diff options
author | Jeff King <peff@peff.net> | 2014-02-24 02:39:45 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2014-02-24 10:12:58 -0800 |
commit | 7ca36d9398a85e7974d04f8fbd2c6adb088290e1 (patch) | |
tree | e3ef065ab5fee09448ad78239edefb09c9ca927a | |
parent | fsck: report integer overflow in author timestamps (diff) | |
download | tgif-7ca36d9398a85e7974d04f8fbd2c6adb088290e1.tar.xz |
date: check date overflow against time_t
When we check whether a timestamp has overflowed, we check
only against ULONG_MAX, meaning that strtoul has overflowed.
However, we also feed these timestamps to system functions
like gmtime, which expect a time_t. On many systems, time_t
is actually smaller than "unsigned long" (e.g., because it
is signed), and we would overflow when using these
functions. We don't know the actual size or signedness of
time_t, but we can easily check for truncation with a simple
assignment.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
-rw-r--r-- | cache.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | date.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fsck.c | 2 |
3 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -909,6 +909,7 @@ void datestamp(char *buf, int bufsize); unsigned long approxidate_careful(const char *, int *); unsigned long approxidate_relative(const char *date, const struct timeval *now); enum date_mode parse_date_format(const char *format); +int date_overflows(unsigned long date); #define IDENT_STRICT 1 #define IDENT_NO_DATE 2 @@ -1085,3 +1085,20 @@ unsigned long approxidate_careful(const char *date, int *error_ret) gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); return approxidate_str(date, &tv, error_ret); } + +int date_overflows(unsigned long t) +{ + time_t sys; + + /* If we overflowed our unsigned long, that's bad... */ + if (t == ULONG_MAX) + return 1; + + /* + * ...but we also are going to feed the result to system + * functions that expect time_t, which is often "signed long". + * Make sure that we fit into time_t, as well. + */ + sys = t; + return t != sys || (t < 1) != (sys < 1); +} @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int fsck_ident(char **ident, struct object *obj, fsck_error error_func) (*ident)++; if (**ident == '0' && (*ident)[1] != ' ') return error_func(obj, FSCK_ERROR, "invalid author/committer line - zero-padded date"); - if (strtoul(*ident, &end, 10) == ULONG_MAX) + if (date_overflows(strtoul(*ident, &end, 10))) return error_func(obj, FSCK_ERROR, "invalid author/committer line - date causes integer overflow"); if (end == *ident || *end != ' ') return error_func(obj, FSCK_ERROR, "invalid author/committer line - bad date"); |