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2025-09-17[chore] remove nollamas middleware for now (after discussions with a ↵Libravatar kim1
security advisor) (#4433) i'll keep this on a separate branch for now while i experiment with other possible alternatives, but for now both our hacky implementation especially, and more popular ones (like anubis) aren't looking too great on the deterrent front: https://github.com/eternal-flame-AD/pow-buster Co-authored-by: tobi <tobi.smethurst@protonmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4433 Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
2025-05-31[feature] make client-side nonce calculation multi-threaded (#4219)Libravatar kim1
# Description Thank you in part to f0x for nerd-sniping me into banging this together :p ## Checklist - [x] I/we have read the [GoToSocial contribution guidelines](https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). - [x] I/we have discussed the proposed changes already, either in an issue on the repository, or in the Matrix chat. - [x] I/we have not leveraged AI to create the proposed changes. - [x] I/we have performed a self-review of added code. - [x] I/we have written code that is legible and maintainable by others. - [x] I/we have commented the added code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas. - [ ] I/we have made any necessary changes to documentation. - [ ] I/we have added tests that cover new code. - [x] I/we have run tests and they pass locally with the changes. - [x] I/we have run `go fmt ./...` and `golangci-lint run`. Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4219 Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
2025-05-26[feature] update proof-of-work to allow setting required rounds (#4186)Libravatar kim1
# Description This updates our proof-of-work middleware, NoLLaMas, to work on a more easily configurable algorithm (thank you f0x for bringing this to my attention!). Instead of requiring that a solution with pre-determined number of '0' chars be found, it now pre-computes a result with a pre-determined nonce value that it expects the client to iterate up-to. (though with some level of jitter applied, to prevent it being too-easily gamed). This allows the user to configure roughly how many hash-encode rounds they want their clients to have to complete. ## Checklist - [x] I/we have read the [GoToSocial contribution guidelines](https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). - [x] I/we have discussed the proposed changes already, either in an issue on the repository, or in the Matrix chat. - [x] I/we have not leveraged AI to create the proposed changes. - [x] I/we have performed a self-review of added code. - [x] I/we have written code that is legible and maintainable by others. - [x] I/we have commented the added code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas. - [x] I/we have made any necessary changes to documentation. - [ ] I/we have added tests that cover new code. - [x] I/we have run tests and they pass locally with the changes. - [x] I/we have run `go fmt ./...` and `golangci-lint run`. Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4186 Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
2025-05-03[chore] more NoLLaMas proof-of-work tweaking (#4096)Libravatar kim1
- replaces the sha256 calculation with an alternative implementation that seems to use more uniform time-taken across different platforms - goes back to the simpler difficulty calculation without a "partial" difficulty level Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4096 Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
2025-04-29[chore] tweak NoLLaMas proof-of-work algorithm (#4090)Libravatar kim1
# Description - tweaks the NoLLaMas proof-of-work algorithm to further granularity on time spent computing solutions - standardizes GoToSocial cookie security directive setting in a CookiePolicy{} type ## Checklist - [x] I/we have read the [GoToSocial contribution guidelines](https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md). - [x] I/we have discussed the proposed changes already, either in an issue on the repository, or in the Matrix chat. - [x] I/we have not leveraged AI to create the proposed changes. - [x] I/we have performed a self-review of added code. - [x] I/we have written code that is legible and maintainable by others. - [x] I/we have commented the added code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas. - [ ] I/we have made any necessary changes to documentation. - [ ] I/we have added tests that cover new code. - [ ] I/we have run tests and they pass locally with the changes. - [x] I/we have run `go fmt ./...` and `golangci-lint run`. Co-authored-by: tobi <tobi.smethurst@protonmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4090 Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
2025-04-28[feature] proof of work scraper deterrence (#4043)Libravatar kim1
This adds a proof-of-work based scraper deterrence to GoToSocial's middleware stack on profile and status web pages. Heavily inspired by https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis, but massively stripped back for our own usecase. Todo: - ~~add configuration option so this is disabled by default~~ - ~~fix whatever weirdness is preventing this working with CSP (even in debug)~~ - ~~use our standard templating mechanism going through apiutil helper func~~ - ~~probably some absurdly small performance improvements to be made in pooling re-used hex encode / hash encode buffers~~ the web endpoints aren't as hot a path as API / ActivityPub, will leave as-is for now as it is already very minimal and well optimized - ~~verify the cryptographic assumptions re: using a portion of token as challenge data~~ this isn't a serious application of cryptography, if it turns out to be a problem we'll fix it, but it definitely should not be easily possible to guess a SHA256 hash from the first 1/4 of it even if mathematically it might make it a bit easier - ~~theme / make look nice??~~ - ~~add a spinner~~ - ~~add entry in example configuration~~ - ~~add documentation~~ Verification page originally based on https://github.com/LucienV1/powtect Co-authored-by: tobi <tobi.smethurst@protonmail.com> Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4043 Reviewed-by: tobi <tsmethurst@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com> Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>