proc_addr(&proc_addr_##function))
-static inline void *get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc)
+static inline FARVOIDPROC get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc)
{
/* only do this once */
if (!proc->initialized) {
@@ -46,7 +49,8 @@ static inline void *get_proc_addr(struct proc_addr *proc)
hnd = LoadLibraryExA(proc->dll, NULL,
LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32);
if (hnd)
- proc->pfunction = GetProcAddress(hnd, proc->function);
+ proc->pfunction = (FARVOIDPROC)GetProcAddress(hnd,
+ proc->function);
}
/* set ENOSYS if DLL or function was not found */
if (!proc->pfunction)