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| author |  Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> | 2007-03-20 15:32:35 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |  Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net> | 2007-03-20 22:08:25 -0700 |
| commit | 8685da42561d16bb01aeaa1a2392459965187925 (patch) | |
| tree | 6da04c6a3289c4b8cc870002d007a0b7dc2a2877 /t/t5300-pack-object.sh | |
| parent | git-fetch: Fix single_force in append_fetch_head (diff) | |
| download | tgif-8685da42561d16bb01aeaa1a2392459965187925.tar.xz | |
don't ever allow SHA1 collisions to exist by fetching a pack
Waaaaaaay back Git was considered to be secure as it never overwrote
an object it already had. This was ensured by always unpacking the
packfile received over the network (both in fetch and receive-pack)
and our already existing logic to not create a loose object for an
object we already have.
Lately however we keep "large-ish" packfiles on both fetch and push
by running them through index-pack instead of unpack-objects. This
would let an attacker perform a birthday attack.
How? Assume the attacker knows a SHA-1 that has two different
data streams. He knows the client is likely to have the "good"
one. So he sends the "evil" variant to the other end as part of
a "large-ish" packfile. The recipient keeps that packfile, and
indexes it. Now since this is a birthday attack there is a SHA-1
collision; two objects exist in the repository with the same SHA-1.
They have *very* different data streams. One of them is "evil".
Currently the poor recipient cannot tell the two objects apart,
short of by examining the timestamp of the packfiles. But lets
say the recipient repacks before he realizes he's been attacked.
We may wind up packing the "evil" version of the object, and deleting
the "good" one. This is made *even more likely* by Junio's recent
rearrange_packed_git patch (b867092f).
It is extremely unlikely for a SHA1 collisions to occur, but if it
ever happens with a remote (hence untrusted) object we simply must
not let the fetch succeed.
Normally received packs should not contain objects we already have.
But when they do we must ensure duplicated objects with the same SHA1
actually contain the same data.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 't/t5300-pack-object.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | t/t5300-pack-object.sh | 10 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/t/t5300-pack-object.sh b/t/t5300-pack-object.sh index eacb1e92c2..35e036a864 100755 --- a/t/t5300-pack-object.sh +++ b/t/t5300-pack-object.sh @@ -255,4 +255,14 @@ test_expect_success \ :' +test_expect_success \ + 'fake a SHA1 hash collision' \ + 'test -f .git/objects/c8/2de19312b6c3695c0c18f70709a6c535682a67 && + cp -f .git/objects/9d/235ed07cd19811a6ceb342de82f190e49c9f68 \ + .git/objects/c8/2de19312b6c3695c0c18f70709a6c535682a67' + +test_expect_failure \ + 'make sure index-pack detects the SHA1 collision' \ + 'git-index-pack -o bad.idx test-3.pack' + test_done |