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author | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2019-10-01 23:27:18 +0200 |
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committer | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2019-12-05 15:36:51 +0100 |
commit | a8dee3ca610f5a1d403634492136c887f83b59d2 (patch) | |
tree | 3055874d4666b3364d15cc205dc36e9680f294d9 /utf8.h | |
parent | protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default (diff) | |
download | tgif-a8dee3ca610f5a1d403634492136c887f83b59d2.tar.xz |
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
Currently it is technically possible to let a submodule's git
directory point right into the git dir of a sibling submodule.
Example: the git directories of two submodules with the names `hippo`
and `hippo/hooks` would be `.git/modules/hippo/` and
`.git/modules/hippo/hooks/`, respectively, but the latter is already
intended to house the former's hooks.
In most cases, this is just confusing, but there is also a (quite
contrived) attack vector where Git can be fooled into mistaking remote
content for file contents it wrote itself during a recursive clone.
Let's plug this bug.
To do so, we introduce the new function `validate_submodule_git_dir()`
which simply verifies that no git dir exists for any leading directories
of the submodule name (if there are any).
Note: this patch specifically continues to allow sibling modules names
of the form `core/lib`, `core/doc`, etc, as long as `core` is not a
submodule name.
This fixes CVE-2019-1387.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'utf8.h')
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