diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh')
22 files changed, 0 insertions, 11375 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go deleted file mode 100644 index 1ab07d078..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "io" - "sync" -) - -// buffer provides a linked list buffer for data exchange -// between producer and consumer. Theoretically the buffer is -// of unlimited capacity as it does no allocation of its own. -type buffer struct { - // protects concurrent access to head, tail and closed - *sync.Cond - - head *element // the buffer that will be read first - tail *element // the buffer that will be read last - - closed bool -} - -// An element represents a single link in a linked list. -type element struct { - buf []byte - next *element -} - -// newBuffer returns an empty buffer that is not closed. -func newBuffer() *buffer { - e := new(element) - b := &buffer{ - Cond: newCond(), - head: e, - tail: e, - } - return b -} - -// write makes buf available for Read to receive. -// buf must not be modified after the call to write. -func (b *buffer) write(buf []byte) { - b.Cond.L.Lock() - e := &element{buf: buf} - b.tail.next = e - b.tail = e - b.Cond.Signal() - b.Cond.L.Unlock() -} - -// eof closes the buffer. Reads from the buffer once all -// the data has been consumed will receive io.EOF. -func (b *buffer) eof() { - b.Cond.L.Lock() - b.closed = true - b.Cond.Signal() - b.Cond.L.Unlock() -} - -// Read reads data from the internal buffer in buf. Reads will block -// if no data is available, or until the buffer is closed. -func (b *buffer) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) { - b.Cond.L.Lock() - defer b.Cond.L.Unlock() - - for len(buf) > 0 { - // if there is data in b.head, copy it - if len(b.head.buf) > 0 { - r := copy(buf, b.head.buf) - buf, b.head.buf = buf[r:], b.head.buf[r:] - n += r - continue - } - // if there is a next buffer, make it the head - if len(b.head.buf) == 0 && b.head != b.tail { - b.head = b.head.next - continue - } - - // if at least one byte has been copied, return - if n > 0 { - break - } - - // if nothing was read, and there is nothing outstanding - // check to see if the buffer is closed. - if b.closed { - err = io.EOF - break - } - // out of buffers, wait for producer - b.Cond.Wait() - } - return -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go deleted file mode 100644 index 27d0e14aa..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,611 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "net" - "sort" - "time" -) - -// Certificate algorithm names from [PROTOCOL.certkeys]. These values can appear -// in Certificate.Type, PublicKey.Type, and ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. -// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner nor -// returned by MultiAlgorithmSigner and don't appear in the Signature.Format -// field. -const ( - CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoSKED25519v01 = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" - - // CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 and CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 can't appear as a - // Certificate.Type (or PublicKey.Type), but only in - // ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. - CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 = "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" - CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 = "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" -) - -const ( - // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSAv01. - CertSigAlgoRSAv01 = CertAlgoRSAv01 - // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA256v01. - CertSigAlgoRSASHA2256v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 - // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA512v01. - CertSigAlgoRSASHA2512v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 -) - -// Certificate types distinguish between host and user -// certificates. The values can be set in the CertType field of -// Certificate. -const ( - UserCert = 1 - HostCert = 2 -) - -// Signature represents a cryptographic signature. -type Signature struct { - Format string - Blob []byte - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that -// a certificate does not expire. -const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1 - -// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in -// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the -// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using -// ParsePublicKey. -type Certificate struct { - Nonce []byte - Key PublicKey - Serial uint64 - CertType uint32 - KeyId string - ValidPrincipals []string - ValidAfter uint64 - ValidBefore uint64 - Permissions - Reserved []byte - SignatureKey PublicKey - Signature *Signature -} - -// genericCertData holds the key-independent part of the certificate data. -// Overall, certificates contain an nonce, public key fields and -// key-independent fields. -type genericCertData struct { - Serial uint64 - CertType uint32 - KeyId string - ValidPrincipals []byte - ValidAfter uint64 - ValidBefore uint64 - CriticalOptions []byte - Extensions []byte - Reserved []byte - SignatureKey []byte - Signature []byte -} - -func marshalStringList(namelist []string) []byte { - var to []byte - for _, name := range namelist { - s := struct{ N string }{name} - to = append(to, Marshal(&s)...) - } - return to -} - -type optionsTuple struct { - Key string - Value []byte -} - -type optionsTupleValue struct { - Value string -} - -// serialize a map of critical options or extensions -// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, -// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty string value -func marshalTuples(tups map[string]string) []byte { - keys := make([]string, 0, len(tups)) - for key := range tups { - keys = append(keys, key) - } - sort.Strings(keys) - - var ret []byte - for _, key := range keys { - s := optionsTuple{Key: key} - if value := tups[key]; len(value) > 0 { - s.Value = Marshal(&optionsTupleValue{value}) - } - ret = append(ret, Marshal(&s)...) - } - return ret -} - -// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, -// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty option value -func parseTuples(in []byte) (map[string]string, error) { - tups := map[string]string{} - var lastKey string - var haveLastKey bool - - for len(in) > 0 { - var key, val, extra []byte - var ok bool - - if key, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - keyStr := string(key) - // according to [PROTOCOL.certkeys], the names must be in - // lexical order. - if haveLastKey && keyStr <= lastKey { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate options are not in lexical order") - } - lastKey, haveLastKey = keyStr, true - // the next field is a data field, which if non-empty has a string embedded - if val, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - if len(val) > 0 { - val, extra, ok = parseString(val) - if !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - if len(extra) > 0 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected trailing data after certificate option value") - } - tups[keyStr] = string(val) - } else { - tups[keyStr] = "" - } - } - return tups, nil -} - -func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) { - nonce, rest, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - - key, rest, err := parsePubKey(rest, privAlgo) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var g genericCertData - if err := Unmarshal(rest, &g); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - c := &Certificate{ - Nonce: nonce, - Key: key, - Serial: g.Serial, - CertType: g.CertType, - KeyId: g.KeyId, - ValidAfter: g.ValidAfter, - ValidBefore: g.ValidBefore, - } - - for principals := g.ValidPrincipals; len(principals) > 0; { - principal, rest, ok := parseString(principals) - if !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - c.ValidPrincipals = append(c.ValidPrincipals, string(principal)) - principals = rest - } - - c.CriticalOptions, err = parseTuples(g.CriticalOptions) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.Extensions, err = parseTuples(g.Extensions) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.Reserved = g.Reserved - k, err := ParsePublicKey(g.SignatureKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - c.SignatureKey = k - c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature) - if !ok || len(rest) > 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") - } - - return c, nil -} - -type openSSHCertSigner struct { - pub *Certificate - signer Signer -} - -type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct { - *openSSHCertSigner - algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner -} - -// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose -// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert -// doesn't match the key used by signer. -func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) { - if !bytes.Equal(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key") - } - - switch s := signer.(type) { - case MultiAlgorithmSigner: - return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ - AlgorithmSigner: &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ - &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, - supportedAlgorithms: s.Algorithms(), - }, nil - case AlgorithmSigner: - return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ - &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, nil - default: - return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil - } -} - -func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { - return s.signer.Sign(rand, data) -} - -func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { - return s.pub -} - -func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { - return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) -} - -const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address" - -// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods -// can be plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback and -// ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. For the CertChecker to work, -// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set. -type CertChecker struct { - // SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the - // server application layer understands. These are only used - // for user certificates. - SupportedCriticalOptions []string - - // IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an - // authority for the given user certificate. This allows for - // certificates to be signed by other certificates. This must be set - // if this CertChecker will be checking user certificates. - IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool - - // IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as - // an authority for this host. This allows for certificates to be - // signed by other keys, and for those other keys to only be valid - // signers for particular hostnames. This must be set if this - // CertChecker will be checking host certificates. - IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool - - // Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now - // is used. - Clock func() time.Time - - // UserKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.Authenticate encounters a - // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement validation - // of user keys or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. - UserKeyFallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) - - // HostKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.CheckHostKey encounters a - // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement host key - // validation or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. - HostKeyFallback HostKeyCallback - - // IsRevoked is called for each certificate so that revocation checking - // can be implemented. It should return true if the given certificate - // is revoked and false otherwise. If nil, no certificates are - // considered to have been revoked. - IsRevoked func(cert *Certificate) bool -} - -// CheckHostKey checks a host key certificate. This method can be -// plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback. -func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { - cert, ok := key.(*Certificate) - if !ok { - if c.HostKeyFallback != nil { - return c.HostKeyFallback(addr, remote, key) - } - return errors.New("ssh: non-certificate host key") - } - if cert.CertType != HostCert { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType) - } - if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr) - } - - hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - // Pass hostname only as principal for host certificates (consistent with OpenSSH) - return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert) -} - -// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as -// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. -func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) { - cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate) - if !ok { - if c.UserKeyFallback != nil { - return c.UserKeyFallback(conn, pubKey) - } - return nil, errors.New("ssh: normal key pairs not accepted") - } - - if cert.CertType != UserCert { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType) - } - if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority") - } - - if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &cert.Permissions, nil -} - -// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and -// the signature of the certificate. -func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { - if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) - } - - for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions { - // sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by - // serverAuthenticate - if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption { - continue - } - - found := false - for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions { - if supp == opt { - found = true - break - } - } - if !found { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt) - } - } - - if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) > 0 { - // By default, certs are valid for all users/hosts. - found := false - for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals { - if p == principal { - found = true - break - } - } - if !found { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: principal %q not in the set of valid principals for given certificate: %q", principal, cert.ValidPrincipals) - } - } - - clock := c.Clock - if clock == nil { - clock = time.Now - } - - unixNow := clock().Unix() - if after := int64(cert.ValidAfter); after < 0 || unixNow < int64(cert.ValidAfter) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert is not yet valid") - } - if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired") - } - if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify") - } - - return nil -} - -// SignCert signs the certificate with an authority, setting the Nonce, -// SignatureKey, and Signature fields. If the authority implements the -// MultiAlgorithmSigner interface the first algorithm in the list is used. This -// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm. -func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error { - c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil { - return err - } - c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey() - - if v, ok := authority.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { - if len(v.Algorithms()) == 0 { - return errors.New("the provided authority has no signature algorithm") - } - // Use the first algorithm in the list. - sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), v.Algorithms()[0]) - if err != nil { - return err - } - c.Signature = sig - return nil - } else if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA { - // Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers. - // TODO: consider using KeyAlgoRSASHA256 as default. - sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), KeyAlgoRSASHA512) - if err != nil { - return err - } - c.Signature = sig - return nil - } - - sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning()) - if err != nil { - return err - } - c.Signature = sig - return nil -} - -// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the -// corresponding public key signature algorithm. -// -// This map must be kept in sync with the one in agent/client.go. -var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{ - CertAlgoRSAv01: KeyAlgoRSA, - CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA256, - CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA512, - CertAlgoDSAv01: KeyAlgoDSA, - CertAlgoECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoECDSA256, - CertAlgoECDSA384v01: KeyAlgoECDSA384, - CertAlgoECDSA521v01: KeyAlgoECDSA521, - CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, - CertAlgoED25519v01: KeyAlgoED25519, - CertAlgoSKED25519v01: KeyAlgoSKED25519, -} - -// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is -// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are -// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms. -func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string { - if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok { - return a - } - return algo -} - -// certificateAlgo returns the certificate algorithms that uses the provided -// underlying signature algorithm. -func certificateAlgo(algo string) (certAlgo string, ok bool) { - for certName, algoName := range certKeyAlgoNames { - if algoName == algo { - return certName, true - } - } - return "", false -} - -func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte { - c2 := *cert - c2.Signature = nil - out := c2.Marshal() - // Drop trailing signature length. - return out[:len(out)-4] -} - -// Marshal serializes c into OpenSSH's wire format. It is part of the -// PublicKey interface. -func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte { - generic := genericCertData{ - Serial: c.Serial, - CertType: c.CertType, - KeyId: c.KeyId, - ValidPrincipals: marshalStringList(c.ValidPrincipals), - ValidAfter: uint64(c.ValidAfter), - ValidBefore: uint64(c.ValidBefore), - CriticalOptions: marshalTuples(c.CriticalOptions), - Extensions: marshalTuples(c.Extensions), - Reserved: c.Reserved, - SignatureKey: c.SignatureKey.Marshal(), - } - if c.Signature != nil { - generic.Signature = Marshal(c.Signature) - } - genericBytes := Marshal(&generic) - keyBytes := c.Key.Marshal() - _, keyBytes, _ = parseString(keyBytes) - prefix := Marshal(&struct { - Name string - Nonce []byte - Key []byte `ssh:"rest"` - }{c.Type(), c.Nonce, keyBytes}) - - result := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(genericBytes)) - result = append(result, prefix...) - result = append(result, genericBytes...) - return result -} - -// Type returns the certificate algorithm name. It is part of the PublicKey interface. -func (c *Certificate) Type() string { - certName, ok := certificateAlgo(c.Key.Type()) - if !ok { - panic("unknown certificate type for key type " + c.Key.Type()) - } - return certName -} - -// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public -// key. It is part of the PublicKey interface. -func (c *Certificate) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - return c.Key.Verify(data, sig) -} - -func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { - format, in, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return - } - - out = &Signature{ - Format: string(format), - } - - if out.Blob, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { - return - } - - switch out.Format { - case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, KeyAlgoSKED25519, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: - out.Rest = in - return out, nil, ok - } - - return out, in, ok -} - -func parseSignature(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { - sigBytes, rest, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return - } - - out, trailing, ok := parseSignatureBody(sigBytes) - if !ok || len(trailing) > 0 { - return nil, nil, false - } - return -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go deleted file mode 100644 index cc0bb7ab6..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,645 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "sync" -) - -const ( - minPacketLength = 9 - // channelMaxPacket contains the maximum number of bytes that will be - // sent in a single packet. As per RFC 4253, section 6.1, 32k is also - // the minimum. - channelMaxPacket = 1 << 15 - // We follow OpenSSH here. - channelWindowSize = 64 * channelMaxPacket -) - -// NewChannel represents an incoming request to a channel. It must either be -// accepted for use by calling Accept, or rejected by calling Reject. -type NewChannel interface { - // Accept accepts the channel creation request. It returns the Channel - // and a Go channel containing SSH requests. The Go channel must be - // serviced otherwise the Channel will hang. - Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) - - // Reject rejects the channel creation request. After calling - // this, no other methods on the Channel may be called. - Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error - - // ChannelType returns the type of the channel, as supplied by the - // client. - ChannelType() string - - // ExtraData returns the arbitrary payload for this channel, as supplied - // by the client. This data is specific to the channel type. - ExtraData() []byte -} - -// A Channel is an ordered, reliable, flow-controlled, duplex stream -// that is multiplexed over an SSH connection. -type Channel interface { - // Read reads up to len(data) bytes from the channel. - Read(data []byte) (int, error) - - // Write writes len(data) bytes to the channel. - Write(data []byte) (int, error) - - // Close signals end of channel use. No data may be sent after this - // call. - Close() error - - // CloseWrite signals the end of sending in-band - // data. Requests may still be sent, and the other side may - // still send data - CloseWrite() error - - // SendRequest sends a channel request. If wantReply is true, - // it will wait for a reply and return the result as a - // boolean, otherwise the return value will be false. Channel - // requests are out-of-band messages so they may be sent even - // if the data stream is closed or blocked by flow control. - // If the channel is closed before a reply is returned, io.EOF - // is returned. - SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) - - // Stderr returns an io.ReadWriter that writes to this channel - // with the extended data type set to stderr. Stderr may - // safely be read and written from a different goroutine than - // Read and Write respectively. - Stderr() io.ReadWriter -} - -// Request is a request sent outside of the normal stream of -// data. Requests can either be specific to an SSH channel, or they -// can be global. -type Request struct { - Type string - WantReply bool - Payload []byte - - ch *channel - mux *mux -} - -// Reply sends a response to a request. It must be called for all requests -// where WantReply is true and is a no-op otherwise. The payload argument is -// ignored for replies to channel-specific requests. -func (r *Request) Reply(ok bool, payload []byte) error { - if !r.WantReply { - return nil - } - - if r.ch == nil { - return r.mux.ackRequest(ok, payload) - } - - return r.ch.ackRequest(ok) -} - -// RejectionReason is an enumeration used when rejecting channel creation -// requests. See RFC 4254, section 5.1. -type RejectionReason uint32 - -const ( - Prohibited RejectionReason = iota + 1 - ConnectionFailed - UnknownChannelType - ResourceShortage -) - -// String converts the rejection reason to human readable form. -func (r RejectionReason) String() string { - switch r { - case Prohibited: - return "administratively prohibited" - case ConnectionFailed: - return "connect failed" - case UnknownChannelType: - return "unknown channel type" - case ResourceShortage: - return "resource shortage" - } - return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r)) -} - -func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 { - if a < uint32(b) { - return a - } - return uint32(b) -} - -type channelDirection uint8 - -const ( - channelInbound channelDirection = iota - channelOutbound -) - -// channel is an implementation of the Channel interface that works -// with the mux class. -type channel struct { - // R/O after creation - chanType string - extraData []byte - localId, remoteId uint32 - - // maxIncomingPayload and maxRemotePayload are the maximum - // payload sizes of normal and extended data packets for - // receiving and sending, respectively. The wire packet will - // be 9 or 13 bytes larger (excluding encryption overhead). - maxIncomingPayload uint32 - maxRemotePayload uint32 - - mux *mux - - // decided is set to true if an accept or reject message has been sent - // (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels). - decided bool - - // direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created - // locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer. - direction channelDirection - - // Pending internal channel messages. - msg chan interface{} - - // Since requests have no ID, there can be only one request - // with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a - // goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending. - sentRequestMu sync.Mutex - - incomingRequests chan *Request - - sentEOF bool - - // thread-safe data - remoteWin window - pending *buffer - extPending *buffer - - // windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window, and myConsumed, - // the number of bytes consumed since we last increased myWindow - windowMu sync.Mutex - myWindow uint32 - myConsumed uint32 - - // writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and - // protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be - // different from windowMu, as writePacket can block if there - // is a key exchange pending. - writeMu sync.Mutex - sentClose bool - - // packetPool has a buffer for each extended channel ID to - // save allocations during writes. - packetPool map[uint32][]byte -} - -// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates -// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu. -func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error { - ch.writeMu.Lock() - if ch.sentClose { - ch.writeMu.Unlock() - return io.EOF - } - ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose) - err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet) - ch.writeMu.Unlock() - return err -} - -func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { - if debugMux { - log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg) - } - - p := Marshal(msg) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId) - return ch.writePacket(p) -} - -// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are -// used, for example, for stderr. -func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) { - if ch.sentEOF { - return 0, io.EOF - } - // 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length - opCode := byte(msgChannelData) - headerLength := uint32(9) - if extendedCode > 0 { - headerLength += 4 - opCode = msgChannelExtendedData - } - - ch.writeMu.Lock() - packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode] - // We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so - // WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be - // flagged as errors by the race detector. - ch.writeMu.Unlock() - - for len(data) > 0 { - space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) - if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil { - return n, err - } - if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want { - packet = make([]byte, want) - } else { - packet = packet[:want] - } - - todo := data[:space] - - packet[0] = opCode - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId) - if extendedCode > 0 { - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode)) - } - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo))) - copy(packet[headerLength:], todo) - if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil { - return n, err - } - - n += len(todo) - data = data[len(todo):] - } - - ch.writeMu.Lock() - ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet - ch.writeMu.Unlock() - - return n, err -} - -func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error { - headerLen := 9 - isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData - if isExtendedData { - headerLen = 13 - } - if len(packet) < headerLen { - // malformed data packet - return parseError(packet[0]) - } - - var extended uint32 - if isExtendedData { - extended = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[5:]) - } - - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[headerLen-4 : headerLen]) - if length == 0 { - return nil - } - if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload { - // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect? - return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size") - } - - data := packet[headerLen:] - if length != uint32(len(data)) { - return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length") - } - - ch.windowMu.Lock() - if ch.myWindow < length { - ch.windowMu.Unlock() - // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason? - return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much") - } - ch.myWindow -= length - ch.windowMu.Unlock() - - if extended == 1 { - ch.extPending.write(data) - } else if extended > 0 { - // discard other extended data. - } else { - ch.pending.write(data) - } - return nil -} - -func (c *channel) adjustWindow(adj uint32) error { - c.windowMu.Lock() - // Since myConsumed and myWindow are managed on our side, and can never - // exceed the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow. - c.myConsumed += adj - var sendAdj uint32 - if (channelWindowSize-c.myWindow > 3*c.maxIncomingPayload) || - (c.myWindow < channelWindowSize/2) { - sendAdj = c.myConsumed - c.myConsumed = 0 - c.myWindow += sendAdj - } - c.windowMu.Unlock() - if sendAdj == 0 { - return nil - } - return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{ - AdditionalBytes: sendAdj, - }) -} - -func (c *channel) ReadExtended(data []byte, extended uint32) (n int, err error) { - switch extended { - case 1: - n, err = c.extPending.Read(data) - case 0: - n, err = c.pending.Read(data) - default: - return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: extended code %d unimplemented", extended) - } - - if n > 0 { - err = c.adjustWindow(uint32(n)) - // sendWindowAdjust can return io.EOF if the remote - // peer has closed the connection, however we want to - // defer forwarding io.EOF to the caller of Read until - // the buffer has been drained. - if n > 0 && err == io.EOF { - err = nil - } - } - - return n, err -} - -func (c *channel) close() { - c.pending.eof() - c.extPending.eof() - close(c.msg) - close(c.incomingRequests) - c.writeMu.Lock() - // This is not necessary for a normal channel teardown, but if - // there was another error, it is. - c.sentClose = true - c.writeMu.Unlock() - // Unblock writers. - c.remoteWin.close() -} - -// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is -// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the -// given channel. -func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error { - if ch.direction == channelInbound { - return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel") - } - if ch.decided { - return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel") - } - ch.decided = true - return nil -} - -func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error { - switch packet[0] { - case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData: - return ch.handleData(packet) - case msgChannelClose: - ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId}) - ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId) - ch.close() - return nil - case msgChannelEOF: - // RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but - // it is logical to signal EOF at the same time. - ch.extPending.eof() - ch.pending.eof() - return nil - } - - decoded, err := decode(packet) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - switch msg := decoded.(type) { - case *channelOpenFailureMsg: - if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { - return err - } - ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID) - ch.msg <- msg - case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: - if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { - return err - } - if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize) - } - ch.remoteId = msg.MyID - ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize - ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow) - ch.msg <- msg - case *windowAdjustMsg: - if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes) - } - case *channelRequestMsg: - req := Request{ - Type: msg.Request, - WantReply: msg.WantReply, - Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData, - ch: ch, - } - - ch.incomingRequests <- &req - default: - ch.msg <- msg - } - return nil -} - -func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData []byte) *channel { - ch := &channel{ - remoteWin: window{Cond: newCond()}, - myWindow: channelWindowSize, - pending: newBuffer(), - extPending: newBuffer(), - direction: direction, - incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), - msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize), - chanType: chanType, - extraData: extraData, - mux: m, - packetPool: make(map[uint32][]byte), - } - ch.localId = m.chanList.add(ch) - return ch -} - -var errUndecided = errors.New("ssh: must Accept or Reject channel") -var errDecidedAlready = errors.New("ssh: can call Accept or Reject only once") - -type extChannel struct { - code uint32 - ch *channel -} - -func (e *extChannel) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) { - return e.ch.WriteExtended(data, e.code) -} - -func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) { - return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code) -} - -func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { - if ch.decided { - return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready - } - ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket - confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId, - MyID: ch.localId, - MyWindow: ch.myWindow, - MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, - } - ch.decided = true - if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil -} - -func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error { - if ch.decided { - return errDecidedAlready - } - reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId, - Reason: reason, - Message: message, - Language: "en", - } - ch.decided = true - return ch.sendMessage(reject) -} - -func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) { - if !ch.decided { - return 0, errUndecided - } - return ch.ReadExtended(data, 0) -} - -func (ch *channel) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { - if !ch.decided { - return 0, errUndecided - } - return ch.WriteExtended(data, 0) -} - -func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error { - if !ch.decided { - return errUndecided - } - ch.sentEOF = true - return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId}) -} - -func (ch *channel) Close() error { - if !ch.decided { - return errUndecided - } - - return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId}) -} - -// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given, -// SSH extended stream. Such streams are used, for example, for stderr. -func (ch *channel) Extended(code uint32) io.ReadWriter { - if !ch.decided { - return nil - } - return &extChannel{code, ch} -} - -func (ch *channel) Stderr() io.ReadWriter { - return ch.Extended(1) -} - -func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { - if !ch.decided { - return false, errUndecided - } - - if wantReply { - ch.sentRequestMu.Lock() - defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock() - } - - msg := channelRequestMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId, - Request: name, - WantReply: wantReply, - RequestSpecificData: payload, - } - - if err := ch.sendMessage(msg); err != nil { - return false, err - } - - if wantReply { - m, ok := (<-ch.msg) - if !ok { - return false, io.EOF - } - switch m.(type) { - case *channelRequestFailureMsg: - return false, nil - case *channelRequestSuccessMsg: - return true, nil - default: - return false, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to channel request: %#v", m) - } - } - - return false, nil -} - -// ackRequest either sends an ack or nack to the channel request. -func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error { - if !ch.decided { - return errUndecided - } - - var msg interface{} - if !ok { - msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId, - } - } else { - msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{ - PeersID: ch.remoteId, - } - } - return ch.sendMessage(msg) -} - -func (ch *channel) ChannelType() string { - return ch.chanType -} - -func (ch *channel) ExtraData() []byte { - return ch.extraData -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go deleted file mode 100644 index 741e984f3..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,789 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "crypto/aes" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/des" - "crypto/rc4" - "crypto/subtle" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" - "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305" -) - -const ( - packetSizeMultiple = 16 // TODO(huin) this should be determined by the cipher. - - // RFC 4253 section 6.1 defines a minimum packet size of 32768 that implementations - // MUST be able to process (plus a few more kilobytes for padding and mac). The RFC - // indicates implementations SHOULD be able to handle larger packet sizes, but then - // waffles on about reasonable limits. - // - // OpenSSH caps their maxPacket at 256kB so we choose to do - // the same. maxPacket is also used to ensure that uint32 - // length fields do not overflow, so it should remain well - // below 4G. - maxPacket = 256 * 1024 -) - -// noneCipher implements cipher.Stream and provides no encryption. It is used -// by the transport before the first key-exchange. -type noneCipher struct{} - -func (c noneCipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { - copy(dst, src) -} - -func newAESCTR(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { - c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return cipher.NewCTR(c, iv), nil -} - -func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { - return rc4.NewCipher(key) -} - -type cipherMode struct { - keySize int - ivSize int - create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) -} - -func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - stream, err := createFunc(key, iv) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var streamDump []byte - if skip > 0 { - streamDump = make([]byte, 512) - } - - for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; { - dumpThisTime := remainingToDump - if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { - dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) - } - stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) - remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime - } - - mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey) - return &streamPacketCipher{ - mac: mac, - etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, - macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()), - cipher: stream, - }, nil - } -} - -// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included -// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in -// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers. -var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{ - // Ciphers from RFC 4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms - // are defined in the order specified in the RFC. - "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, - "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, - "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, - - // Ciphers from RFC 4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers. - // They are defined in the order specified in the RFC. - "arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, - "arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, - - // Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol. - // Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and - // RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution." - // RFC 4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour. - "arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)}, - - // AEAD ciphers - gcm128CipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher}, - gcm256CipherID: {32, 12, newGCMCipher}, - chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher}, - - // CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config. - // (See https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a526.pdf). If absolutely - // needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it. - // You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if - // you do. - aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}, - - // 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default - // config. - tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}, -} - -// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length -// and number of padding bytes. -const prefixLen = 5 - -// streamPacketCipher is a packetCipher using a stream cipher. -type streamPacketCipher struct { - mac hash.Hash - cipher cipher.Stream - etm bool - - // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. - prefix [prefixLen]byte - seqNumBytes [4]byte - padding [2 * packetSizeMultiple]byte - packetData []byte - macResult []byte -} - -// readCipherPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument. -func (s *streamPacketCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte - if s.mac != nil && s.etm { - copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5]) - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) - } else { - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) - } - - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4]) - paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4]) - - var macSize uint32 - if s.mac != nil { - s.mac.Reset() - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) - s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) - if s.etm { - s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4]) - s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:]) - } else { - s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) - } - macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size()) - } - - if length <= paddingLength+1 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too small") - } - - if length > maxPacket { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") - } - - // the maxPacket check above ensures that length-1+macSize - // does not overflow. - if uint32(cap(s.packetData)) < length-1+macSize { - s.packetData = make([]byte, length-1+macSize) - } else { - s.packetData = s.packetData[:length-1+macSize] - } - - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.packetData); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - mac := s.packetData[length-1:] - data := s.packetData[:length-1] - - if s.mac != nil && s.etm { - s.mac.Write(data) - } - - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data) - - if s.mac != nil { - if !s.etm { - s.mac.Write(data) - } - s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) - if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") - } - } - - return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil -} - -// writeCipherPacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument -func (s *streamPacketCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { - if len(packet) > maxPacket { - return errors.New("ssh: packet too large") - } - - aadlen := 0 - if s.mac != nil && s.etm { - // packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes - aadlen = 4 - } - - paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple - if paddingLength < 4 { - paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple - } - - length := len(packet) + 1 + paddingLength - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.prefix[:], uint32(length)) - s.prefix[4] = byte(paddingLength) - padding := s.padding[:paddingLength] - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, padding); err != nil { - return err - } - - if s.mac != nil { - s.mac.Reset() - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) - s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) - - if s.etm { - // For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted, - // but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) - } - - s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) - - if !s.etm { - // For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data - s.mac.Write(packet) - s.mac.Write(padding) - } - } - - if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) { - // For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted - // and the packet length must remain unencrypted - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) - } - - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet) - s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding) - - if s.mac != nil && s.etm { - // For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted - s.mac.Write(packet) - s.mac.Write(padding) - } - - if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := w.Write(packet); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := w.Write(padding); err != nil { - return err - } - - if s.mac != nil { - s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) - if _, err := w.Write(s.macResult); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - return nil -} - -type gcmCipher struct { - aead cipher.AEAD - prefix [4]byte - iv []byte - buf []byte -} - -func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(c) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &gcmCipher{ - aead: aead, - iv: iv, - }, nil -} - -const gcmTagSize = 16 - -func (c *gcmCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { - // Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the - // stream cipher because that encrypts the length too. - padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple) - if padding < 4 { - padding += packetSizeMultiple - } - - length := uint32(len(packet) + int(padding) + 1) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.prefix[:], length) - if _, err := w.Write(c.prefix[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - - if cap(c.buf) < int(length) { - c.buf = make([]byte, length) - } else { - c.buf = c.buf[:length] - } - - c.buf[0] = padding - copy(c.buf[1:], packet) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[1+len(packet):]); err != nil { - return err - } - c.buf = c.aead.Seal(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) - if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { - return err - } - c.incIV() - - return nil -} - -func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() { - for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- { - c.iv[i]++ - if c.iv[i] != 0 { - break - } - } -} - -func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:]) - if length > maxPacket { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded") - } - - if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) { - c.buf = make([]byte, length+gcmTagSize) - } else { - c.buf = c.buf[:length+gcmTagSize] - } - - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - plain, err := c.aead.Open(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.incIV() - - if len(plain) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") - } - - padding := plain[0] - if padding < 4 { - // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies - // the maximum size, which is 255. - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) - } - - if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) - } - plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)] - return plain, nil -} - -// cbcCipher implements aes128-cbc cipher defined in RFC 4253 section 6.1 -type cbcCipher struct { - mac hash.Hash - macSize uint32 - decrypter cipher.BlockMode - encrypter cipher.BlockMode - - // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. - seqNumBytes [4]byte - packetData []byte - macResult []byte - - // Amount of data we should still read to hide which - // verification error triggered. - oracleCamouflage uint32 -} - -func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - cbc := &cbcCipher{ - mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), - decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv), - encrypter: cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, iv), - packetData: make([]byte, 1024), - } - if cbc.mac != nil { - cbc.macSize = uint32(cbc.mac.Size()) - } - - return cbc, nil -} - -func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return cbc, nil -} - -func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return cbc, nil -} - -func maxUInt32(a, b int) uint32 { - if a > b { - return uint32(a) - } - return uint32(b) -} - -const ( - cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple = 8 - cbcMinPacketSize = 16 - cbcMinPaddingSize = 4 -) - -// cbcError represents a verification error that may leak information. -type cbcError string - -func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) } - -func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - p, err := c.readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum, r) - if err != nil { - if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok { - // Verification error: read a fixed amount of - // data, to make distinguishing between - // failing MAC and failing length check more - // difficult. - io.CopyN(io.Discard, r, int64(c.oracleCamouflage)) - } - } - return p, err -} - -func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize() - - // Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the - // case of block ciphers - this is copied back to the payload later. - // How many bytes of payload/padding will be read with this first read. - firstBlockLength := uint32((prefixLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize * blockSize) - firstBlock := c.packetData[:firstBlockLength] - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, firstBlock); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - c.oracleCamouflage = maxPacket + 4 + c.macSize - firstBlockLength - - c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(firstBlock, firstBlock) - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(firstBlock[:4]) - if length > maxPacket { - return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too large") - } - if length+4 < maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSize, blockSize) { - // The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size, whichever - // is larger) bytes. - return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too small") - } - // The length of the packet (including the length field but not the MAC) must - // be a multiple of the block size or 8, whichever is larger. - if (length+4)%maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, blockSize) != 0 { - return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length multiple") - } - - paddingLength := uint32(firstBlock[4]) - if paddingLength < cbcMinPaddingSize || length <= paddingLength+1 { - return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length") - } - - // Positions within the c.packetData buffer: - macStart := 4 + length - paddingStart := macStart - paddingLength - - // Entire packet size, starting before length, ending at end of mac. - entirePacketSize := macStart + c.macSize - - // Ensure c.packetData is large enough for the entire packet data. - if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < entirePacketSize { - // Still need to upsize and copy, but this should be rare at runtime, only - // on upsizing the packetData buffer. - c.packetData = make([]byte, entirePacketSize) - copy(c.packetData, firstBlock) - } else { - c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize] - } - - n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n) - - remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart] - c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted) - - mac := c.packetData[macStart:] - if c.mac != nil { - c.mac.Reset() - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) - c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) - c.mac.Write(c.packetData[:macStart]) - c.macResult = c.mac.Sum(c.macResult[:0]) - if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c.macResult, mac) != 1 { - return nil, cbcError("ssh: MAC failure") - } - } - - return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil -} - -func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { - effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize()) - - // Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding). - // Enforce minimum padding and packet size. - encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize) - // Enforce block size. - encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize - - length := encLength - 4 - paddingLength := int(length) - (1 + len(packet)) - - // Overall buffer contains: header, payload, padding, mac. - // Space for the MAC is reserved in the capacity but not the slice length. - bufferSize := encLength + c.macSize - if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < bufferSize { - c.packetData = make([]byte, encLength, bufferSize) - } else { - c.packetData = c.packetData[:encLength] - } - - p := c.packetData - - // Packet header. - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, length) - p = p[4:] - p[0] = byte(paddingLength) - - // Payload. - p = p[1:] - copy(p, packet) - - // Padding. - p = p[len(packet):] - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, p); err != nil { - return err - } - - if c.mac != nil { - c.mac.Reset() - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) - c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) - c.mac.Write(c.packetData) - // The MAC is now appended into the capacity reserved for it earlier. - c.packetData = c.mac.Sum(c.packetData) - } - - c.encrypter.CryptBlocks(c.packetData[:encLength], c.packetData[:encLength]) - - if _, err := w.Write(c.packetData); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" - -// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com -// AEAD, which is described here: -// -// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00 -// -// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC 4253 Section 6 -// also requires of stream ciphers. -type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { - lengthKey [32]byte - contentKey [32]byte - buf []byte -} - -func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { - if len(key) != 64 { - panic(len(key)) - } - - c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{ - buf: make([]byte, 256), - } - - copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) - copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) - return c, nil -} - -func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - nonce := make([]byte, 12) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) - s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte - s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) - s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes - - encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var lenBytes [4]byte - ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) - - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) - if length > maxPacket { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") - } - - contentEnd := 4 + length - packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize - if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd { - c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd) - copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength) - } else { - c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd] - } - - if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte - copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd]) - if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") - } - - plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] - s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain) - - if len(plain) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") - } - - padding := plain[0] - if padding < 4 { - // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies - // the maximum size, which is 255. - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) - } - - if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) - } - - plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)] - - return plain, nil -} - -func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { - nonce := make([]byte, 12) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) - s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) - if err != nil { - return err - } - var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte - s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) - s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes - - // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte - // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. - const packetSizeMultiple = 8 - - padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple - if padding < 4 { - padding += packetSizeMultiple - } - - // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag. - totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize - if cap(c.buf) < totalLength { - c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength) - } else { - c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength] - } - - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) - ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) - if err != nil { - return err - } - ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) - c.buf[4] = byte(padding) - copy(c.buf[5:], payload) - packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil { - return err - } - - s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd]) - - var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte - poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) - - copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:]) - - if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { - return err - } - return nil -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go deleted file mode 100644 index fd8c49749..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,282 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "errors" - "fmt" - "net" - "os" - "sync" - "time" -) - -// Client implements a traditional SSH client that supports shells, -// subprocesses, TCP port/streamlocal forwarding and tunneled dialing. -type Client struct { - Conn - - handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards - - forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side - mu sync.Mutex - channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel -} - -// HandleChannelOpen returns a channel on which NewChannel requests -// for the given type are sent. If the type already is being handled, -// nil is returned. The channel is closed when the connection is closed. -func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel { - c.mu.Lock() - defer c.mu.Unlock() - if c.channelHandlers == nil { - // The SSH channel has been closed. - c := make(chan NewChannel) - close(c) - return c - } - - ch := c.channelHandlers[channelType] - if ch != nil { - return nil - } - - ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize) - c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch - return ch -} - -// NewClient creates a Client on top of the given connection. -func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client { - conn := &Client{ - Conn: c, - channelHandlers: make(map[string]chan NewChannel, 1), - } - - go conn.handleGlobalRequests(reqs) - go conn.handleChannelOpens(chans) - go func() { - conn.Wait() - conn.forwards.closeAll() - }() - return conn -} - -// NewClientConn establishes an authenticated SSH connection using c -// as the underlying transport. The Request and NewChannel channels -// must be serviced or the connection will hang. -func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { - fullConf := *config - fullConf.SetDefaults() - if fullConf.HostKeyCallback == nil { - c.Close() - return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: must specify HostKeyCallback") - } - - conn := &connection{ - sshConn: sshConn{conn: c, user: fullConf.User}, - } - - if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil { - c.Close() - return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %w", err) - } - conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport) - return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil -} - -// clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section -// 7. -func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error { - if config.ClientVersion != "" { - c.clientVersion = []byte(config.ClientVersion) - } else { - c.clientVersion = []byte(packageVersion) - } - var err error - c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - c.transport = newClientTransport( - newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */), - c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr()) - if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { - return err - } - - c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID() - return c.clientAuthenticate(config) -} - -// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key exchange. -// algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may be a certificate type. -func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, algo string, result *kexResult) error { - sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature) - if len(rest) > 0 || !ok { - return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") - } - - if a := underlyingAlgo(algo); sig.Format != a { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid signature algorithm %q, expected %q", sig.Format, a) - } - - return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig) -} - -// NewSession opens a new Session for this client. (A session is a remote -// execution of a program.) -func (c *Client) NewSession() (*Session, error) { - ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("session", nil) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return newSession(ch, in) -} - -func (c *Client) handleGlobalRequests(incoming <-chan *Request) { - for r := range incoming { - // This handles keepalive messages and matches - // the behaviour of OpenSSH. - r.Reply(false, nil) - } -} - -// handleChannelOpens channel open messages from the remote side. -func (c *Client) handleChannelOpens(in <-chan NewChannel) { - for ch := range in { - c.mu.Lock() - handler := c.channelHandlers[ch.ChannelType()] - c.mu.Unlock() - - if handler != nil { - handler <- ch - } else { - ch.Reject(UnknownChannelType, fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel type: %v", ch.ChannelType())) - } - } - - c.mu.Lock() - for _, ch := range c.channelHandlers { - close(ch) - } - c.channelHandlers = nil - c.mu.Unlock() -} - -// Dial starts a client connection to the given SSH server. It is a -// convenience function that connects to the given network address, -// initiates the SSH handshake, and then sets up a Client. For access -// to incoming channels and requests, use net.Dial with NewClientConn -// instead. -func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) { - conn, err := net.DialTimeout(network, addr, config.Timeout) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c, chans, reqs, err := NewClientConn(conn, addr, config) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return NewClient(c, chans, reqs), nil -} - -// HostKeyCallback is the function type used for verifying server -// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or -// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial -// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the -// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection. -type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error - -// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by -// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server. -type BannerCallback func(message string) error - -// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be -// modified after having been passed to an SSH function. -type ClientConfig struct { - // Config contains configuration that is shared between clients and - // servers. - Config - - // User contains the username to authenticate as. - User string - - // Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the - // server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will - // be used during authentication. - Auth []AuthMethod - - // HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic - // handshake to validate the server's host key. The client - // configuration must supply this callback for the connection - // to succeed. The functions InsecureIgnoreHostKey or - // FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks. - HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback - - // BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom - // server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to - // handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for - // simplistic display on Stderr. - BannerCallback BannerCallback - - // ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will - // be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used. - ClientVersion string - - // HostKeyAlgorithms lists the public key algorithms that the client will - // accept from the server for host key authentication, in order of - // preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any - // string returned from a PublicKey.Type method may be used, or - // any of the CertAlgo and KeyAlgo constants. - HostKeyAlgorithms []string - - // Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish. - // - // A Timeout of zero means no timeout. - Timeout time.Duration -} - -// InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for -// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept any host key. It should -// not be used for production code. -func InsecureIgnoreHostKey() HostKeyCallback { - return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { - return nil - } -} - -type fixedHostKey struct { - key PublicKey -} - -func (f *fixedHostKey) check(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { - if f.key == nil { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: required host key was nil") - } - if !bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), f.key.Marshal()) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: host key mismatch") - } - return nil -} - -// FixedHostKey returns a function for use in -// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept only a specific host key. -func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback { - hk := &fixedHostKey{key} - return hk.check -} - -// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for -// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr. -func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback { - return func(banner string) error { - _, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner) - - return err - } -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go deleted file mode 100644 index b86dde151..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,796 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "strings" -) - -type authResult int - -const ( - authFailure authResult = iota - authPartialSuccess - authSuccess -) - -// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. -func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { - // initiate user auth session - if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil { - return err - } - packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return err - } - // The server may choose to send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at this point (if we - // advertised willingness to receive one, which we always do) or not. See - // RFC 8308, Section 2.4. - extensions := make(map[string][]byte) - if len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgExtInfo { - var extInfo extInfoMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &extInfo); err != nil { - return err - } - payload := extInfo.Payload - for i := uint32(0); i < extInfo.NumExtensions; i++ { - name, rest, ok := parseString(payload) - if !ok { - return parseError(msgExtInfo) - } - value, rest, ok := parseString(rest) - if !ok { - return parseError(msgExtInfo) - } - extensions[string(name)] = value - payload = rest - } - packet, err = c.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil { - return err - } - - // during the authentication phase the client first attempts the "none" method - // then any untried methods suggested by the server. - var tried []string - var lastMethods []string - - sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID() - for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; { - ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions) - if err != nil { - // On disconnect, return error immediately - if _, ok := err.(*disconnectMsg); ok { - return err - } - // We return the error later if there is no other method left to - // try. - ok = authFailure - } - if ok == authSuccess { - // success - return nil - } else if ok == authFailure { - if m := auth.method(); !contains(tried, m) { - tried = append(tried, m) - } - } - if methods == nil { - methods = lastMethods - } - lastMethods = methods - - auth = nil - - findNext: - for _, a := range config.Auth { - candidateMethod := a.method() - if contains(tried, candidateMethod) { - continue - } - for _, meth := range methods { - if meth == candidateMethod { - auth = a - break findNext - } - } - } - - if auth == nil && err != nil { - // We have an error and there are no other authentication methods to - // try, so we return it. - return err - } - } - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", tried) -} - -func contains(list []string, e string) bool { - for _, s := range list { - if s == e { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -// An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method. -type AuthMethod interface { - // auth authenticates user over transport t. - // Returns true if authentication is successful. - // If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative - // method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored - // and the previous set of possible methods will be reused. - auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) - - // method returns the RFC 4252 method name. - method() string -} - -// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2. -type noneAuth int - -func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: "none", - })); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - return handleAuthResponse(c) -} - -func (n *noneAuth) method() string { - return "none" -} - -// passwordCallback is an AuthMethod that fetches the password through -// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user. -type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error) - -func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { - type passwordAuthMsg struct { - User string `sshtype:"50"` - Service string - Method string - Reply bool - Password string - } - - pw, err := cb() - // REVIEW NOTE: is there a need to support skipping a password attempt? - // The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password - // when prompting. - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: cb.method(), - Reply: false, - Password: pw, - })); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - return handleAuthResponse(c) -} - -func (cb passwordCallback) method() string { - return "password" -} - -// Password returns an AuthMethod using the given password. -func Password(secret string) AuthMethod { - return passwordCallback(func() (string, error) { return secret, nil }) -} - -// PasswordCallback returns an AuthMethod that uses a callback for -// fetching a password. -func PasswordCallback(prompt func() (secret string, err error)) AuthMethod { - return passwordCallback(prompt) -} - -type publickeyAuthMsg struct { - User string `sshtype:"50"` - Service string - Method string - // HasSig indicates to the receiver packet that the auth request is signed and - // should be used for authentication of the request. - HasSig bool - Algoname string - PubKey []byte - // Sig is tagged with "rest" so Marshal will exclude it during - // validateKey - Sig []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// publicKeyCallback is an AuthMethod that uses a set of key -// pairs for authentication. -type publicKeyCallback func() ([]Signer, error) - -func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string { - return "publickey" -} - -func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, string, error) { - var as MultiAlgorithmSigner - keyFormat := signer.PublicKey().Type() - - // If the signer implements MultiAlgorithmSigner we use the algorithms it - // support, if it implements AlgorithmSigner we assume it supports all - // algorithms, otherwise only the key format one. - switch s := signer.(type) { - case MultiAlgorithmSigner: - as = s - case AlgorithmSigner: - as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ - AlgorithmSigner: s, - supportedAlgorithms: algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)), - } - default: - as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ - AlgorithmSigner: algorithmSignerWrapper{signer}, - supportedAlgorithms: []string{underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)}, - } - } - - getFallbackAlgo := func() (string, error) { - // Fallback to use if there is no "server-sig-algs" extension or a - // common algorithm cannot be found. We use the public key format if the - // MultiAlgorithmSigner supports it, otherwise we return an error. - if !contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) { - return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common public key signature algorithm, server only supports %q for key type %q, signer only supports %v", - underlyingAlgo(keyFormat), keyFormat, as.Algorithms()) - } - return keyFormat, nil - } - - extPayload, ok := extensions["server-sig-algs"] - if !ok { - // If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension use the fallback - // algorithm. - algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() - return as, algo, err - } - - // The server-sig-algs extension only carries underlying signature - // algorithm, but we are trying to select a protocol-level public key - // algorithm, which might be a certificate type. Extend the list of server - // supported algorithms to include the corresponding certificate algorithms. - serverAlgos := strings.Split(string(extPayload), ",") - for _, algo := range serverAlgos { - if certAlgo, ok := certificateAlgo(algo); ok { - serverAlgos = append(serverAlgos, certAlgo) - } - } - - // Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner. - var keyAlgos []string - for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { - if contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { - keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo) - } - } - - algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos) - if err != nil { - // If there is no overlap, return the fallback algorithm to support - // servers that fail to list all supported algorithms. - algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() - return as, algo, err - } - return as, algo, nil -} - -func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { - // Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is - // acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will - // attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat - // the process with the remaining keys. - - signers, err := cb() - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - var methods []string - var errSigAlgo error - - origSignersLen := len(signers) - for idx := 0; idx < len(signers); idx++ { - signer := signers[idx] - pub := signer.PublicKey() - as, algo, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions) - if err != nil && errSigAlgo == nil { - // If we cannot negotiate a signature algorithm store the first - // error so we can return it to provide a more meaningful message if - // no other signers work. - errSigAlgo = err - continue - } - ok, err := validateKey(pub, algo, user, c) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - // OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 advertises support for rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 - // in the "server-sig-algs" extension but doesn't support these - // algorithms for certificate authentication, so if the server rejects - // the key try to use the obtained algorithm as if "server-sig-algs" had - // not been implemented if supported from the algorithm signer. - if !ok && idx < origSignersLen && isRSACert(algo) && algo != CertAlgoRSAv01 { - if contains(as.Algorithms(), KeyAlgoRSA) { - // We retry using the compat algorithm after all signers have - // been tried normally. - signers = append(signers, &multiAlgorithmSigner{ - AlgorithmSigner: as, - supportedAlgorithms: []string{KeyAlgoRSA}, - }) - } - } - if !ok { - continue - } - - pubKey := pub.Marshal() - data := buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: cb.method(), - }, algo, pubKey) - sign, err := as.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - // manually wrap the serialized signature in a string - s := Marshal(sign) - sig := make([]byte, stringLength(len(s))) - marshalString(sig, s) - msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: cb.method(), - HasSig: true, - Algoname: algo, - PubKey: pubKey, - Sig: sig, - } - p := Marshal(&msg) - if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - var success authResult - success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not - // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any - // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when - // additional authentication methods are required. - if success == authSuccess || !contains(methods, cb.method()) { - return success, methods, err - } - } - - return authFailure, methods, errSigAlgo -} - -// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server. -func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) { - pubKey := key.Marshal() - msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: "publickey", - HasSig: false, - Algoname: algo, - PubKey: pubKey, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil { - return false, err - } - - return confirmKeyAck(key, c) -} - -func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) { - pubKey := key.Marshal() - - for { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return false, err - } - switch packet[0] { - case msgUserAuthBanner: - if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { - return false, err - } - case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: - var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return false, err - } - // According to RFC 4252 Section 7 the algorithm in - // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK should match that of the request but some - // servers send the key type instead. OpenSSH allows any algorithm - // that matches the public key, so we do the same. - // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/86bdd385/sshconnect2.c#L709 - if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(key.Type()), msg.Algo) { - return false, nil - } - if !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) { - return false, nil - } - return true, nil - case msgUserAuthFailure: - return false, nil - default: - return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthPubKeyOk, packet[0]) - } - } -} - -// PublicKeys returns an AuthMethod that uses the given key -// pairs. -func PublicKeys(signers ...Signer) AuthMethod { - return publicKeyCallback(func() ([]Signer, error) { return signers, nil }) -} - -// PublicKeysCallback returns an AuthMethod that runs the given -// function to obtain a list of key pairs. -func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMethod { - return publicKeyCallback(getSigners) -} - -// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded -// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and -// an error if an unexpected response was received. -func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) { - gotMsgExtInfo := false - for { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - switch packet[0] { - case msgUserAuthBanner: - if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - case msgExtInfo: - // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. - if gotMsgExtInfo { - return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) - } - gotMsgExtInfo = true - case msgUserAuthFailure: - var msg userAuthFailureMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - if msg.PartialSuccess { - return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil - } - return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil - case msgUserAuthSuccess: - return authSuccess, nil, nil - default: - return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) - } - } -} - -func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error { - var msg userAuthBannerMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return err - } - - transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport) - if !ok { - return nil - } - - if transport.bannerCallback != nil { - return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message) - } - - return nil -} - -// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally -// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers. -// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After -// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no -// questions, for which the name and instruction messages should be -// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for -// both CLI and GUI environments. -type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) - -// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response -// sequence controlled by the server. -func KeyboardInteractive(challenge KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) AuthMethod { - return challenge -} - -func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string { - return "keyboard-interactive" -} - -func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { - type initiateMsg struct { - User string `sshtype:"50"` - Service string - Method string - Language string - Submethods string - } - - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&initiateMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: "keyboard-interactive", - })); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - gotMsgExtInfo := false - gotUserAuthInfoRequest := false - for { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - // like handleAuthResponse, but with less options. - switch packet[0] { - case msgUserAuthBanner: - if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - continue - case msgExtInfo: - // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. - if gotMsgExtInfo { - return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) - } - gotMsgExtInfo = true - continue - case msgUserAuthInfoRequest: - // OK - case msgUserAuthFailure: - var msg userAuthFailureMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - if msg.PartialSuccess { - return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil - } - if !gotUserAuthInfoRequest { - return authFailure, msg.Methods, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) - } - return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil - case msgUserAuthSuccess: - return authSuccess, nil, nil - default: - return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) - } - - var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - gotUserAuthInfoRequest = true - - // Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs. - rest := msg.Prompts - var prompts []string - var echos []bool - for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ { - prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest) - if !ok || len(r) == 0 { - return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") - } - prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt)) - echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0) - rest = r[1:] - } - - if len(rest) != 0 { - return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") - } - - answers, err := cb(msg.Name, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - - if len(answers) != len(prompts) { - return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: incorrect number of answers from keyboard-interactive callback %d (expected %d)", len(answers), len(prompts)) - } - responseLength := 1 + 4 - for _, a := range answers { - responseLength += stringLength(len(a)) - } - serialized := make([]byte, responseLength) - p := serialized - p[0] = msgUserAuthInfoResponse - p = p[1:] - p = marshalUint32(p, uint32(len(answers))) - for _, a := range answers { - p = marshalString(p, []byte(a)) - } - - if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - } -} - -type retryableAuthMethod struct { - authMethod AuthMethod - maxTries int -} - -func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) { - for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ { - ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand, extensions) - if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate - return ok, methods, err - } - } - return ok, methods, err -} - -func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string { - return r.authMethod.method() -} - -// RetryableAuthMethod is a decorator for other auth methods enabling them to -// be retried up to maxTries before considering that AuthMethod itself failed. -// If maxTries is <= 0, will retry indefinitely -// -// This is useful for interactive clients using challenge/response type -// authentication (e.g. Keyboard-Interactive, Password, etc) where the user -// could mistype their response resulting in the server issuing a -// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (rfc4252 #8 [password] and rfc4256 #3.4 -// [keyboard-interactive]); Without this decorator, the non-retryable -// AuthMethod would be removed from future consideration, and never tried again -// (and so the user would never be able to retry their entry). -func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod { - return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries} -} - -// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication. -// See RFC 4462 section 3 -// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details. -// target is the server host you want to log in to. -func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod { - if gssAPIClient == nil { - panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic") - } - return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target} -} - -type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct { - gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient - target string -} - -func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { - m := &userAuthRequestMsg{ - User: user, - Service: serviceSSH, - Method: g.method(), - } - // The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST. - // See RFC 4462 section 3.2. - m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1) - m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID)) - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - // The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an - // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or - // with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE. - // See RFC 4462 section 3.3. - // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check - // selected mech if it is valid. - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - // Start the loop into the exchange token. - // See RFC 4462 section 3.4. - var token []byte - defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext() - for { - // Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer. - nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - if len(nextToken) > 0 { - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ - Token: nextToken, - })); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - } - if !needContinue { - break - } - packet, err = c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - switch packet[0] { - case msgUserAuthFailure: - var msg userAuthFailureMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - if msg.PartialSuccess { - return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil - } - return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: - userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+ - "Major Status: %d\n"+ - "Minor Status: %d\n"+ - "Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus, - userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message) - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: - userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token - } - } - // Binding Encryption Keys. - // See RFC 4462 section 3.5. - micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic") - micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField) - if err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{ - MIC: micToken, - })); err != nil { - return authFailure, nil, err - } - return handleAuthResponse(c) -} - -func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string { - return "gssapi-with-mic" -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go deleted file mode 100644 index 7e9c2cbc6..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,476 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/rand" - "fmt" - "io" - "math" - "sync" - - _ "crypto/sha1" - _ "crypto/sha256" - _ "crypto/sha512" -) - -// These are string constants in the SSH protocol. -const ( - compressionNone = "none" - serviceUserAuth = "ssh-userauth" - serviceSSH = "ssh-connection" -) - -// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend. -var supportedCiphers = []string{ - "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", - "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID, - chacha20Poly1305ID, - "arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour", - aes128cbcID, - tripledescbcID, -} - -// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers. -var preferredCiphers = []string{ - "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID, - chacha20Poly1305ID, - "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", -} - -// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in -// preference order. -var supportedKexAlgos = []string{ - kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH, - // P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't - // reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK. - kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, - kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH16SHA512, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, - kexAlgoDH1SHA1, -} - -// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden -// for the server half. -var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{ - kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests - kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests -} - -// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange -// algorithms in preference order. The diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 algorithm -// is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than the others. -var preferredKexAlgos = []string{ - kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH, - kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, - kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, -} - -// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods -// of authenticating servers) in preference order. -var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{ - CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, - CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, - CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, - - KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, - KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, - KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, - - KeyAlgoED25519, -} - -// supportedMACs specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order. -// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed -// because they have reached the end of their useful life. -var supportedMACs = []string{ - "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha2-512", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96", -} - -var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone} - -// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported signature algorithms to their -// respective hashes needed for signing and verification. -var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{ - KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1, - KeyAlgoRSASHA256: crypto.SHA256, - KeyAlgoRSASHA512: crypto.SHA512, - KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1, - KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256, - KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384, - KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512, - // KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash. - KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: crypto.SHA256, - KeyAlgoSKED25519: crypto.SHA256, -} - -// algorithmsForKeyFormat returns the supported signature algorithms for a given -// public key format (PublicKey.Type), in order of preference. See RFC 8332, -// Section 2. See also the note in sendKexInit on backwards compatibility. -func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string { - switch keyFormat { - case KeyAlgoRSA: - return []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA} - case CertAlgoRSAv01: - return []string{CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSAv01} - default: - return []string{keyFormat} - } -} - -// isRSA returns whether algo is a supported RSA algorithm, including certificate -// algorithms. -func isRSA(algo string) bool { - algos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(KeyAlgoRSA) - return contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo)) -} - -func isRSACert(algo string) bool { - _, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo] - if !ok { - return false - } - return isRSA(algo) -} - -// supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key -// authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate types -// since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the client if -// it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. -var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{ - KeyAlgoED25519, - KeyAlgoSKED25519, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, - KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, - KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA, - KeyAlgoDSA, -} - -// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't -// match what we wanted. -func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected %d)", got, expected) -} - -// parseError results from a malformed SSH message. -func parseError(tag uint8) error { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag) -} - -func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, err error) { - for _, c := range client { - for _, s := range server { - if c == s { - return c, nil - } - } - } - return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server) -} - -// directionAlgorithms records algorithm choices in one direction (either read or write) -type directionAlgorithms struct { - Cipher string - MAC string - Compression string -} - -// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes. -func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 { - // According to RFC 4344 block ciphers should rekey after - // 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is - // 128. - switch a.Cipher { - case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcm128CipherID, gcm256CipherID, aes128cbcID: - return 16 * (1 << 32) - - } - - // For others, stick with RFC 4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data. - return 1 << 30 -} - -var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{ - gcm128CipherID: true, - gcm256CipherID: true, - chacha20Poly1305ID: true, -} - -type algorithms struct { - kex string - hostKey string - w directionAlgorithms - r directionAlgorithms -} - -func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) { - result := &algorithms{} - - result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos) - if err != nil { - return - } - - result.hostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos) - if err != nil { - return - } - - stoc, ctos := &result.w, &result.r - if isClient { - ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos - } - - ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer) - if err != nil { - return - } - - stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient) - if err != nil { - return - } - - if !aeadCiphers[ctos.Cipher] { - ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer) - if err != nil { - return - } - } - - if !aeadCiphers[stoc.Cipher] { - stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient) - if err != nil { - return - } - } - - ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer) - if err != nil { - return - } - - stoc.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient) - if err != nil { - return - } - - return result, nil -} - -// If rekeythreshold is too small, we can't make any progress sending -// stuff. -const minRekeyThreshold uint64 = 256 - -// Config contains configuration data common to both ServerConfig and -// ClientConfig. -type Config struct { - // Rand provides the source of entropy for cryptographic - // primitives. If Rand is nil, the cryptographic random reader - // in package crypto/rand will be used. - Rand io.Reader - - // The maximum number of bytes sent or received after which a - // new key is negotiated. It must be at least 256. If - // unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used. - RekeyThreshold uint64 - - // The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a default set - // of algorithms is used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. - KeyExchanges []string - - // The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is - // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. - Ciphers []string - - // The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is - // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. - MACs []string -} - -// SetDefaults sets sensible values for unset fields in config. This is -// exported for testing: Configs passed to SSH functions are copied and have -// default values set automatically. -func (c *Config) SetDefaults() { - if c.Rand == nil { - c.Rand = rand.Reader - } - if c.Ciphers == nil { - c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers - } - var ciphers []string - for _, c := range c.Ciphers { - if cipherModes[c] != nil { - // Ignore the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition. - ciphers = append(ciphers, c) - } - } - c.Ciphers = ciphers - - if c.KeyExchanges == nil { - c.KeyExchanges = preferredKexAlgos - } - var kexs []string - for _, k := range c.KeyExchanges { - if kexAlgoMap[k] != nil { - // Ignore the KEX if we have no kexAlgoMap definition. - kexs = append(kexs, k) - } - } - c.KeyExchanges = kexs - - if c.MACs == nil { - c.MACs = supportedMACs - } - var macs []string - for _, m := range c.MACs { - if macModes[m] != nil { - // Ignore the MAC if we have no macModes definition. - macs = append(macs, m) - } - } - c.MACs = macs - - if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 { - // cipher specific default - } else if c.RekeyThreshold < minRekeyThreshold { - c.RekeyThreshold = minRekeyThreshold - } else if c.RekeyThreshold >= math.MaxInt64 { - // Avoid weirdness if somebody uses -1 as a threshold. - c.RekeyThreshold = math.MaxInt64 - } -} - -// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove -// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7. algo is the advertised -// algorithm, and may be a certificate type. -func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo string, pubKey []byte) []byte { - data := struct { - Session []byte - Type byte - User string - Service string - Method string - Sign bool - Algo string - PubKey []byte - }{ - sessionID, - msgUserAuthRequest, - req.User, - req.Service, - req.Method, - true, - algo, - pubKey, - } - return Marshal(data) -} - -func appendU16(buf []byte, n uint16) []byte { - return append(buf, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) -} - -func appendU32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte { - return append(buf, byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) -} - -func appendU64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte { - return append(buf, - byte(n>>56), byte(n>>48), byte(n>>40), byte(n>>32), - byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) -} - -func appendInt(buf []byte, n int) []byte { - return appendU32(buf, uint32(n)) -} - -func appendString(buf []byte, s string) []byte { - buf = appendU32(buf, uint32(len(s))) - buf = append(buf, s...) - return buf -} - -func appendBool(buf []byte, b bool) []byte { - if b { - return append(buf, 1) - } - return append(buf, 0) -} - -// newCond is a helper to hide the fact that there is no usable zero -// value for sync.Cond. -func newCond() *sync.Cond { return sync.NewCond(new(sync.Mutex)) } - -// window represents the buffer available to clients -// wishing to write to a channel. -type window struct { - *sync.Cond - win uint32 // RFC 4254 5.2 says the window size can grow to 2^32-1 - writeWaiters int - closed bool -} - -// add adds win to the amount of window available -// for consumers. -func (w *window) add(win uint32) bool { - // a zero sized window adjust is a noop. - if win == 0 { - return true - } - w.L.Lock() - if w.win+win < win { - w.L.Unlock() - return false - } - w.win += win - // It is unusual that multiple goroutines would be attempting to reserve - // window space, but not guaranteed. Use broadcast to notify all waiters - // that additional window is available. - w.Broadcast() - w.L.Unlock() - return true -} - -// close sets the window to closed, so all reservations fail -// immediately. -func (w *window) close() { - w.L.Lock() - w.closed = true - w.Broadcast() - w.L.Unlock() -} - -// reserve reserves win from the available window capacity. -// If no capacity remains, reserve will block. reserve may -// return less than requested. -func (w *window) reserve(win uint32) (uint32, error) { - var err error - w.L.Lock() - w.writeWaiters++ - w.Broadcast() - for w.win == 0 && !w.closed { - w.Wait() - } - w.writeWaiters-- - if w.win < win { - win = w.win - } - w.win -= win - if w.closed { - err = io.EOF - } - w.L.Unlock() - return win, err -} - -// waitWriterBlocked waits until some goroutine is blocked for further -// writes. It is used in tests only. -func (w *window) waitWriterBlocked() { - w.Cond.L.Lock() - for w.writeWaiters == 0 { - w.Cond.Wait() - } - w.Cond.L.Unlock() -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go deleted file mode 100644 index 8f345ee92..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "fmt" - "net" -) - -// OpenChannelError is returned if the other side rejects an -// OpenChannel request. -type OpenChannelError struct { - Reason RejectionReason - Message string -} - -func (e *OpenChannelError) Error() string { - return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: rejected: %s (%s)", e.Reason, e.Message) -} - -// ConnMetadata holds metadata for the connection. -type ConnMetadata interface { - // User returns the user ID for this connection. - User() string - - // SessionID returns the session hash, also denoted by H. - SessionID() []byte - - // ClientVersion returns the client's version string as hashed - // into the session ID. - ClientVersion() []byte - - // ServerVersion returns the server's version string as hashed - // into the session ID. - ServerVersion() []byte - - // RemoteAddr returns the remote address for this connection. - RemoteAddr() net.Addr - - // LocalAddr returns the local address for this connection. - LocalAddr() net.Addr -} - -// Conn represents an SSH connection for both server and client roles. -// Conn is the basis for implementing an application layer, such -// as ClientConn, which implements the traditional shell access for -// clients. -type Conn interface { - ConnMetadata - - // SendRequest sends a global request, and returns the - // reply. If wantReply is true, it returns the response status - // and payload. See also RFC 4254, section 4. - SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) - - // OpenChannel tries to open an channel. If the request is - // rejected, it returns *OpenChannelError. On success it returns - // the SSH Channel and a Go channel for incoming, out-of-band - // requests. The Go channel must be serviced, or the - // connection will hang. - OpenChannel(name string, data []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) - - // Close closes the underlying network connection - Close() error - - // Wait blocks until the connection has shut down, and returns the - // error causing the shutdown. - Wait() error - - // TODO(hanwen): consider exposing: - // RequestKeyChange - // Disconnect -} - -// DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the -// passed-in channel. -func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) { - for req := range in { - if req.WantReply { - req.Reply(false, nil) - } - } -} - -// A connection represents an incoming connection. -type connection struct { - transport *handshakeTransport - sshConn - - // The connection protocol. - *mux -} - -func (c *connection) Close() error { - return c.sshConn.conn.Close() -} - -// sshConn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and -// writes. -type sshConn struct { - conn net.Conn - - user string - sessionID []byte - clientVersion []byte - serverVersion []byte -} - -func dup(src []byte) []byte { - dst := make([]byte, len(src)) - copy(dst, src) - return dst -} - -func (c *sshConn) User() string { - return c.user -} - -func (c *sshConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { - return c.conn.RemoteAddr() -} - -func (c *sshConn) Close() error { - return c.conn.Close() -} - -func (c *sshConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { - return c.conn.LocalAddr() -} - -func (c *sshConn) SessionID() []byte { - return dup(c.sessionID) -} - -func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte { - return dup(c.clientVersion) -} - -func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte { - return dup(c.serverVersion) -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go deleted file mode 100644 index f5d352fe3..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -/* -Package ssh implements an SSH client and server. - -SSH is a transport security protocol, an authentication protocol and a -family of application protocols. The most typical application level -protocol is a remote shell and this is specifically implemented. However, -the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support -others. - -References: - - [PROTOCOL]: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?rev=HEAD - [PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD - [SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1 - -This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself, -so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise. -*/ -package ssh diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go deleted file mode 100644 index fef687db0..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,816 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "crypto/rand" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "net" - "strings" - "sync" -) - -// debugHandshake, if set, prints messages sent and received. Key -// exchange messages are printed as if DH were used, so the debug -// messages are wrong when using ECDH. -const debugHandshake = false - -// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is -// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more -// quickly. -const chanSize = 16 - -// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key -// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through -// msgNewKeys in both directions. -type keyingTransport interface { - packetConn - - // prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a - // direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent - // or received. - prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error - - // setStrictMode sets the strict KEX mode, notably triggering - // sequence number resets on sending or receiving msgNewKeys. - // If the sequence number is already > 1 when setStrictMode - // is called, an error is returned. - setStrictMode() error - - // setInitialKEXDone indicates to the transport that the initial key exchange - // was completed - setInitialKEXDone() -} - -// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport -// and offers a thread-safe writePacket() interface. -type handshakeTransport struct { - conn keyingTransport - config *Config - - serverVersion []byte - clientVersion []byte - - // hostKeys is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, - // it contains all host keys that can be used to sign the - // connection. - hostKeys []Signer - - // publicKeyAuthAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, - // it contains the supported client public key authentication algorithms. - publicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string - - // hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case, - // we accept these key types from the server as host key. - hostKeyAlgorithms []string - - // On read error, incoming is closed, and readError is set. - incoming chan []byte - readError error - - mu sync.Mutex - writeError error - sentInitPacket []byte - sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg - pendingPackets [][]byte // Used when a key exchange is in progress. - writePacketsLeft uint32 - writeBytesLeft int64 - userAuthComplete bool // whether the user authentication phase is complete - - // If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this - // channel, and the write loop will send out a kex - // message. - requestKex chan struct{} - - // If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit - // packet is sent here for the write loop to find it. - startKex chan *pendingKex - kexLoopDone chan struct{} // closed (with writeError non-nil) when kexLoop exits - - // data for host key checking - hostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback - dialAddress string - remoteAddr net.Addr - - // bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in - // ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication - // dance to handle a custom server's message. - bannerCallback BannerCallback - - // Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange. - algorithms *algorithms - - // Counters exclusively owned by readLoop. - readPacketsLeft uint32 - readBytesLeft int64 - - // The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet. - sessionID []byte - - // strictMode indicates if the other side of the handshake indicated - // that we should be following the strict KEX protocol restrictions. - strictMode bool -} - -type pendingKex struct { - otherInit []byte - done chan error -} - -func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport { - t := &handshakeTransport{ - conn: conn, - serverVersion: serverVersion, - clientVersion: clientVersion, - incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize), - requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1), - startKex: make(chan *pendingKex), - kexLoopDone: make(chan struct{}), - - config: config, - } - t.resetReadThresholds() - t.resetWriteThresholds() - - // We always start with a mandatory key exchange. - t.requestKex <- struct{}{} - return t -} - -func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ClientConfig, dialAddr string, addr net.Addr) *handshakeTransport { - t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) - t.dialAddress = dialAddr - t.remoteAddr = addr - t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback - t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback - if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil { - t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms - } else { - t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos - } - go t.readLoop() - go t.kexLoop() - return t -} - -func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport { - t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) - t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys - t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms = config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms - go t.readLoop() - go t.kexLoop() - return t -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte { - return t.sessionID -} - -// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be -// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport. -func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error { - p, err := t.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return err - } - if p[0] != msgNewKeys { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys") - } - - return nil -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string { - if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { - return "server" - } - return "client" -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { - action := "got" - if write { - action = "sent" - } - - if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { - log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p)) - } else { - msg, err := decode(p) - log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err) - } -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) { - p, ok := <-t.incoming - if !ok { - return nil, t.readError - } - return p, nil -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() { - first := true - for { - p, err := t.readOnePacket(first) - first = false - if err != nil { - t.readError = err - close(t.incoming) - break - } - // If this is the first kex, and strict KEX mode is enabled, - // we don't ignore any messages, as they may be used to manipulate - // the packet sequence numbers. - if !(t.sessionID == nil && t.strictMode) && (p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug) { - continue - } - t.incoming <- p - } - - // Stop writers too. - t.recordWriteError(t.readError) - - // Unblock the writer should it wait for this. - close(t.startKex) - - // Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket. -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error { - if debugHandshake { - t.printPacket(p, true) - } - return t.conn.writePacket(p) -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error { - t.mu.Lock() - defer t.mu.Unlock() - return t.writeError -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) { - t.mu.Lock() - defer t.mu.Unlock() - if t.writeError == nil && err != nil { - t.writeError = err - } -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() { - select { - case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}: - default: - // something already requested a kex, so do nothing. - } -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() { - t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold - if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { - t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) - } else if t.algorithms != nil { - t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes() - } else { - t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30 - } -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() { - -write: - for t.getWriteError() == nil { - var request *pendingKex - var sent bool - - for request == nil || !sent { - var ok bool - select { - case request, ok = <-t.startKex: - if !ok { - break write - } - case <-t.requestKex: - break - } - - if !sent { - if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil { - t.recordWriteError(err) - break - } - sent = true - } - } - - if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil { - if request != nil { - request.done <- err - } - break - } - - // We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK: - // we never block on sending to t.requestKex. - - // We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end - // has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send - // another key change request, until we close the done - // channel on the pendingKex request. - - err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit) - - t.mu.Lock() - t.writeError = err - t.sentInitPacket = nil - t.sentInitMsg = nil - - t.resetWriteThresholds() - - // we have completed the key exchange. Since the - // reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out - // the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation - // where: 1) we consumed our own request for the - // initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side - // caused another send on the requestKex channel, - clear: - for { - select { - case <-t.requestKex: - // - default: - break clear - } - } - - request.done <- t.writeError - - // kex finished. Push packets that we received while - // the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex - // and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger - // another kex while we are still busy with the last - // one, things will become very confusing. - for _, p := range t.pendingPackets { - t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p) - if t.writeError != nil { - break - } - } - t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0] - t.mu.Unlock() - } - - // Unblock reader. - t.conn.Close() - - // drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex - // because nobody does blocking sends there. - for request := range t.startKex { - request.done <- t.getWriteError() - } - - // Mark that the loop is done so that Close can return. - close(t.kexLoopDone) -} - -// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them -// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than -// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we -// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the -// key exchange itself. -const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31) - -func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() { - t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold - if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { - t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) - } else if t.algorithms != nil { - t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes() - } else { - t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30 - } -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) { - p, err := t.conn.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 { - t.readPacketsLeft-- - } else { - t.requestKeyExchange() - } - - if t.readBytesLeft > 0 { - t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) - } else { - t.requestKeyExchange() - } - - if debugHandshake { - t.printPacket(p, false) - } - - if first && p[0] != msgKexInit { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit") - } - - if p[0] != msgKexInit { - return p, nil - } - - firstKex := t.sessionID == nil - - kex := pendingKex{ - done: make(chan error, 1), - otherInit: p, - } - t.startKex <- &kex - err = <-kex.done - - if debugHandshake { - log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err) - } - - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - t.resetReadThresholds() - - // By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by - // translating it into msgIgnore. - successPacket := []byte{msgIgnore} - if firstKex { - // sendKexInit() for the first kex waits for - // msgNewKeys so the authentication process is - // guaranteed to happen over an encrypted transport. - successPacket = []byte{msgNewKeys} - } - - return successPacket, nil -} - -const ( - kexStrictClient = "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" - kexStrictServer = "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" -) - -// sendKexInit sends a key change message. -func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { - t.mu.Lock() - defer t.mu.Unlock() - if t.sentInitMsg != nil { - // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side, - // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we - // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a - // second kexInit. - return nil - } - - msg := &kexInitMsg{ - CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers, - CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers, - MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs, - MACsServerClient: t.config.MACs, - CompressionClientServer: supportedCompressions, - CompressionServerClient: supportedCompressions, - } - io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:]) - - // We mutate the KexAlgos slice, in order to add the kex-strict extension algorithm, - // and possibly to add the ext-info extension algorithm. Since the slice may be the - // user owned KeyExchanges, we create our own slice in order to avoid using user - // owned memory by mistake. - msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+2) // room for kex-strict and ext-info - msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...) - - isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0 - if isServer { - for _, k := range t.hostKeys { - // If k is a MultiAlgorithmSigner, we restrict the signature - // algorithms. If k is a AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all - // signature algorithms associated with the key format. If k is not - // an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the - // algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign - // can't pick a different default). - keyFormat := k.PublicKey().Type() - - switch s := k.(type) { - case MultiAlgorithmSigner: - for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { - if contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { - msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algo) - } - } - case AlgorithmSigner: - msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)...) - default: - msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat) - } - } - - if t.sessionID == nil { - msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer) - } - } else { - msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms - - // As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what - // algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC - // 8308, Section 2.1. - // - // We also send the strict KEX mode extension algorithm, in order to opt - // into the strict KEX mode. - if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange { - msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") - msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient) - } - - } - - packet := Marshal(msg) - - // writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy. - packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet)) - copy(packetCopy, packet) - - if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil { - return err - } - - t.sentInitMsg = msg - t.sentInitPacket = packet - - return nil -} - -var errSendBannerPhase = errors.New("ssh: SendAuthBanner outside of authentication phase") - -func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error { - t.mu.Lock() - defer t.mu.Unlock() - - switch p[0] { - case msgKexInit: - return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit") - case msgNewKeys: - return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys") - case msgUserAuthBanner: - if t.userAuthComplete { - return errSendBannerPhase - } - case msgUserAuthSuccess: - t.userAuthComplete = true - } - - if t.writeError != nil { - return t.writeError - } - - if t.sentInitMsg != nil { - // Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer. - cp := make([]byte, len(p)) - copy(cp, p) - t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp) - return nil - } - - if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 { - t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) - } else { - t.requestKeyExchange() - } - - if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 { - t.writePacketsLeft-- - } else { - t.requestKeyExchange() - } - - if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil { - t.writeError = err - } - - return nil -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error { - // Close the connection. This should cause the readLoop goroutine to wake up - // and close t.startKex, which will shut down kexLoop if running. - err := t.conn.Close() - - // Wait for the kexLoop goroutine to complete. - // At that point we know that the readLoop goroutine is complete too, - // because kexLoop itself waits for readLoop to close the startKex channel. - <-t.kexLoopDone - - return err -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { - if debugHandshake { - log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id()) - } - - otherInit := &kexInitMsg{} - if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil { - return err - } - - magics := handshakeMagics{ - clientVersion: t.clientVersion, - serverVersion: t.serverVersion, - clientKexInit: otherInitPacket, - serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket, - } - - clientInit := otherInit - serverInit := t.sentInitMsg - isClient := len(t.hostKeys) == 0 - if isClient { - clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit - - magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket - magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket - } - - var err error - t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient, clientInit, serverInit) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - if t.sessionID == nil && ((isClient && contains(serverInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictServer)) || (!isClient && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, kexStrictClient))) { - t.strictMode = true - if err := t.conn.setStrictMode(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - // We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it. - // - // RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for - // first_kex_packet_follows. It states that the guessed packet - // should be ignored if the "kex algorithm and/or the host - // key algorithm is guessed wrong (server and client have - // different preferred algorithm), or if any of the other - // algorithms cannot be agreed upon". The other algorithms have - // already been checked above so the kex algorithm and host key - // algorithm are checked here. - if otherInit.FirstKexFollows && (clientInit.KexAlgos[0] != serverInit.KexAlgos[0] || clientInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0] != serverInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0]) { - // other side sent a kex message for the wrong algorithm, - // which we have to ignore. - if _, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex] - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex) - } - - var result *kexResult - if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { - result, err = t.server(kex, &magics) - } else { - result, err = t.client(kex, &magics) - } - - if err != nil { - return err - } - - firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil - if firstKeyExchange { - t.sessionID = result.H - } - result.SessionID = t.sessionID - - if err := t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result); err != nil { - return err - } - if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil { - return err - } - - // On the server side, after the first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO - // message with the server-sig-algs extension if the client supports it. See - // RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1, and [PROTOCOL], Section 1.9. - if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") { - supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList := strings.Join(t.publicKeyAuthAlgorithms, ",") - extInfo := &extInfoMsg{ - NumExtensions: 2, - Payload: make([]byte, 0, 4+15+4+len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)+4+16+4+1), - } - extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("server-sig-algs")) - extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "server-sig-algs"...) - extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)) - extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList...) - extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("ping@openssh.com")) - extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "ping@openssh.com"...) - extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, 1) - extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "0"...) - if err := t.conn.writePacket(Marshal(extInfo)); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - if packet, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { - return err - } else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys { - return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0]) - } - - if firstKeyExchange { - // Indicates to the transport that the first key exchange is completed - // after receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS. - t.conn.setInitialKEXDone() - } - - return nil -} - -// algorithmSignerWrapper is an AlgorithmSigner that only supports the default -// key format algorithm. -// -// This is technically a violation of the AlgorithmSigner interface, but it -// should be unreachable given where we use this. Anyway, at least it returns an -// error instead of panicing or producing an incorrect signature. -type algorithmSignerWrapper struct { - Signer -} - -func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { - if algorithm != underlyingAlgo(a.PublicKey().Type()) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: algorithmSignerWrapper invoked with non-default algorithm") - } - return a.Sign(rand, data) -} - -func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner { - for _, k := range hostKeys { - if s, ok := k.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { - if !contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { - continue - } - } - - if algo == k.PublicKey().Type() { - return algorithmSignerWrapper{k} - } - - k, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner) - if !ok { - continue - } - for _, a := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(k.PublicKey().Type()) { - if algo == a { - return k - } - } - } - return nil -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.hostKey) - if hostKey == nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: negotiated unsupported signature type") - } - - r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey) - return r, err -} - -func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - hostKey, err := ParsePublicKey(result.HostKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey, result); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - err = t.hostKeyCallback(t.dialAddress, t.remoteAddr, hostKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return result, nil -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go deleted file mode 100644 index af81d2665..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// Package bcrypt_pbkdf implements bcrypt_pbkdf(3) from OpenBSD. -// -// See https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/bcrypt-pbkdf and -// https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c. -package bcrypt_pbkdf - -import ( - "crypto/sha512" - "errors" - "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish" -) - -const blockSize = 32 - -// Key derives a key from the password, salt and rounds count, returning a -// []byte of length keyLen that can be used as cryptographic key. -func Key(password, salt []byte, rounds, keyLen int) ([]byte, error) { - if rounds < 1 { - return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: number of rounds is too small") - } - if len(password) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: empty password") - } - if len(salt) == 0 || len(salt) > 1<<20 { - return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: bad salt length") - } - if keyLen > 1024 { - return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: keyLen is too large") - } - - numBlocks := (keyLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize - key := make([]byte, numBlocks*blockSize) - - h := sha512.New() - h.Write(password) - shapass := h.Sum(nil) - - shasalt := make([]byte, 0, sha512.Size) - cnt, tmp := make([]byte, 4), make([]byte, blockSize) - for block := 1; block <= numBlocks; block++ { - h.Reset() - h.Write(salt) - cnt[0] = byte(block >> 24) - cnt[1] = byte(block >> 16) - cnt[2] = byte(block >> 8) - cnt[3] = byte(block) - h.Write(cnt) - bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) - - out := make([]byte, blockSize) - copy(out, tmp) - for i := 2; i <= rounds; i++ { - h.Reset() - h.Write(tmp) - bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) - for j := 0; j < len(out); j++ { - out[j] ^= tmp[j] - } - } - - for i, v := range out { - key[i*numBlocks+(block-1)] = v - } - } - return key[:keyLen], nil -} - -var magic = []byte("OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite") - -func bcryptHash(out, shapass, shasalt []byte) { - c, err := blowfish.NewSaltedCipher(shapass, shasalt) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - for i := 0; i < 64; i++ { - blowfish.ExpandKey(shasalt, c) - blowfish.ExpandKey(shapass, c) - } - copy(out, magic) - for i := 0; i < 32; i += 8 { - for j := 0; j < 64; j++ { - c.Encrypt(out[i:i+8], out[i:i+8]) - } - } - // Swap bytes due to different endianness. - for i := 0; i < 32; i += 4 { - out[i+3], out[i+2], out[i+1], out[i] = out[i], out[i+1], out[i+2], out[i+3] - } -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go deleted file mode 100644 index 8a05f7990..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,786 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/rand" - "crypto/subtle" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "math/big" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" -) - -const ( - kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" - kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" - kexAlgoDH14SHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" - kexAlgoDH16SHA512 = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" - kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" - kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" - kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" - kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" - kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256" - - // For the following kex only the client half contains a production - // ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal - // implementation to satisfy the automated tests. - kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" - kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" -) - -// kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange. -type kexResult struct { - // Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8. - H []byte - - // Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8. - K []byte - - // Host key as hashed into H. - HostKey []byte - - // Signature of H. - Signature []byte - - // A cryptographic hash function that matches the security - // level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for - // calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K. - Hash crypto.Hash - - // The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used - // to derive key material inside the transport. - SessionID []byte -} - -// handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the -// session hash. -type handshakeMagics struct { - clientVersion, serverVersion []byte - clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte -} - -func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) { - writeString(w, m.clientVersion) - writeString(w, m.serverVersion) - writeString(w, m.clientKexInit) - writeString(w, m.serverKexInit) -} - -// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms. -type kexAlgorithm interface { - // Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result - // with a hostkey. algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may - // be a certificate type. - Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (*kexResult, error) - - // Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is - // responsible for verifying the host key signature. - Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) -} - -// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. -type dhGroup struct { - g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int - hashFunc crypto.Hash -} - -func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { - if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") - } - return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil -} - -func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - var x *big.Int - for { - var err error - if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if x.Sign() > 0 { - break - } - } - - X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p) - kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{ - X: X, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - h := group.hashFunc.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey) - writeInt(h, X) - writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y) - K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) - marshalInt(K, ki) - h.Write(K) - - return &kexResult{ - H: h.Sum(nil), - K: K, - HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey, - Signature: kexDHReply.Signature, - Hash: group.hashFunc, - }, nil -} - -func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return - } - var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil { - return - } - - var y *big.Int - for { - if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { - return - } - if y.Sign() > 0 { - break - } - } - - Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p) - ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() - - h := group.hashFunc.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) - writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X) - writeInt(h, Y) - - K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) - marshalInt(K, ki) - h.Write(K) - - H := h.Sum(nil) - - // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its - // own key-specific hash algorithm. - sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{ - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Y: Y, - Signature: sig, - } - packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply) - - err = c.writePacket(packet) - return &kexResult{ - H: H, - K: K, - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Signature: sig, - Hash: group.hashFunc, - }, err -} - -// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as -// described in RFC 5656, section 4. -type ecdh struct { - curve elliptic.Curve -} - -func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{ - ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y), - } - - serialized := Marshal(&kexInit) - if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var reply kexECDHReplyMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // generate shared secret - secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes()) - - h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, reply.HostKey) - writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) - writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) - K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) - marshalInt(K, secret) - h.Write(K) - - return &kexResult{ - H: h.Sum(nil), - K: K, - HostKey: reply.HostKey, - Signature: reply.Signature, - Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), - }, nil -} - -// unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key. -func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) { - x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey) - if x == nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure") - } - if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve") - } - return x, y, nil -} - -// validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for -// the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2 -func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool { - if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 { - return false - } - - if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { - return false - } - - if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { - return false - } - - if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { - return false - } - - // We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since - // - // - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit. - // (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST - // curves) - // - // - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small - // subgroup attacks. - return true -} - -func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple - // connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH - // generates a new key for each incoming connection. - ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() - - serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y) - - // generate shared secret - secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes()) - - h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) - writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) - writeString(h, serializedEphKey) - - K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) - marshalInt(K, secret) - h.Write(K) - - H := h.Sum(nil) - - // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its - // own key-specific hash algorithm. - sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ - EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey, - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Signature: sig, - } - - serialized := Marshal(&reply) - if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &kexResult{ - H: H, - K: K, - HostKey: reply.HostKey, - Signature: sig, - Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), - }, nil -} - -// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC -// 5656, section 6.2.1 -func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash { - bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize - switch { - case bitSize <= 256: - return crypto.SHA256 - case bitSize <= 384: - return crypto.SHA384 - } - return crypto.SHA512 -} - -var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{} - -func init() { - // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in - // RFC 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409. - p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16) - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{ - g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), - p: p, - pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), - hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, - } - - // This are the groups called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and - // diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 in RFC 4253 and RFC 8268, - // and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. - p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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group14 := &dhGroup{ - g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), - p: p, - pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), - } - - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{ - g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, - hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, - } - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{ - g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, - hashFunc: crypto.SHA256, - } - - // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC - // 8268 and Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526. - p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200CBBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16) - - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{ - g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), - p: p, - pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), - hashFunc: crypto.SHA512, - } - - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1} - kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256} -} - -// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256 (formerly known as -// curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) key exchange method, as described in RFC 8731. -type curve25519sha256 struct{} - -type curve25519KeyPair struct { - priv [32]byte - pub [32]byte -} - -func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error { - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv) - return nil -} - -// curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something -// convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the -// wrong order. -var curve25519Zeros [32]byte - -func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - var kp curve25519KeyPair - if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var reply kexECDHReplyMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") - } - - var servPub, secret [32]byte - copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey) - curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub) - if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") - } - - h := crypto.SHA256.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, reply.HostKey) - writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) - writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) - - ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) - K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) - marshalInt(K, ki) - h.Write(K) - - return &kexResult{ - H: h.Sum(nil), - K: K, - HostKey: reply.HostKey, - Signature: reply.Signature, - Hash: crypto.SHA256, - }, nil -} - -func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return - } - var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil { - return - } - - if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") - } - - var kp curve25519KeyPair - if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var clientPub, secret [32]byte - copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey) - curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub) - if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") - } - - hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() - - h := crypto.SHA256.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) - writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) - writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) - - ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) - K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) - marshalInt(K, ki) - h.Write(K) - - H := h.Sum(nil) - - sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ - EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:], - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Signature: sig, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return &kexResult{ - H: H, - K: K, - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Signature: sig, - Hash: crypto.SHA256, - }, nil -} - -// dhGEXSHA implements the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and -// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols, -// as described in RFC 4419 -type dhGEXSHA struct { - hashFunc crypto.Hash -} - -const ( - dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits = 2048 - dhGroupExchangePreferredBits = 2048 - dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192 -) - -func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { - // Send GexRequest - kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{ - MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits, - PreferedBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits, - MaxBits: dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // Receive GexGroup - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var msg kexDHGexGroupMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits - if msg.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || msg.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", msg.P.BitLen()) - } - - // Check if g is safe by verifying that 1 < g < p-1 - pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(msg.P, bigOne) - if msg.G.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || msg.G.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe") - } - - // Send GexInit - pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(msg.P, 1) - x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - X := new(big.Int).Exp(msg.G, x, msg.P) - kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{ - X: X, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexInit)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // Receive GexReply - packet, err = c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var kexDHGexReply kexDHGexReplyMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexReply); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") - } - kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexReply.Y, x, msg.P) - - // Check if k is safe by verifying that k > 1 and k < p - 1 - if kInt.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe") - } - - h := gex.hashFunc.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, kexDHGexReply.HostKey) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) - writeInt(h, msg.P) - writeInt(h, msg.G) - writeInt(h, X) - writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y) - K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) - marshalInt(K, kInt) - h.Write(K) - - return &kexResult{ - H: h.Sum(nil), - K: K, - HostKey: kexDHGexReply.HostKey, - Signature: kexDHGexReply.Signature, - Hash: gex.hashFunc, - }, nil -} - -// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256. -// -// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests. -func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { - // Receive GexRequest - packet, err := c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return - } - var kexDHGexRequest kexDHGexRequestMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil { - return - } - - // Send GexGroup - // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC - // 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. - p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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g := big.NewInt(2) - - msg := &kexDHGexGroupMsg{ - P: p, - G: g, - } - if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(msg)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // Receive GexInit - packet, err = c.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return - } - var kexDHGexInit kexDHGexInitMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexInit); err != nil { - return - } - - pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(p, 1) - - y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) - if err != nil { - return - } - Y := new(big.Int).Exp(g, y, p) - - pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne) - if kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") - } - kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexInit.X, y, p) - - hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() - - h := gex.hashFunc.New() - magics.write(h) - writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) - binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) - writeInt(h, p) - writeInt(h, g) - writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X) - writeInt(h, Y) - - K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) - marshalInt(K, kInt) - h.Write(K) - - H := h.Sum(nil) - - // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its - // own key-specific hash algorithm. - sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - kexDHGexReply := kexDHGexReplyMsg{ - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Y: Y, - Signature: sig, - } - packet = Marshal(&kexDHGexReply) - - err = c.writePacket(packet) - - return &kexResult{ - H: H, - K: K, - HostKey: hostKeyBytes, - Signature: sig, - Hash: gex.hashFunc, - }, err -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go deleted file mode 100644 index 98e6706d5..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1778 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "crypto" - "crypto/aes" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/dsa" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/md5" - "crypto/rand" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/sha256" - "crypto/x509" - "encoding/asn1" - "encoding/base64" - "encoding/binary" - "encoding/hex" - "encoding/pem" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "math/big" - "strings" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf" -) - -// Public key algorithms names. These values can appear in PublicKey.Type, -// ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms, Signature.Format, or as AlgorithmSigner -// arguments. -const ( - KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" - KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss" - KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" - KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" - KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" - KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" - KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519" - KeyAlgoSKED25519 = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" - - // KeyAlgoRSASHA256 and KeyAlgoRSASHA512 are only public key algorithms, not - // public key formats, so they can't appear as a PublicKey.Type. The - // corresponding PublicKey.Type is KeyAlgoRSA. See RFC 8332, Section 2. - KeyAlgoRSASHA256 = "rsa-sha2-256" - KeyAlgoRSASHA512 = "rsa-sha2-512" -) - -const ( - // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSA. - SigAlgoRSA = KeyAlgoRSA - // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA256. - SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = KeyAlgoRSASHA256 - // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA512. - SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = KeyAlgoRSASHA512 -) - -// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm. -// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm. -func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - switch algo { - case KeyAlgoRSA: - return parseRSA(in) - case KeyAlgoDSA: - return parseDSA(in) - case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: - return parseECDSA(in) - case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: - return parseSKECDSA(in) - case KeyAlgoED25519: - return parseED25519(in) - case KeyAlgoSKED25519: - return parseSKEd25519(in) - case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: - cert, err := parseCert(in, certKeyAlgoNames[algo]) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - return cert, nil, nil - } - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown key algorithm: %v", algo) -} - -// parseAuthorizedKey parses a public key in OpenSSH authorized_keys format -// (see sshd(8) manual page) once the options and key type fields have been -// removed. -func parseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, err error) { - in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) - - i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") - if i == -1 { - i = len(in) - } - base64Key := in[:i] - - key := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Key))) - n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(key, base64Key) - if err != nil { - return nil, "", err - } - key = key[:n] - out, err = ParsePublicKey(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, "", err - } - comment = string(bytes.TrimSpace(in[i:])) - return out, comment, nil -} - -// ParseKnownHosts parses an entry in the format of the known_hosts file. -// -// The known_hosts format is documented in the sshd(8) manual page. This -// function will parse a single entry from in. On successful return, marker -// will contain the optional marker value (i.e. "cert-authority" or "revoked") -// or else be empty, hosts will contain the hosts that this entry matches, -// pubKey will contain the public key and comment will contain any trailing -// comment at the end of the line. See the sshd(8) manual page for the various -// forms that a host string can take. -// -// The unparsed remainder of the input will be returned in rest. This function -// can be called repeatedly to parse multiple entries. -// -// If no entries were found in the input then err will be io.EOF. Otherwise a -// non-nil err value indicates a parse error. -func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey, comment string, rest []byte, err error) { - for len(in) > 0 { - end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') - if end != -1 { - rest = in[end+1:] - in = in[:end] - } else { - rest = nil - } - - end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') - if end != -1 { - in = in[:end] - } - - in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) - if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { - in = rest - continue - } - - i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") - if i == -1 { - in = rest - continue - } - - // Strip out the beginning of the known_host key. - // This is either an optional marker or a (set of) hostname(s). - keyFields := bytes.Fields(in) - if len(keyFields) < 3 || len(keyFields) > 5 { - return "", nil, nil, "", nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid entry in known_hosts data") - } - - // keyFields[0] is either "@cert-authority", "@revoked" or a comma separated - // list of hosts - marker := "" - if keyFields[0][0] == '@' { - marker = string(keyFields[0][1:]) - keyFields = keyFields[1:] - } - - hosts := string(keyFields[0]) - // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. “ssh-rsa”). - // However, that information is duplicated inside the - // base64-encoded key and so is ignored here. - - key := bytes.Join(keyFields[2:], []byte(" ")) - if pubKey, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(key); err != nil { - return "", nil, nil, "", nil, err - } - - return marker, strings.Split(hosts, ","), pubKey, comment, rest, nil - } - - return "", nil, nil, "", nil, io.EOF -} - -// ParseAuthorizedKey parses a public key from an authorized_keys -// file used in OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page. -func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []string, rest []byte, err error) { - for len(in) > 0 { - end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') - if end != -1 { - rest = in[end+1:] - in = in[:end] - } else { - rest = nil - } - - end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') - if end != -1 { - in = in[:end] - } - - in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) - if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { - in = rest - continue - } - - i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") - if i == -1 { - in = rest - continue - } - - if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { - return out, comment, options, rest, nil - } - - // No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at - // the beginning. - var b byte - inQuote := false - var candidateOptions []string - optionStart := 0 - for i, b = range in { - isEnd := !inQuote && (b == ' ' || b == '\t') - if (b == ',' && !inQuote) || isEnd { - if i-optionStart > 0 { - candidateOptions = append(candidateOptions, string(in[optionStart:i])) - } - optionStart = i + 1 - } - if isEnd { - break - } - if b == '"' && (i == 0 || (i > 0 && in[i-1] != '\\')) { - inQuote = !inQuote - } - } - for i < len(in) && (in[i] == ' ' || in[i] == '\t') { - i++ - } - if i == len(in) { - // Invalid line: unmatched quote - in = rest - continue - } - - in = in[i:] - i = bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") - if i == -1 { - in = rest - continue - } - - if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { - options = candidateOptions - return out, comment, options, rest, nil - } - - in = rest - continue - } - - return nil, "", nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") -} - -// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key formatted for use in -// the SSH wire protocol according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. -func ParsePublicKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, err error) { - algo, in, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return nil, errShortRead - } - var rest []byte - out, rest, err = parsePubKey(in, string(algo)) - if len(rest) > 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: trailing junk in public key") - } - - return out, err -} - -// MarshalAuthorizedKey serializes key for inclusion in an OpenSSH -// authorized_keys file. The return value ends with newline. -func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte { - b := &bytes.Buffer{} - b.WriteString(key.Type()) - b.WriteByte(' ') - e := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, b) - e.Write(key.Marshal()) - e.Close() - b.WriteByte('\n') - return b.Bytes() -} - -// MarshalPrivateKey returns a PEM block with the private key serialized in the -// OpenSSH format. -func MarshalPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string) (*pem.Block, error) { - return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler) -} - -// MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a PEM block holding the encrypted -// private key serialized in the OpenSSH format. -func MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, passphrase []byte) (*pem.Block, error) { - return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase)) -} - -// PublicKey represents a public key using an unspecified algorithm. -// -// Some PublicKeys provided by this package also implement CryptoPublicKey. -type PublicKey interface { - // Type returns the key format name, e.g. "ssh-rsa". - Type() string - - // Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format, with the name - // prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use the ParsePublicKey function. - Marshal() []byte - - // Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this key. This - // method will hash the data appropriately first. sig.Format is allowed to - // be any signature algorithm compatible with the key type, the caller - // should check if it has more stringent requirements. - Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error -} - -// CryptoPublicKey, if implemented by a PublicKey, -// returns the underlying crypto.PublicKey form of the key. -type CryptoPublicKey interface { - CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey -} - -// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key. -// -// Some Signers provided by this package also implement MultiAlgorithmSigner. -type Signer interface { - // PublicKey returns the associated PublicKey. - PublicKey() PublicKey - - // Sign returns a signature for the given data. This method will hash the - // data appropriately first. The signature algorithm is expected to match - // the key format returned by the PublicKey.Type method (and not to be any - // alternative algorithm supported by the key format). - Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) -} - -// An AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying an algorithm to -// use for signing. -// -// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, unless it also -// implements MultiAlgorithmSigner, so it should be prepared to be invoked with -// every algorithm supported by the public key format. -type AlgorithmSigner interface { - Signer - - // SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specifying a desired - // signing algorithm. Callers may pass an empty string for the algorithm in - // which case the AlgorithmSigner will use a default algorithm. This default - // doesn't currently control any behavior in this package. - SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) -} - -// MultiAlgorithmSigner is an AlgorithmSigner that also reports the algorithms -// supported by that signer. -type MultiAlgorithmSigner interface { - AlgorithmSigner - - // Algorithms returns the available algorithms in preference order. The list - // must not be empty, and it must not include certificate types. - Algorithms() []string -} - -// NewSignerWithAlgorithms returns a signer restricted to the specified -// algorithms. The algorithms must be set in preference order. The list must not -// be empty, and it must not include certificate types. An error is returned if -// the specified algorithms are incompatible with the public key type. -func NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer AlgorithmSigner, algorithms []string) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, error) { - if len(algorithms) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: please specify at least one valid signing algorithm") - } - var signerAlgos []string - supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(signer.PublicKey().Type())) - if s, ok := signer.(*multiAlgorithmSigner); ok { - signerAlgos = s.Algorithms() - } else { - signerAlgos = supportedAlgos - } - - for _, algo := range algorithms { - if !contains(supportedAlgos, algo) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported for key type %q", - algo, signer.PublicKey().Type()) - } - if !contains(signerAlgos, algo) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is restricted for the provided signer", algo) - } - } - return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ - AlgorithmSigner: signer, - supportedAlgorithms: algorithms, - }, nil -} - -type multiAlgorithmSigner struct { - AlgorithmSigner - supportedAlgorithms []string -} - -func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) Algorithms() []string { - return s.supportedAlgorithms -} - -func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm string) bool { - if algorithm == "" { - algorithm = underlyingAlgo(s.PublicKey().Type()) - } - for _, algo := range s.supportedAlgorithms { - if algorithm == algo { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { - if !s.isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported: %v", algorithm, s.supportedAlgorithms) - } - return s.AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) -} - -type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey - -func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string { - return "ssh-rsa" -} - -// parseRSA parses an RSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. -func parseRSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - E *big.Int - N *big.Int - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - if w.E.BitLen() > 24 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") - } - e := w.E.Int64() - if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent") - } - - var key rsa.PublicKey - key.E = int(e) - key.N = w.N - return (*rsaPublicKey)(&key), w.Rest, nil -} - -func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - e := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(r.E)) - // RSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by - // parseRSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. - wirekey := struct { - Name string - E *big.Int - N *big.Int - }{ - KeyAlgoRSA, - e, - r.N, - } - return Marshal(&wirekey) -} - -func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(r.Type()) - if !contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type()) - } - hash := hashFuncs[sig.Format] - h := hash.New() - h.Write(data) - digest := h.Sum(nil) - - // Signatures in PKCS1v15 must match the key's modulus in - // length. However with SSH, some signers provide RSA - // signatures which are missing the MSB 0's of the bignum - // represented. With ssh-rsa signatures, this is encouraged by - // the spec (even though e.g. OpenSSH will give the full - // length unconditionally). With rsa-sha2-* signatures, the - // verifier is allowed to support these, even though they are - // out of spec. See RFC 4253 Section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and RFC - // 8332 Section 3 for rsa-sha2-* details. - // - // In practice: - // * OpenSSH always allows "short" signatures: - // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L526 - // but always generates padded signatures: - // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_9_8_P1/ssh-rsa.c#L439 - // - // * PuTTY versions 0.81 and earlier will generate short - // signatures for all RSA signature variants. Note that - // PuTTY is embedded in other software, such as WinSCP and - // FileZilla. At the time of writing, a patch has been - // applied to PuTTY to generate padded signatures for - // rsa-sha2-*, but not yet released: - // https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=a5bcf3d384e1bf15a51a6923c3724cbbee022d8e - // - // * SSH.NET versions 2024.0.0 and earlier will generate short - // signatures for all RSA signature variants, fixed in 2024.1.0: - // https://github.com/sshnet/SSH.NET/releases/tag/2024.1.0 - // - // As a result, we pad these up to the key size by inserting - // leading 0's. - // - // Note that support for short signatures with rsa-sha2-* may - // be removed in the future due to such signatures not being - // allowed by the spec. - blob := sig.Blob - keySize := (*rsa.PublicKey)(r).Size() - if len(blob) < keySize { - padded := make([]byte, keySize) - copy(padded[keySize-len(blob):], blob) - blob = padded - } - return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, blob) -} - -func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return (*rsa.PublicKey)(r) -} - -type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey - -func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string { - return "ssh-dss" -} - -func checkDSAParams(param *dsa.Parameters) error { - // SSH specifies FIPS 186-2, which only provided a single size - // (1024 bits) DSA key. FIPS 186-3 allows for larger key - // sizes, which would confuse SSH. - if l := param.P.BitLen(); l != 1024 { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA key size %d", l) - } - - return nil -} - -// parseDSA parses an DSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. -func parseDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - P, Q, G, Y *big.Int - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - param := dsa.Parameters{ - P: w.P, - Q: w.Q, - G: w.G, - } - if err := checkDSAParams(¶m); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - key := &dsaPublicKey{ - Parameters: param, - Y: w.Y, - } - return key, w.Rest, nil -} - -func (k *dsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - // DSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by - // parseDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. - w := struct { - Name string - P, Q, G, Y *big.Int - }{ - k.Type(), - k.P, - k.Q, - k.G, - k.Y, - } - - return Marshal(&w) -} - -func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != k.Type() { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) - } - h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() - h.Write(data) - digest := h.Sum(nil) - - // Per RFC 4253, section 6.6, - // The value for 'dss_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing - // r, followed by s (which are 160-bit integers, without lengths or - // padding, unsigned, and in network byte order). - // For DSS purposes, sig.Blob should be exactly 40 bytes in length. - if len(sig.Blob) != 40 { - return errors.New("ssh: DSA signature parse error") - } - r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[:20]) - s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[20:]) - if dsa.Verify((*dsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, r, s) { - return nil - } - return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") -} - -func (k *dsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return (*dsa.PublicKey)(k) -} - -type dsaPrivateKey struct { - *dsa.PrivateKey -} - -func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey { - return (*dsaPublicKey)(&k.PrivateKey.PublicKey) -} - -func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { - return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, k.PublicKey().Type()) -} - -func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Algorithms() []string { - return []string{k.PublicKey().Type()} -} - -func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { - if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) - } - - h := hashFuncs[k.PublicKey().Type()].New() - h.Write(data) - digest := h.Sum(nil) - r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - sig := make([]byte, 40) - rb := r.Bytes() - sb := s.Bytes() - - copy(sig[20-len(rb):20], rb) - copy(sig[40-len(sb):], sb) - - return &Signature{ - Format: k.PublicKey().Type(), - Blob: sig, - }, nil -} - -type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey - -func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string { - return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID() -} - -func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string { - switch k.Params().BitSize { - case 256: - return "nistp256" - case 384: - return "nistp384" - case 521: - return "nistp521" - } - panic("ssh: unsupported ecdsa key size") -} - -type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey - -func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string { - return KeyAlgoED25519 -} - -func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - KeyBytes []byte - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) - } - - return ed25519PublicKey(w.KeyBytes), w.Rest, nil -} - -func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - w := struct { - Name string - KeyBytes []byte - }{ - KeyAlgoED25519, - []byte(k), - } - return Marshal(&w) -} - -func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != k.Type() { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) - } - if l := len(k); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) - } - - if ok := ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(k), b, sig.Blob); !ok { - return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") - } - - return nil -} - -func (k ed25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return ed25519.PublicKey(k) -} - -func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool { - return curve == elliptic.P256() || curve == elliptic.P384() || curve == elliptic.P521() -} - -// parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1. -func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - Curve string - KeyBytes []byte - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey) - - switch w.Curve { - case "nistp256": - key.Curve = elliptic.P256() - case "nistp384": - key.Curve = elliptic.P384() - case "nistp521": - key.Curve = elliptic.P521() - default: - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") - } - - key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) - if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") - } - return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil -} - -func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. - keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) - // ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by - // parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. - w := struct { - Name string - ID string - Key []byte - }{ - k.Type(), - k.nistID(), - keyBytes, - } - - return Marshal(&w) -} - -func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != k.Type() { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) - } - - h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() - h.Write(data) - digest := h.Sum(nil) - - // Per RFC 5656, section 3.1.2, - // The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: - // mpint r - // mpint s - var ecSig struct { - R *big.Int - S *big.Int - } - - if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { - return err - } - - if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { - return nil - } - return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") -} - -func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k) -} - -// skFields holds the additional fields present in U2F/FIDO2 signatures. -// See openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f 'SSH U2F Signatures' for details. -type skFields struct { - // Flags contains U2F/FIDO2 flags such as 'user present' - Flags byte - // Counter is a monotonic signature counter which can be - // used to detect concurrent use of a private key, should - // it be extracted from hardware. - Counter uint32 -} - -type skECDSAPublicKey struct { - // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. - // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. - application string - ecdsa.PublicKey -} - -func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string { - return KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 -} - -func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) nistID() string { - return "nistp256" -} - -func parseSKECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - Curve string - KeyBytes []byte - Application string - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - key := new(skECDSAPublicKey) - key.application = w.Application - - if w.Curve != "nistp256" { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") - } - key.Curve = elliptic.P256() - - key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) - if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") - } - - return key, w.Rest, nil -} - -func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. - keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) - w := struct { - Name string - ID string - Key []byte - Application string - }{ - k.Type(), - k.nistID(), - keyBytes, - k.application, - } - - return Marshal(&w) -} - -func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != k.Type() { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) - } - - h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() - h.Write([]byte(k.application)) - appDigest := h.Sum(nil) - - h.Reset() - h.Write(data) - dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) - - var ecSig struct { - R *big.Int - S *big.Int - } - if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { - return err - } - - var skf skFields - if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { - return err - } - - blob := struct { - ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - Flags byte - Counter uint32 - MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - }{ - appDigest, - skf.Flags, - skf.Counter, - dataDigest, - } - - original := Marshal(blob) - - h.Reset() - h.Write(original) - digest := h.Sum(nil) - - if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(&k.PublicKey), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { - return nil - } - return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") -} - -func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return &k.PublicKey -} - -type skEd25519PublicKey struct { - // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. - // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. - application string - ed25519.PublicKey -} - -func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string { - return KeyAlgoSKED25519 -} - -func parseSKEd25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { - var w struct { - KeyBytes []byte - Application string - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - - if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { - return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) - } - - key := new(skEd25519PublicKey) - key.application = w.Application - key.PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey(w.KeyBytes) - - return key, w.Rest, nil -} - -func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { - w := struct { - Name string - KeyBytes []byte - Application string - }{ - KeyAlgoSKED25519, - []byte(k.PublicKey), - k.application, - } - return Marshal(&w) -} - -func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != k.Type() { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) - } - if l := len(k.PublicKey); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) - } - - h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() - h.Write([]byte(k.application)) - appDigest := h.Sum(nil) - - h.Reset() - h.Write(data) - dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) - - var edSig struct { - Signature []byte `ssh:"rest"` - } - - if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &edSig); err != nil { - return err - } - - var skf skFields - if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { - return err - } - - blob := struct { - ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - Flags byte - Counter uint32 - MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` - }{ - appDigest, - skf.Flags, - skf.Counter, - dataDigest, - } - - original := Marshal(blob) - - if ok := ed25519.Verify(k.PublicKey, original, edSig.Signature); !ok { - return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") - } - - return nil -} - -func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { - return k.PublicKey -} - -// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey, -// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a -// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or -// P-521. DSA keys must use parameter size L1024N160. -func NewSignerFromKey(key interface{}) (Signer, error) { - switch key := key.(type) { - case crypto.Signer: - return NewSignerFromSigner(key) - case *dsa.PrivateKey: - return newDSAPrivateKey(key) - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) - } -} - -func newDSAPrivateKey(key *dsa.PrivateKey) (Signer, error) { - if err := checkDSAParams(&key.PublicKey.Parameters); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &dsaPrivateKey{key}, nil -} - -type wrappedSigner struct { - signer crypto.Signer - pubKey PublicKey -} - -// NewSignerFromSigner takes any crypto.Signer implementation and -// returns a corresponding Signer interface. This can be used, for -// example, with keys kept in hardware modules. -func NewSignerFromSigner(signer crypto.Signer) (Signer, error) { - pubKey, err := NewPublicKey(signer.Public()) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return &wrappedSigner{signer, pubKey}, nil -} - -func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { - return s.pubKey -} - -func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { - return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, s.pubKey.Type()) -} - -func (s *wrappedSigner) Algorithms() []string { - return algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type()) -} - -func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { - if algorithm == "" { - algorithm = s.pubKey.Type() - } - - if !contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type()) - } - - hashFunc := hashFuncs[algorithm] - var digest []byte - if hashFunc != 0 { - h := hashFunc.New() - h.Write(data) - digest = h.Sum(nil) - } else { - digest = data - } - - signature, err := s.signer.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // crypto.Signer.Sign is expected to return an ASN.1-encoded signature - // for ECDSA and DSA, but that's not the encoding expected by SSH, so - // re-encode. - switch s.pubKey.(type) { - case *ecdsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey: - type asn1Signature struct { - R, S *big.Int - } - asn1Sig := new(asn1Signature) - _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, asn1Sig) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - switch s.pubKey.(type) { - case *ecdsaPublicKey: - signature = Marshal(asn1Sig) - - case *dsaPublicKey: - signature = make([]byte, 40) - r := asn1Sig.R.Bytes() - s := asn1Sig.S.Bytes() - copy(signature[20-len(r):20], r) - copy(signature[40-len(s):40], s) - } - } - - return &Signature{ - Format: algorithm, - Blob: signature, - }, nil -} - -// NewPublicKey takes an *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, -// or ed25519.PublicKey returns a corresponding PublicKey instance. -// ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or P-521. -func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) { - switch key := key.(type) { - case *rsa.PublicKey: - return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported") - } - return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil - case *dsa.PublicKey: - return (*dsaPublicKey)(key), nil - case ed25519.PublicKey: - if l := len(key); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) - } - return ed25519PublicKey(key), nil - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) - } -} - -// ParsePrivateKey returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private key. It supports -// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey. If the private key is encrypted, it -// will return a PassphraseMissingError. -func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) { - key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return NewSignerFromKey(key) -} - -// ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private -// key and passphrase. It supports the same keys as -// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase. -func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (Signer, error) { - key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return NewSignerFromKey(key) -} - -// encryptedBlock tells whether a private key is -// encrypted by examining its Proc-Type header -// for a mention of ENCRYPTED -// according to RFC 1421 Section 4.6.1.1. -func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool { - return strings.Contains(block.Headers["Proc-Type"], "ENCRYPTED") -} - -// A PassphraseMissingError indicates that parsing this private key requires a -// passphrase. Use ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase. -type PassphraseMissingError struct { - // PublicKey will be set if the private key format includes an unencrypted - // public key along with the encrypted private key. - PublicKey PublicKey -} - -func (*PassphraseMissingError) Error() string { - return "ssh: this private key is passphrase protected" -} - -// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It supports -// RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 private keys in PKCS#1, PKCS#8, OpenSSL, and OpenSSH -// formats. If the private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError. -func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { - block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) - if block == nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") - } - - if encryptedBlock(block) { - return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} - } - - switch block.Type { - case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": - return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) - // RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208 - case "PRIVATE KEY": - return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes) - case "EC PRIVATE KEY": - return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes) - case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": - return ParseDSAPrivateKey(block.Bytes) - case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY": - return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, unencryptedOpenSSHKey) - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) - } -} - -// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a private key decrypted with -// passphrase from a PEM encoded private key. If the passphrase is wrong, it -// will return x509.IncorrectPasswordError. -func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (interface{}, error) { - block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) - if block == nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") - } - - if block.Type == "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY" { - return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase)) - } - - if !encryptedBlock(block) || !x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: not an encrypted key") - } - - buf, err := x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passphrase) - if err != nil { - if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError { - return nil, err - } - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err) - } - - var result interface{} - - switch block.Type { - case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": - result, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf) - case "EC PRIVATE KEY": - result, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf) - case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": - result, err = ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf) - default: - err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) - } - // Because of deficiencies in the format, DecryptPEMBlock does not always - // detect an incorrect password. In these cases decrypted DER bytes is - // random noise. If the parsing of the key returns an asn1.StructuralError - // we return x509.IncorrectPasswordError. - if _, ok := err.(asn1.StructuralError); ok { - return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError - } - - return result, err -} - -// ParseDSAPrivateKey returns a DSA private key from its ASN.1 DER encoding, as -// specified by the OpenSSL DSA man page. -func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) { - var k struct { - Version int - P *big.Int - Q *big.Int - G *big.Int - Pub *big.Int - Priv *big.Int - } - rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &k) - if err != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to parse DSA key: " + err.Error()) - } - if len(rest) > 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: garbage after DSA key") - } - - return &dsa.PrivateKey{ - PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ - Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ - P: k.P, - Q: k.Q, - G: k.G, - }, - Y: k.Pub, - }, - X: k.Priv, - }, nil -} - -func unencryptedOpenSSHKey(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if kdfName != "none" || cipherName != "none" { - return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} - } - if kdfOpts != "" { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key") - } - return privKeyBlock, nil -} - -func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc { - return func(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if kdfName == "none" || cipherName == "none" { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: key is not password protected") - } - if kdfName != "bcrypt" { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown KDF %q, only supports %q", kdfName, "bcrypt") - } - - var opts struct { - Salt string - Rounds uint32 - } - if err := Unmarshal([]byte(kdfOpts), &opts); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, []byte(opts.Salt), int(opts.Rounds), 32+16) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] - - c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - switch cipherName { - case "aes256-ctr": - ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, iv) - ctr.XORKeyStream(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) - case "aes256-cbc": - if len(privKeyBlock)%c.BlockSize() != 0 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid encrypted private key length, not a multiple of the block size") - } - cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv) - cbc.CryptBlocks(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown cipher %q, only supports %q or %q", cipherName, "aes256-ctr", "aes256-cbc") - } - - return privKeyBlock, nil - } -} - -func unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { - key := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, 8) - return key, "none", "none", "", nil -} - -func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase []byte) openSSHEncryptFunc { - return func(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { - salt := make([]byte, 16) - if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil { - return nil, "", "", "", err - } - - opts := struct { - Salt []byte - Rounds uint32 - }{salt, 16} - - // Derive key to encrypt the private key block. - k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, salt, int(opts.Rounds), 32+aes.BlockSize) - if err != nil { - return nil, "", "", "", err - } - - // Add padding matching the block size of AES. - keyBlock := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, aes.BlockSize) - - // Encrypt the private key using the derived secret. - - dst := make([]byte, len(keyBlock)) - key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] - block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - return nil, "", "", "", err - } - - stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv) - stream.XORKeyStream(dst, keyBlock) - - return dst, "aes256-ctr", "bcrypt", string(Marshal(opts)), nil - } -} - -const privateKeyAuthMagic = "openssh-key-v1\x00" - -type openSSHDecryptFunc func(CipherName, KdfName, KdfOpts string, PrivKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) -type openSSHEncryptFunc func(PrivKeyBlock []byte) (ProtectedKeyBlock []byte, cipherName, kdfName, kdfOptions string, err error) - -type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct { - CipherName string - KdfName string - KdfOpts string - NumKeys uint32 - PubKey []byte - PrivKeyBlock []byte -} - -type openSSHPrivateKey struct { - Check1 uint32 - Check2 uint32 - Keytype string - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -type openSSHRSAPrivateKey struct { - N *big.Int - E *big.Int - D *big.Int - Iqmp *big.Int - P *big.Int - Q *big.Int - Comment string - Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -type openSSHEd25519PrivateKey struct { - Pub []byte - Priv []byte - Comment string - Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -type openSSHECDSAPrivateKey struct { - Curve string - Pub []byte - D *big.Int - Comment string - Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// parseOpenSSHPrivateKey parses an OpenSSH private key, using the decrypt -// function to unwrap the encrypted portion. unencryptedOpenSSHKey can be used -// as the decrypt function to parse an unencrypted private key. See -// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key. -func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { - if len(key) < len(privateKeyAuthMagic) || string(key[:len(privateKeyAuthMagic)]) != privateKeyAuthMagic { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format") - } - remaining := key[len(privateKeyAuthMagic):] - - var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey - if err := Unmarshal(remaining, &w); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if w.NumKeys != 1 { - // We only support single key files, and so does OpenSSH. - // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/4103a3ec7/sshkey.c#L4171 - return nil, errors.New("ssh: multi-key files are not supported") - } - - privKeyBlock, err := decrypt(w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, w.PrivKeyBlock) - if err != nil { - if err, ok := err.(*PassphraseMissingError); ok { - pub, errPub := ParsePublicKey(w.PubKey) - if errPub != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: failed to parse embedded public key: %v", errPub) - } - err.PublicKey = pub - } - return nil, err - } - - var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey - if err := Unmarshal(privKeyBlock, &pk1); err != nil || pk1.Check1 != pk1.Check2 { - if w.CipherName != "none" { - return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError - } - return nil, errors.New("ssh: malformed OpenSSH key") - } - - switch pk1.Keytype { - case KeyAlgoRSA: - var key openSSHRSAPrivateKey - if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{ - PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ - N: key.N, - E: int(key.E.Int64()), - }, - D: key.D, - Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q}, - } - - if err := pk.Validate(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - pk.Precompute() - - return pk, nil - case KeyAlgoED25519: - var key openSSHEd25519PrivateKey - if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if len(key.Priv) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: private key unexpected length") - } - - if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)) - copy(pk, key.Priv) - return &pk, nil - case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: - var key openSSHECDSAPrivateKey - if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var curve elliptic.Curve - switch key.Curve { - case "nistp256": - curve = elliptic.P256() - case "nistp384": - curve = elliptic.P384() - case "nistp521": - curve = elliptic.P521() - default: - return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve: " + key.Curve) - } - - X, Y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, key.Pub) - if X == nil || Y == nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to unmarshal public key") - } - - if key.D.Cmp(curve.Params().N) >= 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: scalar is out of range") - } - - x, y := curve.ScalarBaseMult(key.D.Bytes()) - if x.Cmp(X) != 0 || y.Cmp(Y) != 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: public key does not match private key") - } - - return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{ - PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{ - Curve: curve, - X: X, - Y: Y, - }, - D: key.D, - }, nil - default: - return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled key type") - } -} - -func marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, encrypt openSSHEncryptFunc) (*pem.Block, error) { - var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey - var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey - - // Random check bytes. - var check uint32 - if err := binary.Read(rand.Reader, binary.BigEndian, &check); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - pk1.Check1 = check - pk1.Check2 = check - w.NumKeys = 1 - - // Use a []byte directly on ed25519 keys. - if k, ok := key.(*ed25519.PrivateKey); ok { - key = *k - } - - switch k := key.(type) { - case *rsa.PrivateKey: - E := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(k.PublicKey.E)) - // Marshal public key: - // E and N are in reversed order in the public and private key. - pubKey := struct { - KeyType string - E *big.Int - N *big.Int - }{ - KeyAlgoRSA, - E, k.PublicKey.N, - } - w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) - - // Marshal private key. - key := openSSHRSAPrivateKey{ - N: k.PublicKey.N, - E: E, - D: k.D, - Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv, - P: k.Primes[0], - Q: k.Primes[1], - Comment: comment, - } - pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoRSA - pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) - case ed25519.PrivateKey: - pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) - priv := make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize) - copy(pub, k[32:]) - copy(priv, k) - - // Marshal public key. - pubKey := struct { - KeyType string - Pub []byte - }{ - KeyAlgoED25519, pub, - } - w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) - - // Marshal private key. - key := openSSHEd25519PrivateKey{ - Pub: pub, - Priv: priv, - Comment: comment, - } - pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoED25519 - pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) - case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: - var curve, keyType string - switch name := k.Curve.Params().Name; name { - case "P-256": - curve = "nistp256" - keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA256 - case "P-384": - curve = "nistp384" - keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA384 - case "P-521": - curve = "nistp521" - keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA521 - default: - return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve " + name) - } - - pub := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.PublicKey.X, k.PublicKey.Y) - - // Marshal public key. - pubKey := struct { - KeyType string - Curve string - Pub []byte - }{ - keyType, curve, pub, - } - w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) - - // Marshal private key. - key := openSSHECDSAPrivateKey{ - Curve: curve, - Pub: pub, - D: k.D, - Comment: comment, - } - pk1.Keytype = keyType - pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", k) - } - - var err error - // Add padding and encrypt the key if necessary. - w.PrivKeyBlock, w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, err = encrypt(Marshal(pk1)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - b := Marshal(w) - block := &pem.Block{ - Type: "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY", - Bytes: append([]byte(privateKeyAuthMagic), b...), - } - return block, nil -} - -func checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(pad []byte) error { - for i, b := range pad { - if int(b) != i+1 { - return errors.New("ssh: padding not as expected") - } - } - return nil -} - -func generateOpenSSHPadding(block []byte, blockSize int) []byte { - for i, l := 0, len(block); (l+i)%blockSize != 0; i++ { - block = append(block, byte(i+1)) - } - return block -} - -// FingerprintLegacyMD5 returns the user presentation of the key's -// fingerprint as described by RFC 4716 section 4. -func FingerprintLegacyMD5(pubKey PublicKey) string { - md5sum := md5.Sum(pubKey.Marshal()) - hexarray := make([]string, len(md5sum)) - for i, c := range md5sum { - hexarray[i] = hex.EncodeToString([]byte{c}) - } - return strings.Join(hexarray, ":") -} - -// FingerprintSHA256 returns the user presentation of the key's -// fingerprint as unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash. -// This format was introduced from OpenSSH 6.8. -// https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 -// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-3.2 (unpadded base64 encoding) -func FingerprintSHA256(pubKey PublicKey) string { - sha256sum := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Marshal()) - hash := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(sha256sum[:]) - return "SHA256:" + hash -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go deleted file mode 100644 index 06a1b2750..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -// Message authentication support - -import ( - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/sha1" - "crypto/sha256" - "crypto/sha512" - "hash" -) - -type macMode struct { - keySize int - etm bool - new func(key []byte) hash.Hash -} - -// truncatingMAC wraps around a hash.Hash and truncates the output digest to -// a given size. -type truncatingMAC struct { - length int - hmac hash.Hash -} - -func (t truncatingMAC) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { - return t.hmac.Write(data) -} - -func (t truncatingMAC) Sum(in []byte) []byte { - out := t.hmac.Sum(in) - return out[:len(in)+t.length] -} - -func (t truncatingMAC) Reset() { - t.hmac.Reset() -} - -func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int { - return t.length -} - -func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() } - -var macModes = map[string]*macMode{ - "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com": {64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) - }}, - "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) - }}, - "hmac-sha2-512": {64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) - }}, - "hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) - }}, - "hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha1.New, key) - }}, - "hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)} - }}, -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go deleted file mode 100644 index b55f86056..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,891 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "math/big" - "reflect" - "strconv" - "strings" -) - -// These are SSH message type numbers. They are scattered around several -// documents but many were taken from [SSH-PARAMETERS]. -const ( - msgIgnore = 2 - msgUnimplemented = 3 - msgDebug = 4 - msgNewKeys = 21 -) - -// SSH messages: -// -// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding SSH messages. -// They are marshaled using reflection with the marshal and unmarshal functions -// in this file. The only wrinkle is that a final member of type []byte with a -// ssh tag of "rest" receives the remainder of a packet when unmarshaling. - -// See RFC 4253, section 11.1. -const msgDisconnect = 1 - -// disconnectMsg is the message that signals a disconnect. It is also -// the error type returned from mux.Wait() -type disconnectMsg struct { - Reason uint32 `sshtype:"1"` - Message string - Language string -} - -func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string { - return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message) -} - -// See RFC 4253, section 7.1. -const msgKexInit = 20 - -type kexInitMsg struct { - Cookie [16]byte `sshtype:"20"` - KexAlgos []string - ServerHostKeyAlgos []string - CiphersClientServer []string - CiphersServerClient []string - MACsClientServer []string - MACsServerClient []string - CompressionClientServer []string - CompressionServerClient []string - LanguagesClientServer []string - LanguagesServerClient []string - FirstKexFollows bool - Reserved uint32 -} - -// See RFC 4253, section 8. - -// Diffie-Hellman -const msgKexDHInit = 30 - -type kexDHInitMsg struct { - X *big.Int `sshtype:"30"` -} - -const msgKexECDHInit = 30 - -type kexECDHInitMsg struct { - ClientPubKey []byte `sshtype:"30"` -} - -const msgKexECDHReply = 31 - -type kexECDHReplyMsg struct { - HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` - EphemeralPubKey []byte - Signature []byte -} - -const msgKexDHReply = 31 - -type kexDHReplyMsg struct { - HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` - Y *big.Int - Signature []byte -} - -// See RFC 4419, section 5. -const msgKexDHGexGroup = 31 - -type kexDHGexGroupMsg struct { - P *big.Int `sshtype:"31"` - G *big.Int -} - -const msgKexDHGexInit = 32 - -type kexDHGexInitMsg struct { - X *big.Int `sshtype:"32"` -} - -const msgKexDHGexReply = 33 - -type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct { - HostKey []byte `sshtype:"33"` - Y *big.Int - Signature []byte -} - -const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34 - -type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct { - MinBits uint32 `sshtype:"34"` - PreferedBits uint32 - MaxBits uint32 -} - -// See RFC 4253, section 10. -const msgServiceRequest = 5 - -type serviceRequestMsg struct { - Service string `sshtype:"5"` -} - -// See RFC 4253, section 10. -const msgServiceAccept = 6 - -type serviceAcceptMsg struct { - Service string `sshtype:"6"` -} - -// See RFC 8308, section 2.3 -const msgExtInfo = 7 - -type extInfoMsg struct { - NumExtensions uint32 `sshtype:"7"` - Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4252, section 5. -const msgUserAuthRequest = 50 - -type userAuthRequestMsg struct { - User string `sshtype:"50"` - Service string - Method string - Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// Used for debug printouts of packets. -type userAuthSuccessMsg struct { -} - -// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 -const msgUserAuthFailure = 51 - -type userAuthFailureMsg struct { - Methods []string `sshtype:"51"` - PartialSuccess bool -} - -// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 -const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52 - -// See RFC 4252, section 5.4 -const msgUserAuthBanner = 53 - -type userAuthBannerMsg struct { - Message string `sshtype:"53"` - // unused, but required to allow message parsing - Language string -} - -// See RFC 4256, section 3.2 -const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60 -const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61 - -type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct { - Name string `sshtype:"60"` - Instruction string - Language string - NumPrompts uint32 - Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. -const msgChannelOpen = 90 - -type channelOpenMsg struct { - ChanType string `sshtype:"90"` - PeersID uint32 - PeersWindow uint32 - MaxPacketSize uint32 - TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -const msgChannelExtendedData = 95 -const msgChannelData = 94 - -// Used for debug print outs of packets. -type channelDataMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"` - Length uint32 - Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. -const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91 - -type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"` - MyID uint32 - MyWindow uint32 - MaxPacketSize uint32 - TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. -const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92 - -type channelOpenFailureMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"` - Reason RejectionReason - Message string - Language string -} - -const msgChannelRequest = 98 - -type channelRequestMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"` - Request string - WantReply bool - RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. -const msgChannelSuccess = 99 - -type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. -const msgChannelFailure = 100 - -type channelRequestFailureMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 -const msgChannelClose = 97 - -type channelCloseMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 -const msgChannelEOF = 96 - -type channelEOFMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 4 -const msgGlobalRequest = 80 - -type globalRequestMsg struct { - Type string `sshtype:"80"` - WantReply bool - Data []byte `ssh:"rest"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 4 -const msgRequestSuccess = 81 - -type globalRequestSuccessMsg struct { - Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"81"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 4 -const msgRequestFailure = 82 - -type globalRequestFailureMsg struct { - Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"82"` -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 5.2 -const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93 - -type windowAdjustMsg struct { - PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"` - AdditionalBytes uint32 -} - -// See RFC 4252, section 7 -const msgUserAuthPubKeyOk = 60 - -type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct { - Algo string `sshtype:"60"` - PubKey []byte -} - -// See RFC 4462, section 3 -const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60 - -type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct { - SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"` -} - -const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61 - -type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct { - Token []byte `sshtype:"61"` -} - -const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66 - -type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct { - MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"` -} - -// See RFC 4462, section 3.9 -const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64 - -type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct { - ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"` -} - -// See RFC 4462, section 3.8 -const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65 - -type userAuthGSSAPIError struct { - MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"` - MinorStatus uint32 - Message string - LanguageTag string -} - -// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 -const msgPing = 192 - -type pingMsg struct { - Data string `sshtype:"192"` -} - -// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 -const msgPong = 193 - -type pongMsg struct { - Data string `sshtype:"193"` -} - -// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which -// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character. -func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) { - tagStr := structType.Field(0).Tag.Get("sshtype") - - for _, tag := range strings.Split(tagStr, "|") { - i, err := strconv.Atoi(tag) - if err == nil { - tags = append(tags, byte(i)) - } - } - - return tags -} - -func fieldError(t reflect.Type, field int, problem string) error { - if problem != "" { - problem = ": " + problem - } - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unmarshal error for field %s of type %s%s", t.Field(field).Name, t.Name(), problem) -} - -var errShortRead = errors.New("ssh: short read") - -// Unmarshal parses data in SSH wire format into a structure. The out -// argument should be a pointer to struct. If the first member of the -// struct has the "sshtype" tag set to a '|'-separated set of numbers -// in decimal, the packet must start with one of those numbers. In -// case of error, Unmarshal returns a ParseError or -// UnexpectedMessageError. -func Unmarshal(data []byte, out interface{}) error { - v := reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem() - structType := v.Type() - expectedTypes := typeTags(structType) - - var expectedType byte - if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { - expectedType = expectedTypes[0] - } - - if len(data) == 0 { - return parseError(expectedType) - } - - if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { - goodType := false - for _, e := range expectedTypes { - if e > 0 && data[0] == e { - goodType = true - break - } - } - if !goodType { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected one of %v)", data[0], expectedTypes) - } - data = data[1:] - } - - var ok bool - for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ { - field := v.Field(i) - t := field.Type() - switch t.Kind() { - case reflect.Bool: - if len(data) < 1 { - return errShortRead - } - field.SetBool(data[0] != 0) - data = data[1:] - case reflect.Array: - if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { - return fieldError(structType, i, "array of unsupported type") - } - if len(data) < t.Len() { - return errShortRead - } - for j, n := 0, t.Len(); j < n; j++ { - field.Index(j).Set(reflect.ValueOf(data[j])) - } - data = data[t.Len():] - case reflect.Uint64: - var u64 uint64 - if u64, data, ok = parseUint64(data); !ok { - return errShortRead - } - field.SetUint(u64) - case reflect.Uint32: - var u32 uint32 - if u32, data, ok = parseUint32(data); !ok { - return errShortRead - } - field.SetUint(uint64(u32)) - case reflect.Uint8: - if len(data) < 1 { - return errShortRead - } - field.SetUint(uint64(data[0])) - data = data[1:] - case reflect.String: - var s []byte - if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { - return fieldError(structType, i, "") - } - field.SetString(string(s)) - case reflect.Slice: - switch t.Elem().Kind() { - case reflect.Uint8: - if structType.Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") == "rest" { - field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(data)) - data = nil - } else { - var s []byte - if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { - return errShortRead - } - field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(s)) - } - case reflect.String: - var nl []string - if nl, data, ok = parseNameList(data); !ok { - return errShortRead - } - field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(nl)) - default: - return fieldError(structType, i, "slice of unsupported type") - } - case reflect.Ptr: - if t == bigIntType { - var n *big.Int - if n, data, ok = parseInt(data); !ok { - return errShortRead - } - field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(n)) - } else { - return fieldError(structType, i, "pointer to unsupported type") - } - default: - return fieldError(structType, i, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type: %v", t)) - } - } - - if len(data) != 0 { - return parseError(expectedType) - } - - return nil -} - -// Marshal serializes the message in msg to SSH wire format. The msg -// argument should be a struct or pointer to struct. If the first -// member has the "sshtype" tag set to a number in decimal, that -// number is prepended to the result. If the last of member has the -// "ssh" tag set to "rest", its contents are appended to the output. -func Marshal(msg interface{}) []byte { - out := make([]byte, 0, 64) - return marshalStruct(out, msg) -} - -func marshalStruct(out []byte, msg interface{}) []byte { - v := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(msg)) - msgTypes := typeTags(v.Type()) - if len(msgTypes) > 0 { - out = append(out, msgTypes[0]) - } - - for i, n := 0, v.NumField(); i < n; i++ { - field := v.Field(i) - switch t := field.Type(); t.Kind() { - case reflect.Bool: - var v uint8 - if field.Bool() { - v = 1 - } - out = append(out, v) - case reflect.Array: - if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { - panic(fmt.Sprintf("array of non-uint8 in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) - } - for j, l := 0, t.Len(); j < l; j++ { - out = append(out, uint8(field.Index(j).Uint())) - } - case reflect.Uint32: - out = appendU32(out, uint32(field.Uint())) - case reflect.Uint64: - out = appendU64(out, uint64(field.Uint())) - case reflect.Uint8: - out = append(out, uint8(field.Uint())) - case reflect.String: - s := field.String() - out = appendInt(out, len(s)) - out = append(out, s...) - case reflect.Slice: - switch t.Elem().Kind() { - case reflect.Uint8: - if v.Type().Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") != "rest" { - out = appendInt(out, field.Len()) - } - out = append(out, field.Bytes()...) - case reflect.String: - offset := len(out) - out = appendU32(out, 0) - if n := field.Len(); n > 0 { - for j := 0; j < n; j++ { - f := field.Index(j) - if j != 0 { - out = append(out, ',') - } - out = append(out, f.String()...) - } - // overwrite length value - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[offset:], uint32(len(out)-offset-4)) - } - default: - panic(fmt.Sprintf("slice of unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) - } - case reflect.Ptr: - if t == bigIntType { - var n *big.Int - nValue := reflect.ValueOf(&n) - nValue.Elem().Set(field) - needed := intLength(n) - oldLength := len(out) - - if cap(out)-len(out) < needed { - newOut := make([]byte, len(out), 2*(len(out)+needed)) - copy(newOut, out) - out = newOut - } - out = out[:oldLength+needed] - marshalInt(out[oldLength:], n) - } else { - panic(fmt.Sprintf("pointer to unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) - } - } - } - - return out -} - -var bigOne = big.NewInt(1) - -func parseString(in []byte) (out, rest []byte, ok bool) { - if len(in) < 4 { - return - } - length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in) - in = in[4:] - if uint32(len(in)) < length { - return - } - out = in[:length] - rest = in[length:] - ok = true - return -} - -var ( - comma = []byte{','} - emptyNameList = []string{} -) - -func parseNameList(in []byte) (out []string, rest []byte, ok bool) { - contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return - } - if len(contents) == 0 { - out = emptyNameList - return - } - parts := bytes.Split(contents, comma) - out = make([]string, len(parts)) - for i, part := range parts { - out[i] = string(part) - } - return -} - -func parseInt(in []byte) (out *big.Int, rest []byte, ok bool) { - contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) - if !ok { - return - } - out = new(big.Int) - - if len(contents) > 0 && contents[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { - // This is a negative number - notBytes := make([]byte, len(contents)) - for i := range notBytes { - notBytes[i] = ^contents[i] - } - out.SetBytes(notBytes) - out.Add(out, bigOne) - out.Neg(out) - } else { - // Positive number - out.SetBytes(contents) - } - ok = true - return -} - -func parseUint32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) { - if len(in) < 4 { - return 0, nil, false - } - return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in), in[4:], true -} - -func parseUint64(in []byte) (uint64, []byte, bool) { - if len(in) < 8 { - return 0, nil, false - } - return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(in), in[8:], true -} - -func intLength(n *big.Int) int { - length := 4 /* length bytes */ - if n.Sign() < 0 { - nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) - nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) - bitLen := nMinus1.BitLen() - if bitLen%8 == 0 { - // The number will need 0xff padding - length++ - } - length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 - } else if n.Sign() == 0 { - // A zero is the zero length string - } else { - bitLen := n.BitLen() - if bitLen%8 == 0 { - // The number will need 0x00 padding - length++ - } - length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 - } - - return length -} - -func marshalUint32(to []byte, n uint32) []byte { - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(to, n) - return to[4:] -} - -func marshalUint64(to []byte, n uint64) []byte { - binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(to, n) - return to[8:] -} - -func marshalInt(to []byte, n *big.Int) []byte { - lengthBytes := to - to = to[4:] - length := 0 - - if n.Sign() < 0 { - // A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement - // form. So we'll subtract 1 and invert. If the - // most-significant-bit isn't set then we'll need to pad the - // beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number negative. - nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) - nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) - bytes := nMinus1.Bytes() - for i := range bytes { - bytes[i] ^= 0xff - } - if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 { - to[0] = 0xff - to = to[1:] - length++ - } - nBytes := copy(to, bytes) - to = to[nBytes:] - length += nBytes - } else if n.Sign() == 0 { - // A zero is the zero length string - } else { - bytes := n.Bytes() - if len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 { - // We'll have to pad this with a 0x00 in order to - // stop it looking like a negative number. - to[0] = 0 - to = to[1:] - length++ - } - nBytes := copy(to, bytes) - to = to[nBytes:] - length += nBytes - } - - lengthBytes[0] = byte(length >> 24) - lengthBytes[1] = byte(length >> 16) - lengthBytes[2] = byte(length >> 8) - lengthBytes[3] = byte(length) - return to -} - -func writeInt(w io.Writer, n *big.Int) { - length := intLength(n) - buf := make([]byte, length) - marshalInt(buf, n) - w.Write(buf) -} - -func writeString(w io.Writer, s []byte) { - var lengthBytes [4]byte - lengthBytes[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) - lengthBytes[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) - lengthBytes[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) - lengthBytes[3] = byte(len(s)) - w.Write(lengthBytes[:]) - w.Write(s) -} - -func stringLength(n int) int { - return 4 + n -} - -func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte { - to[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) - to[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) - to[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) - to[3] = byte(len(s)) - to = to[4:] - copy(to, s) - return to[len(s):] -} - -var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil)) - -// Decode a packet into its corresponding message. -func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) { - var msg interface{} - switch packet[0] { - case msgDisconnect: - msg = new(disconnectMsg) - case msgServiceRequest: - msg = new(serviceRequestMsg) - case msgServiceAccept: - msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg) - case msgExtInfo: - msg = new(extInfoMsg) - case msgKexInit: - msg = new(kexInitMsg) - case msgKexDHInit: - msg = new(kexDHInitMsg) - case msgKexDHReply: - msg = new(kexDHReplyMsg) - case msgUserAuthRequest: - msg = new(userAuthRequestMsg) - case msgUserAuthSuccess: - return new(userAuthSuccessMsg), nil - case msgUserAuthFailure: - msg = new(userAuthFailureMsg) - case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: - msg = new(userAuthPubKeyOkMsg) - case msgGlobalRequest: - msg = new(globalRequestMsg) - case msgRequestSuccess: - msg = new(globalRequestSuccessMsg) - case msgRequestFailure: - msg = new(globalRequestFailureMsg) - case msgChannelOpen: - msg = new(channelOpenMsg) - case msgChannelData: - msg = new(channelDataMsg) - case msgChannelOpenConfirm: - msg = new(channelOpenConfirmMsg) - case msgChannelOpenFailure: - msg = new(channelOpenFailureMsg) - case msgChannelWindowAdjust: - msg = new(windowAdjustMsg) - case msgChannelEOF: - msg = new(channelEOFMsg) - case msgChannelClose: - msg = new(channelCloseMsg) - case msgChannelRequest: - msg = new(channelRequestMsg) - case msgChannelSuccess: - msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg) - case msgChannelFailure: - msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg) - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: - msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken) - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC: - msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC) - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok: - msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok) - case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: - msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError) - default: - return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0]) - } - if err := Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return msg, nil -} - -var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{ - msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg", - msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg", - msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg", - msgExtInfo: "extInfoMsg", - msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg", - msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg", - msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg", - msgUserAuthRequest: "userAuthRequestMsg", - msgUserAuthSuccess: "userAuthSuccessMsg", - msgUserAuthFailure: "userAuthFailureMsg", - msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: "userAuthPubKeyOkMsg", - msgGlobalRequest: "globalRequestMsg", - msgRequestSuccess: "globalRequestSuccessMsg", - msgRequestFailure: "globalRequestFailureMsg", - msgChannelOpen: "channelOpenMsg", - msgChannelData: "channelDataMsg", - msgChannelOpenConfirm: "channelOpenConfirmMsg", - msgChannelOpenFailure: "channelOpenFailureMsg", - msgChannelWindowAdjust: "windowAdjustMsg", - msgChannelEOF: "channelEOFMsg", - msgChannelClose: "channelCloseMsg", - msgChannelRequest: "channelRequestMsg", - msgChannelSuccess: "channelRequestSuccessMsg", - msgChannelFailure: "channelRequestFailureMsg", -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go deleted file mode 100644 index d2d24c635..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,357 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "encoding/binary" - "fmt" - "io" - "log" - "sync" - "sync/atomic" -) - -// debugMux, if set, causes messages in the connection protocol to be -// logged. -const debugMux = false - -// chanList is a thread safe channel list. -type chanList struct { - // protects concurrent access to chans - sync.Mutex - - // chans are indexed by the local id of the channel, which the - // other side should send in the PeersId field. - chans []*channel - - // This is a debugging aid: it offsets all IDs by this - // amount. This helps distinguish otherwise identical - // server/client muxes - offset uint32 -} - -// Assigns a channel ID to the given channel. -func (c *chanList) add(ch *channel) uint32 { - c.Lock() - defer c.Unlock() - for i := range c.chans { - if c.chans[i] == nil { - c.chans[i] = ch - return uint32(i) + c.offset - } - } - c.chans = append(c.chans, ch) - return uint32(len(c.chans)-1) + c.offset -} - -// getChan returns the channel for the given ID. -func (c *chanList) getChan(id uint32) *channel { - id -= c.offset - - c.Lock() - defer c.Unlock() - if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { - return c.chans[id] - } - return nil -} - -func (c *chanList) remove(id uint32) { - id -= c.offset - c.Lock() - if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { - c.chans[id] = nil - } - c.Unlock() -} - -// dropAll forgets all channels it knows, returning them in a slice. -func (c *chanList) dropAll() []*channel { - c.Lock() - defer c.Unlock() - var r []*channel - - for _, ch := range c.chans { - if ch == nil { - continue - } - r = append(r, ch) - } - c.chans = nil - return r -} - -// mux represents the state for the SSH connection protocol, which -// multiplexes many channels onto a single packet transport. -type mux struct { - conn packetConn - chanList chanList - - incomingChannels chan NewChannel - - globalSentMu sync.Mutex - globalResponses chan interface{} - incomingRequests chan *Request - - errCond *sync.Cond - err error -} - -// When debugging, each new chanList instantiation has a different -// offset. -var globalOff uint32 - -func (m *mux) Wait() error { - m.errCond.L.Lock() - defer m.errCond.L.Unlock() - for m.err == nil { - m.errCond.Wait() - } - return m.err -} - -// newMux returns a mux that runs over the given connection. -func newMux(p packetConn) *mux { - m := &mux{ - conn: p, - incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize), - globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1), - incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), - errCond: newCond(), - } - if debugMux { - m.chanList.offset = atomic.AddUint32(&globalOff, 1) - } - - go m.loop() - return m -} - -func (m *mux) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { - p := Marshal(msg) - if debugMux { - log.Printf("send global(%d): %#v", m.chanList.offset, msg) - } - return m.conn.writePacket(p) -} - -func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) { - if wantReply { - m.globalSentMu.Lock() - defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock() - } - - if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{ - Type: name, - WantReply: wantReply, - Data: payload, - }); err != nil { - return false, nil, err - } - - if !wantReply { - return false, nil, nil - } - - msg, ok := <-m.globalResponses - if !ok { - return false, nil, io.EOF - } - switch msg := msg.(type) { - case *globalRequestFailureMsg: - return false, msg.Data, nil - case *globalRequestSuccessMsg: - return true, msg.Data, nil - default: - return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to request: %#v", msg) - } -} - -// ackRequest must be called after processing a global request that -// has WantReply set. -func (m *mux) ackRequest(ok bool, data []byte) error { - if ok { - return m.sendMessage(globalRequestSuccessMsg{Data: data}) - } - return m.sendMessage(globalRequestFailureMsg{Data: data}) -} - -func (m *mux) Close() error { - return m.conn.Close() -} - -// loop runs the connection machine. It will process packets until an -// error is encountered. To synchronize on loop exit, use mux.Wait. -func (m *mux) loop() { - var err error - for err == nil { - err = m.onePacket() - } - - for _, ch := range m.chanList.dropAll() { - ch.close() - } - - close(m.incomingChannels) - close(m.incomingRequests) - close(m.globalResponses) - - m.conn.Close() - - m.errCond.L.Lock() - m.err = err - m.errCond.Broadcast() - m.errCond.L.Unlock() - - if debugMux { - log.Println("loop exit", err) - } -} - -// onePacket reads and processes one packet. -func (m *mux) onePacket() error { - packet, err := m.conn.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return err - } - - if debugMux { - if packet[0] == msgChannelData || packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { - log.Printf("decoding(%d): data packet - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, len(packet)) - } else { - p, _ := decode(packet) - log.Printf("decoding(%d): %d %#v - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, packet[0], p, len(packet)) - } - } - - switch packet[0] { - case msgChannelOpen: - return m.handleChannelOpen(packet) - case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure: - return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet) - case msgPing: - var msg pingMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal ping@openssh.com message: %w", err) - } - return m.sendMessage(pongMsg(msg)) - } - - // assume a channel packet. - if len(packet) < 5 { - return parseError(packet[0]) - } - id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[1:]) - ch := m.chanList.getChan(id) - if ch == nil { - return m.handleUnknownChannelPacket(id, packet) - } - - return ch.handlePacket(packet) -} - -func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error { - msg, err := decode(packet) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - switch msg := msg.(type) { - case *globalRequestMsg: - m.incomingRequests <- &Request{ - Type: msg.Type, - WantReply: msg.WantReply, - Payload: msg.Data, - mux: m, - } - case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg: - m.globalResponses <- msg - default: - panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg)) - } - - return nil -} - -// handleChannelOpen schedules a channel to be Accept()ed. -func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error { - var msg channelOpenMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return err - } - - if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { - failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{ - PeersID: msg.PeersID, - Reason: ConnectionFailed, - Message: "invalid request", - Language: "en_US.UTF-8", - } - return m.sendMessage(failMsg) - } - - c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData) - c.remoteId = msg.PeersID - c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize - c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow) - m.incomingChannels <- c - return nil -} - -func (m *mux) OpenChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { - ch, err := m.openChannel(chanType, extra) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil -} - -func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) { - ch := m.newChannel(chanType, channelOutbound, extra) - - ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket - - open := channelOpenMsg{ - ChanType: chanType, - PeersWindow: ch.myWindow, - MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, - TypeSpecificData: extra, - PeersID: ch.localId, - } - if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - switch msg := (<-ch.msg).(type) { - case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: - return ch, nil - case *channelOpenFailureMsg: - return nil, &OpenChannelError{msg.Reason, msg.Message} - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected packet in response to channel open: %T", msg) - } -} - -func (m *mux) handleUnknownChannelPacket(id uint32, packet []byte) error { - msg, err := decode(packet) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - switch msg := msg.(type) { - // RFC 4254 section 5.4 says unrecognized channel requests should - // receive a failure response. - case *channelRequestMsg: - if msg.WantReply { - return m.sendMessage(channelRequestFailureMsg{ - PeersID: msg.PeersID, - }) - } - return nil - default: - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid channel %d", id) - } -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go deleted file mode 100644 index 1839ddc6a..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,933 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bytes" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "net" - "strings" -) - -// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are -// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user. -// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is -// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from -// the user-authentication phase to the application layer. -type Permissions struct { - // CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default - // permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with - // user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates - // defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to - // execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from - // the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces - // the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server - // implementations to enforce other critical options, such as - // "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake - // is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject - // connections that specify critical options that are unknown - // or not supported. - CriticalOptions map[string]string - - // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may - // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an - // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common - // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", - // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does - // not act on any extension, and it is up to server - // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to - // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server - // application layer. - Extensions map[string]string -} - -type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { - // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic - // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the - // results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN. - // GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions. - // This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with - // which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error. - AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error) - - // Server must be set. It's the implementation - // of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details. - Server GSSAPIServer -} - -// SendAuthBanner implements [ServerPreAuthConn]. -func (s *connection) SendAuthBanner(msg string) error { - return s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthBannerMsg{ - Message: msg, - })) -} - -func (*connection) unexportedMethodForFutureProofing() {} - -// ServerPreAuthConn is the interface available on an incoming server -// connection before authentication has completed. -type ServerPreAuthConn interface { - unexportedMethodForFutureProofing() // permits growing ServerPreAuthConn safely later, ala testing.TB - - ConnMetadata - - // SendAuthBanner sends a banner message to the client. - // It returns an error once the authentication phase has ended. - SendAuthBanner(string) error -} - -// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. -type ServerConfig struct { - // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. - Config - - // PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key - // authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate - // types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the - // client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. - // If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used. - PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string - - hostKeys []Signer - - // NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without - // authenticating. - // To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true - // and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value. - NoClientAuth bool - - // NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user - // attempts to authenticate with auth method "none". - // NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or - // this func is unused. - NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error) - - // MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts - // permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of - // attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited - // to 6. - MaxAuthTries int - - // PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user - // attempts to authenticate using a password. - PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) - - // PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client - // offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error - // if the given public key can be used to authenticate the - // given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A - // call to this function does not guarantee that the key - // offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data - // depending on the public key, store it inside a - // Permissions.Extensions entry. - PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) - - // KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when - // keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC - // 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be - // used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple - // Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client - // should be presented a challenge even if the user is - // unknown. - KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) - - // AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication - // attempts. - AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) - - // PreAuthConnCallback, if non-nil, is called upon receiving a new connection - // before any authentication has started. The provided ServerPreAuthConn - // can be used at any time before authentication is complete, including - // after this callback has returned. - PreAuthConnCallback func(ServerPreAuthConn) - - // ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in - // the public handshake. - // If empty, a reasonable default is used. - // Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with - // "SSH-2.0-". - ServerVersion string - - // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to - // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication. - BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string - - // GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used - // when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). - GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig -} - -// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host -// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server -// config must have at least one host key. -func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) { - for i, k := range s.hostKeys { - if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() { - s.hostKeys[i] = key - return - } - } - - s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key) -} - -// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is -// acceptable for a user. This is a FIFO cache. -type cachedPubKey struct { - user string - pubKeyData []byte - result error - perms *Permissions -} - -// maxCachedPubKeys is the number of cache entries we store. -// -// Due to consistent misuse of the PublicKeyCallback API, we have reduced this -// to 1, such that the only key in the cache is the most recently seen one. This -// forces the behavior that the last call to PublicKeyCallback will always be -// with the key that is used for authentication. -const maxCachedPubKeys = 1 - -// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients -// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to -// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public -// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn. -type pubKeyCache struct { - keys []cachedPubKey -} - -// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple. -func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) { - for _, k := range c.keys { - if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) { - return k, true - } - } - return cachedPubKey{}, false -} - -// add adds the given tuple to the cache. -func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { - if len(c.keys) >= maxCachedPubKeys { - c.keys = c.keys[1:] - } - c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate) -} - -// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the -// server -type ServerConn struct { - Conn - - // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a - // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. - Permissions *Permissions -} - -// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying -// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is -// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The -// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection -// will hang. -// -// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for -// authentication errors. -func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { - fullConf := *config - fullConf.SetDefaults() - if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 { - fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6 - } - if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 { - fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos - } else { - for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms { - if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) { - c.Close() - return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo) - } - } - } - // Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges - for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges { - if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok { - c.Close() - return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex) - } - } - - s := &connection{ - sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, - } - perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf) - if err != nil { - c.Close() - return nil, nil, nil, err - } - return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil -} - -// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm, -// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate -// algorithm and may be a certificate type. -func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) { - sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return Marshal(sig), nil -} - -// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication. -func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { - if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys") - } - - if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && - config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || - config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") - } - - if config.ServerVersion != "" { - s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion) - } else { - s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion) - } - var err error - s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */) - s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config) - - if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established. - s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID() - - var packet []byte - if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg - if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating") - } - serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{ - Service: serviceUserAuth, - } - if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - s.mux = newMux(s.transport) - return perms, err -} - -func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error { - if addr == nil { - return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required") - } - - tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr) - } - - for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") { - if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil { - if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) { - return nil - } - } else { - _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err) - } - - if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) { - return nil - } - } - } - - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr) -} - -func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection, - sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) { - gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server - defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext() - var srcName string - for { - var ( - outToken []byte - needContinue bool - ) - outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token) - if err != nil { - return err, nil, nil - } - if len(outToken) != 0 { - if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ - Token: outToken, - })); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - } - if !needContinue { - break - } - packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token - } - packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method) - if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil { - return err, nil, nil - } - perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName) - return authErr, perms, nil -} - -// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the -// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old -// clients. -func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool { - // Compatibility for old clients. - // - // For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can - // be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm - // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com. - // - // With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 - // for signature format ssh-rsa. - if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) { - return true - } - // Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format. - return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat -} - -// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is -// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication -// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication -// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate. -type ServerAuthError struct { - // Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication - // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth. - Errors []error -} - -func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string { - var errs []string - for _, err := range l.Errors { - errs = append(errs, err.Error()) - } - return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]" -} - -// ServerAuthCallbacks defines server-side authentication callbacks. -type ServerAuthCallbacks struct { - // PasswordCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PasswordCallback]. - PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) - - // PublicKeyCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback]. - PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) - - // KeyboardInteractiveCallback behaves like [ServerConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback]. - KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) - - // GSSAPIWithMICConfig behaves like [ServerConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig]. - GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig -} - -// PartialSuccessError can be returned by any of the [ServerConfig] -// authentication callbacks to indicate to the client that authentication has -// partially succeeded, but further steps are required. -type PartialSuccessError struct { - // Next defines the authentication callbacks to apply to further steps. The - // available methods communicated to the client are based on the non-nil - // ServerAuthCallbacks fields. - Next ServerAuthCallbacks -} - -func (p *PartialSuccessError) Error() string { - return "ssh: authenticated with partial success" -} - -// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no -// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal -// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries -// 'none' authentication to discover available methods. -// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn. -var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet") - -// BannerError is an error that can be returned by authentication handlers in -// ServerConfig to send a banner message to the client. -type BannerError struct { - Err error - Message string -} - -func (b *BannerError) Unwrap() error { - return b.Err -} - -func (b *BannerError) Error() string { - if b.Err == nil { - return b.Message - } - return b.Err.Error() -} - -func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { - if config.PreAuthConnCallback != nil { - config.PreAuthConnCallback(s) - } - - sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID() - var cache pubKeyCache - var perms *Permissions - - authFailures := 0 - noneAuthCount := 0 - var authErrs []error - var calledBannerCallback bool - partialSuccessReturned := false - // Set the initial authentication callbacks from the config. They can be - // changed if a PartialSuccessError is returned. - authConfig := ServerAuthCallbacks{ - PasswordCallback: config.PasswordCallback, - PublicKeyCallback: config.PublicKeyCallback, - KeyboardInteractiveCallback: config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback, - GSSAPIWithMICConfig: config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig, - } - -userAuthLoop: - for { - if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 { - discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ - Reason: 2, - Message: "too many authentication failures", - } - - if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - authErrs = append(authErrs, discMsg) - return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} - } - - var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg - if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { - if err == io.EOF { - return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} - } - return nil, err - } else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service) - } - - if s.user != userAuthReq.User && partialSuccessReturned { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: client changed the user after a partial success authentication, previous user %q, current user %q", - s.user, userAuthReq.User) - } - - s.user = userAuthReq.User - - if !calledBannerCallback && config.BannerCallback != nil { - calledBannerCallback = true - if msg := config.BannerCallback(s); msg != "" { - if err := s.SendAuthBanner(msg); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - } - - perms = nil - authErr := ErrNoAuth - - switch userAuthReq.Method { - case "none": - noneAuthCount++ - // We don't allow none authentication after a partial success - // response. - if config.NoClientAuth && !partialSuccessReturned { - if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil { - perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s) - } else { - authErr = nil - } - } - case "password": - if authConfig.PasswordCallback == nil { - authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured") - break - } - payload := userAuthReq.Payload - if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - payload = payload[1:] - password, payload, ok := parseString(payload) - if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - - perms, authErr = authConfig.PasswordCallback(s, password) - case "keyboard-interactive": - if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { - authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") - break - } - - prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s} - perms, authErr = authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge) - case "publickey": - if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback == nil { - authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured") - break - } - payload := userAuthReq.Payload - if len(payload) < 1 { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - isQuery := payload[0] == 0 - payload = payload[1:] - algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload) - if !ok { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - algo := string(algoBytes) - if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo) - break - } - - pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload) - if !ok { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - - pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData) - if !ok { - candidate.user = s.user - candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData - candidate.perms, candidate.result = authConfig.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey) - _, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError) - - if (candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError) && - candidate.perms != nil && - candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && - candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" { - if err := checkSourceAddress( - s.RemoteAddr(), - candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]); err != nil { - candidate.result = err - } - } - cache.add(candidate) - } - - if isQuery { - // The client can query if the given public key - // would be okay. - - if len(payload) > 0 { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - _, isPartialSuccessError := candidate.result.(*PartialSuccessError) - if candidate.result == nil || isPartialSuccessError { - okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{ - Algo: algo, - PubKey: pubKeyData, - } - if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - continue userAuthLoop - } - authErr = candidate.result - } else { - sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload) - if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - // Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the - // decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g. - // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public - // key type. The algorithm and public key type must be - // consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither. - if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", - pubKey.Type(), algo) - break - } - // Ensure the public key algo and signature algo - // are supported. Compare the private key - // algorithm name that corresponds to algo with - // sig.Format. This is usually the same, but - // for certs, the names differ. - if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format) - break - } - if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo) - break - } - - signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData) - - if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - authErr = candidate.result - perms = candidate.perms - } - case "gssapi-with-mic": - if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil { - authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured") - break - } - gssapiConfig := authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig - userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload) - if err != nil { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) - } - // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication. - if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported") - break - } - var i uint32 - present := false - for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ { - if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) { - present = true - break - } - } - if !present { - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism") - break - } - // Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3. - if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{ - SupportMech: krb5OID, - })); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4. - packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} - if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID, - userAuthReq) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - default: - authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method) - } - - authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr) - - if config.AuthLogCallback != nil { - config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr) - } - - var bannerErr *BannerError - if errors.As(authErr, &bannerErr) { - if bannerErr.Message != "" { - if err := s.SendAuthBanner(bannerErr.Message); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - } - - if authErr == nil { - break userAuthLoop - } - - var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg - - if partialSuccess, ok := authErr.(*PartialSuccessError); ok { - // After a partial success error we don't allow changing the user - // name and execute the NoClientAuthCallback. - partialSuccessReturned = true - - // In case a partial success is returned, the server may send - // a new set of authentication methods. - authConfig = partialSuccess.Next - - // Reset pubkey cache, as the new PublicKeyCallback might - // accept a different set of public keys. - cache = pubKeyCache{} - - // Send back a partial success message to the user. - failureMsg.PartialSuccess = true - } else { - // Allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty. - if authFailures > 0 || userAuthReq.Method != "none" || noneAuthCount != 1 { - authFailures++ - } - if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries { - // If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the - // final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are - // no more authentication methods which can be attempted, - // and this message may cause the client to re-attempt - // authentication while we send the disconnect message. - // Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of - // the loop. - // - // The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this, - // RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure - // be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE - // message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect - // after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which - // message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure - // message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to - // disconnect, should we only send that message.) - // - // Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last - // failed authentication attempt, and given they are typically - // considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable - // to match that behavior. - continue - } - } - - if authConfig.PasswordCallback != nil { - failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password") - } - if authConfig.PublicKeyCallback != nil { - failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey") - } - if authConfig.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { - failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") - } - if authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && - authConfig.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { - failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") - } - - if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods available") - } - - if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - - if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return perms, nil -} - -// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by -// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn. -type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct { - *connection -} - -func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) { - if len(questions) != len(echos) { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length") - } - - var prompts []byte - for i := range questions { - prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i]) - prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i]) - } - - if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{ - Name: name, - Instruction: instruction, - NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)), - Prompts: prompts, - })); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse { - return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0]) - } - packet = packet[1:] - - n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet) - if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) - } - - for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ { - ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet) - if !ok { - return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) - } - - answers = append(answers, string(ans)) - packet = rest - } - if len(packet) != 0 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message") - } - - return answers, nil -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go deleted file mode 100644 index acef62259..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,647 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -// Session implements an interactive session described in -// "RFC 4254, section 6". - -import ( - "bytes" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "sync" -) - -type Signal string - -// POSIX signals as listed in RFC 4254 Section 6.10. -const ( - SIGABRT Signal = "ABRT" - SIGALRM Signal = "ALRM" - SIGFPE Signal = "FPE" - SIGHUP Signal = "HUP" - SIGILL Signal = "ILL" - SIGINT Signal = "INT" - SIGKILL Signal = "KILL" - SIGPIPE Signal = "PIPE" - SIGQUIT Signal = "QUIT" - SIGSEGV Signal = "SEGV" - SIGTERM Signal = "TERM" - SIGUSR1 Signal = "USR1" - SIGUSR2 Signal = "USR2" -) - -var signals = map[Signal]int{ - SIGABRT: 6, - SIGALRM: 14, - SIGFPE: 8, - SIGHUP: 1, - SIGILL: 4, - SIGINT: 2, - SIGKILL: 9, - SIGPIPE: 13, - SIGQUIT: 3, - SIGSEGV: 11, - SIGTERM: 15, -} - -type TerminalModes map[uint8]uint32 - -// POSIX terminal mode flags as listed in RFC 4254 Section 8. -const ( - tty_OP_END = 0 - VINTR = 1 - VQUIT = 2 - VERASE = 3 - VKILL = 4 - VEOF = 5 - VEOL = 6 - VEOL2 = 7 - VSTART = 8 - VSTOP = 9 - VSUSP = 10 - VDSUSP = 11 - VREPRINT = 12 - VWERASE = 13 - VLNEXT = 14 - VFLUSH = 15 - VSWTCH = 16 - VSTATUS = 17 - VDISCARD = 18 - IGNPAR = 30 - PARMRK = 31 - INPCK = 32 - ISTRIP = 33 - INLCR = 34 - IGNCR = 35 - ICRNL = 36 - IUCLC = 37 - IXON = 38 - IXANY = 39 - IXOFF = 40 - IMAXBEL = 41 - IUTF8 = 42 // RFC 8160 - ISIG = 50 - ICANON = 51 - XCASE = 52 - ECHO = 53 - ECHOE = 54 - ECHOK = 55 - ECHONL = 56 - NOFLSH = 57 - TOSTOP = 58 - IEXTEN = 59 - ECHOCTL = 60 - ECHOKE = 61 - PENDIN = 62 - OPOST = 70 - OLCUC = 71 - ONLCR = 72 - OCRNL = 73 - ONOCR = 74 - ONLRET = 75 - CS7 = 90 - CS8 = 91 - PARENB = 92 - PARODD = 93 - TTY_OP_ISPEED = 128 - TTY_OP_OSPEED = 129 -) - -// A Session represents a connection to a remote command or shell. -type Session struct { - // Stdin specifies the remote process's standard input. - // If Stdin is nil, the remote process reads from an empty - // bytes.Buffer. - Stdin io.Reader - - // Stdout and Stderr specify the remote process's standard - // output and error. - // - // If either is nil, Run connects the corresponding file - // descriptor to an instance of io.Discard. There is a - // fixed amount of buffering that is shared for the two streams. - // If either blocks it may eventually cause the remote - // command to block. - Stdout io.Writer - Stderr io.Writer - - ch Channel // the channel backing this session - started bool // true once Start, Run or Shell is invoked. - copyFuncs []func() error - errors chan error // one send per copyFunc - - // true if pipe method is active - stdinpipe, stdoutpipe, stderrpipe bool - - // stdinPipeWriter is non-nil if StdinPipe has not been called - // and Stdin was specified by the user; it is the write end of - // a pipe connecting Session.Stdin to the stdin channel. - stdinPipeWriter io.WriteCloser - - exitStatus chan error -} - -// SendRequest sends an out-of-band channel request on the SSH channel -// underlying the session. -func (s *Session) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { - return s.ch.SendRequest(name, wantReply, payload) -} - -func (s *Session) Close() error { - return s.ch.Close() -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.4. -type setenvRequest struct { - Name string - Value string -} - -// Setenv sets an environment variable that will be applied to any -// command executed by Shell or Run. -func (s *Session) Setenv(name, value string) error { - msg := setenvRequest{ - Name: name, - Value: value, - } - ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("env", true, Marshal(&msg)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = errors.New("ssh: setenv failed") - } - return err -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.2. -type ptyRequestMsg struct { - Term string - Columns uint32 - Rows uint32 - Width uint32 - Height uint32 - Modelist string -} - -// RequestPty requests the association of a pty with the session on the remote host. -func (s *Session) RequestPty(term string, h, w int, termmodes TerminalModes) error { - var tm []byte - for k, v := range termmodes { - kv := struct { - Key byte - Val uint32 - }{k, v} - - tm = append(tm, Marshal(&kv)...) - } - tm = append(tm, tty_OP_END) - req := ptyRequestMsg{ - Term: term, - Columns: uint32(w), - Rows: uint32(h), - Width: uint32(w * 8), - Height: uint32(h * 8), - Modelist: string(tm), - } - ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("pty-req", true, Marshal(&req)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = errors.New("ssh: pty-req failed") - } - return err -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. -type subsystemRequestMsg struct { - Subsystem string -} - -// RequestSubsystem requests the association of a subsystem with the session on the remote host. -// A subsystem is a predefined command that runs in the background when the ssh session is initiated -func (s *Session) RequestSubsystem(subsystem string) error { - msg := subsystemRequestMsg{ - Subsystem: subsystem, - } - ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("subsystem", true, Marshal(&msg)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = errors.New("ssh: subsystem request failed") - } - return err -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.7. -type ptyWindowChangeMsg struct { - Columns uint32 - Rows uint32 - Width uint32 - Height uint32 -} - -// WindowChange informs the remote host about a terminal window dimension change to h rows and w columns. -func (s *Session) WindowChange(h, w int) error { - req := ptyWindowChangeMsg{ - Columns: uint32(w), - Rows: uint32(h), - Width: uint32(w * 8), - Height: uint32(h * 8), - } - _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("window-change", false, Marshal(&req)) - return err -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.9. -type signalMsg struct { - Signal string -} - -// Signal sends the given signal to the remote process. -// sig is one of the SIG* constants. -func (s *Session) Signal(sig Signal) error { - msg := signalMsg{ - Signal: string(sig), - } - - _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("signal", false, Marshal(&msg)) - return err -} - -// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. -type execMsg struct { - Command string -} - -// Start runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote -// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. -// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start or Shell. -func (s *Session) Start(cmd string) error { - if s.started { - return errors.New("ssh: session already started") - } - req := execMsg{ - Command: cmd, - } - - ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("exec", true, Marshal(&req)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: command %v failed", cmd) - } - if err != nil { - return err - } - return s.start() -} - -// Run runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote -// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. -// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, -// or CombinedOutput. -// -// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems -// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit -// status. -// -// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type -// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes -// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type -// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. -func (s *Session) Run(cmd string) error { - err := s.Start(cmd) - if err != nil { - return err - } - return s.Wait() -} - -// Output runs cmd on the remote host and returns its standard output. -func (s *Session) Output(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { - if s.Stdout != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") - } - var b bytes.Buffer - s.Stdout = &b - err := s.Run(cmd) - return b.Bytes(), err -} - -type singleWriter struct { - b bytes.Buffer - mu sync.Mutex -} - -func (w *singleWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { - w.mu.Lock() - defer w.mu.Unlock() - return w.b.Write(p) -} - -// CombinedOutput runs cmd on the remote host and returns its combined -// standard output and standard error. -func (s *Session) CombinedOutput(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { - if s.Stdout != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") - } - if s.Stderr != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") - } - var b singleWriter - s.Stdout = &b - s.Stderr = &b - err := s.Run(cmd) - return b.b.Bytes(), err -} - -// Shell starts a login shell on the remote host. A Session only -// accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, or CombinedOutput. -func (s *Session) Shell() error { - if s.started { - return errors.New("ssh: session already started") - } - - ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("shell", true, nil) - if err == nil && !ok { - return errors.New("ssh: could not start shell") - } - if err != nil { - return err - } - return s.start() -} - -func (s *Session) start() error { - s.started = true - - type F func(*Session) - for _, setupFd := range []F{(*Session).stdin, (*Session).stdout, (*Session).stderr} { - setupFd(s) - } - - s.errors = make(chan error, len(s.copyFuncs)) - for _, fn := range s.copyFuncs { - go func(fn func() error) { - s.errors <- fn() - }(fn) - } - return nil -} - -// Wait waits for the remote command to exit. -// -// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems -// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit -// status. -// -// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type -// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes -// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type -// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. -func (s *Session) Wait() error { - if !s.started { - return errors.New("ssh: session not started") - } - waitErr := <-s.exitStatus - - if s.stdinPipeWriter != nil { - s.stdinPipeWriter.Close() - } - var copyError error - for range s.copyFuncs { - if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil { - copyError = err - } - } - if waitErr != nil { - return waitErr - } - return copyError -} - -func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error { - wm := Waitmsg{status: -1} - // Wait for msg channel to be closed before returning. - for msg := range reqs { - switch msg.Type { - case "exit-status": - wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload)) - case "exit-signal": - var sigval struct { - Signal string - CoreDumped bool - Error string - Lang string - } - if err := Unmarshal(msg.Payload, &sigval); err != nil { - return err - } - - // Must sanitize strings? - wm.signal = sigval.Signal - wm.msg = sigval.Error - wm.lang = sigval.Lang - default: - // This handles keepalives and matches - // OpenSSH's behaviour. - if msg.WantReply { - msg.Reply(false, nil) - } - } - } - if wm.status == 0 { - return nil - } - if wm.status == -1 { - // exit-status was never sent from server - if wm.signal == "" { - // signal was not sent either. RFC 4254 - // section 6.10 recommends against this - // behavior, but it is allowed, so we let - // clients handle it. - return &ExitMissingError{} - } - wm.status = 128 - if _, ok := signals[Signal(wm.signal)]; ok { - wm.status += signals[Signal(wm.signal)] - } - } - - return &ExitError{wm} -} - -// ExitMissingError is returned if a session is torn down cleanly, but -// the server sends no confirmation of the exit status. -type ExitMissingError struct{} - -func (e *ExitMissingError) Error() string { - return "wait: remote command exited without exit status or exit signal" -} - -func (s *Session) stdin() { - if s.stdinpipe { - return - } - var stdin io.Reader - if s.Stdin == nil { - stdin = new(bytes.Buffer) - } else { - r, w := io.Pipe() - go func() { - _, err := io.Copy(w, s.Stdin) - w.CloseWithError(err) - }() - stdin, s.stdinPipeWriter = r, w - } - s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { - _, err := io.Copy(s.ch, stdin) - if err1 := s.ch.CloseWrite(); err == nil && err1 != io.EOF { - err = err1 - } - return err - }) -} - -func (s *Session) stdout() { - if s.stdoutpipe { - return - } - if s.Stdout == nil { - s.Stdout = io.Discard - } - s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { - _, err := io.Copy(s.Stdout, s.ch) - return err - }) -} - -func (s *Session) stderr() { - if s.stderrpipe { - return - } - if s.Stderr == nil { - s.Stderr = io.Discard - } - s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { - _, err := io.Copy(s.Stderr, s.ch.Stderr()) - return err - }) -} - -// sessionStdin reroutes Close to CloseWrite. -type sessionStdin struct { - io.Writer - ch Channel -} - -func (s *sessionStdin) Close() error { - return s.ch.CloseWrite() -} - -// StdinPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the -// remote command's standard input when the command starts. -func (s *Session) StdinPipe() (io.WriteCloser, error) { - if s.Stdin != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdin already set") - } - if s.started { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdinPipe after process started") - } - s.stdinpipe = true - return &sessionStdin{s.ch, s.ch}, nil -} - -// StdoutPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the -// remote command's standard output when the command starts. -// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between -// stdout and stderr streams. If the StdoutPipe reader is -// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the -// remote command to block. -func (s *Session) StdoutPipe() (io.Reader, error) { - if s.Stdout != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") - } - if s.started { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdoutPipe after process started") - } - s.stdoutpipe = true - return s.ch, nil -} - -// StderrPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the -// remote command's standard error when the command starts. -// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between -// stdout and stderr streams. If the StderrPipe reader is -// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the -// remote command to block. -func (s *Session) StderrPipe() (io.Reader, error) { - if s.Stderr != nil { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") - } - if s.started { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: StderrPipe after process started") - } - s.stderrpipe = true - return s.ch.Stderr(), nil -} - -// newSession returns a new interactive session on the remote host. -func newSession(ch Channel, reqs <-chan *Request) (*Session, error) { - s := &Session{ - ch: ch, - } - s.exitStatus = make(chan error, 1) - go func() { - s.exitStatus <- s.wait(reqs) - }() - - return s, nil -} - -// An ExitError reports unsuccessful completion of a remote command. -type ExitError struct { - Waitmsg -} - -func (e *ExitError) Error() string { - return e.Waitmsg.String() -} - -// Waitmsg stores the information about an exited remote command -// as reported by Wait. -type Waitmsg struct { - status int - signal string - msg string - lang string -} - -// ExitStatus returns the exit status of the remote command. -func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int { - return w.status -} - -// Signal returns the exit signal of the remote command if -// it was terminated violently. -func (w Waitmsg) Signal() string { - return w.signal -} - -// Msg returns the exit message given by the remote command -func (w Waitmsg) Msg() string { - return w.msg -} - -// Lang returns the language tag. See RFC 3066 -func (w Waitmsg) Lang() string { - return w.lang -} - -func (w Waitmsg) String() string { - str := fmt.Sprintf("Process exited with status %v", w.status) - if w.signal != "" { - str += fmt.Sprintf(" from signal %v", w.signal) - } - if w.msg != "" { - str += fmt.Sprintf(". Reason was: %v", w.msg) - } - return str -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go deleted file mode 100644 index 24bd7c8e8..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,139 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "encoding/asn1" - "errors" -) - -var krb5OID []byte - -func init() { - krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh) -} - -// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins. -type GSSAPIClient interface { - // InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the - // ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil. - // The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to - // the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to - // AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting - // needContinue to false. To complete the context - // establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh - // server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true. - // In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the - // reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply - // token to InitSecContext via the token parameters. - // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. - InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error) - // GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places - // the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server. - // The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC() - // over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just - // established: - // string session identifier - // byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST - // string user name - // string service - // string "gssapi-with-mic" - // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5. - GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error) - // Whenever possible, it should be possible for - // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even - // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related - // resources to be released. - // In addition to deleting established security contexts, - // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" - // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of - // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. - // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. - DeleteSecContext() error -} - -// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins. -type GSSAPIServer interface { - // AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application - // and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a - // outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client, - // where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext. - // If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this - // by setting the needContinue to false. To - // complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be - // required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext - // will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it - // should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh - // client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the - // token parameters. - // The srcName return value is the authenticated username. - // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. - AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error) - // VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, - // fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client. - // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2. - VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error - // Whenever possible, it should be possible for - // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even - // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related - // resources to be released. - // In addition to deleting established security contexts, - // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" - // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of - // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. - // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. - DeleteSecContext() error -} - -var ( - // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication, - // so we also support the krb5 mechanism only. - // See RFC 1964 section 1. - krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2} -) - -// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST -// See RFC 4462 section 3.2. -type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct { - N uint32 - OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier -} - -func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { - n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload) - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed") - } - s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{ - N: n, - OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n), - } - for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ { - var ( - desiredMech []byte - err error - ) - desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest) - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("parse string failed") - } - if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - } - return s, nil -} - -// See RFC 4462 section 3.6. -func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte { - out := make([]byte, 0, 0) - out = appendString(out, sessionID) - out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest) - out = appendString(out, username) - out = appendString(out, service) - out = appendString(out, authMethod) - return out -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go deleted file mode 100644 index b171b330b..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -package ssh - -import ( - "errors" - "io" - "net" -) - -// streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message -// with "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. -// -// See openssh-portable/PROTOCOL, section 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding -// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL#L235 -type streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg struct { - socketPath string - reserved0 string - reserved1 uint32 -} - -// forwardedStreamLocalPayload is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message -// with "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. -type forwardedStreamLocalPayload struct { - SocketPath string - Reserved0 string -} - -// streamLocalChannelForwardMsg is a struct used for SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message -// with "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"/"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" string. -type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct { - socketPath string -} - -// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket. -func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { - c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) - m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ - socketPath, - } - // send message - ok, _, err := c.SendRequest("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer") - } - ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"}) - - return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil -} - -func (c *Client) dialStreamLocal(socketPath string) (Channel, error) { - msg := streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg{ - socketPath: socketPath, - } - ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", Marshal(&msg)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - go DiscardRequests(in) - return ch, err -} - -type unixListener struct { - socketPath string - - conn *Client - in <-chan forward -} - -// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. -func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { - s, ok := <-l.in - if !ok { - return nil, io.EOF - } - ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - go DiscardRequests(incoming) - - return &chanConn{ - Channel: ch, - laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: l.socketPath, - Net: "unix", - }, - raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: "@", - Net: "unix", - }, - }, nil -} - -// Close closes the listener. -func (l *unixListener) Close() error { - // this also closes the listener. - l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"}) - m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ - l.socketPath, - } - ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com failed") - } - return err -} - -// Addr returns the listener's network address. -func (l *unixListener) Addr() net.Addr { - return &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: l.socketPath, - Net: "unix", - } -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go deleted file mode 100644 index ef5059a11..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,509 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "context" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "math/rand" - "net" - "strconv" - "strings" - "sync" - "time" -) - -// Listen requests the remote peer open a listening socket on -// addr. Incoming connections will be available by calling Accept on -// the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the -// SSH connection may hang. -// N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix". -func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) { - switch n { - case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": - laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return c.ListenTCP(laddr) - case "unix": - return c.ListenUnix(addr) - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) - } -} - -// Automatic port allocation is broken with OpenSSH before 6.0. See -// also https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2017. In -// particular, OpenSSH 5.9 sends a channelOpenMsg with port number 0, -// rather than the actual port number. This means you can never open -// two different listeners with auto allocated ports. We work around -// this by trying explicit ports until we succeed. - -const openSSHPrefix = "OpenSSH_" - -var portRandomizer = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())) - -// isBrokenOpenSSHVersion returns true if the given version string -// specifies a version of OpenSSH that is known to have a bug in port -// forwarding. -func isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(versionStr string) bool { - i := strings.Index(versionStr, openSSHPrefix) - if i < 0 { - return false - } - i += len(openSSHPrefix) - j := i - for ; j < len(versionStr); j++ { - if versionStr[j] < '0' || versionStr[j] > '9' { - break - } - } - version, _ := strconv.Atoi(versionStr[i:j]) - return version < 6 -} - -// autoPortListenWorkaround simulates automatic port allocation by -// trying random ports repeatedly. -func (c *Client) autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { - var sshListener net.Listener - var err error - const tries = 10 - for i := 0; i < tries; i++ { - addr := *laddr - addr.Port = 1024 + portRandomizer.Intn(60000) - sshListener, err = c.ListenTCP(&addr) - if err == nil { - laddr.Port = addr.Port - return sshListener, err - } - } - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: listen on random port failed after %d tries: %v", tries, err) -} - -// RFC 4254 7.1 -type channelForwardMsg struct { - addr string - rport uint32 -} - -// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections. -// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch -// goroutines until needed. -func (c *Client) handleForwards() { - go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) - go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) -} - -// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket -// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling -// Accept on the returned net.Listener. -func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { - c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) - if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { - return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) - } - - m := channelForwardMsg{ - laddr.IP.String(), - uint32(laddr.Port), - } - // send message - ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: tcpip-forward request denied by peer") - } - - // If the original port was 0, then the remote side will - // supply a real port number in the response. - if laddr.Port == 0 { - var p struct { - Port uint32 - } - if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - laddr.Port = int(p.Port) - } - - // Register this forward, using the port number we obtained. - ch := c.forwards.add(laddr) - - return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil -} - -// forwardList stores a mapping between remote -// forward requests and the tcpListeners. -type forwardList struct { - sync.Mutex - entries []forwardEntry -} - -// forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a -// remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener. -type forwardEntry struct { - laddr net.Addr - c chan forward -} - -// forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The -// arguments to add/remove/lookup should be address as specified in -// the original forward-request. -type forward struct { - newCh NewChannel // the ssh client channel underlying this forward - raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection -} - -func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward { - l.Lock() - defer l.Unlock() - f := forwardEntry{ - laddr: addr, - c: make(chan forward, 1), - } - l.entries = append(l.entries, f) - return f.c -} - -// See RFC 4254, section 7.2 -type forwardedTCPPayload struct { - Addr string - Port uint32 - OriginAddr string - OriginPort uint32 -} - -// parseTCPAddr parses the originating address from the remote into a *net.TCPAddr. -func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) { - if port == 0 || port > 65535 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port) - } - ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr)) - if ip == nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr) - } - return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil -} - -func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { - for ch := range in { - var ( - laddr net.Addr - raddr net.Addr - err error - ) - switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType { - case "forwarded-tcpip": - var payload forwardedTCPPayload - if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { - ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-tcpip payload: "+err.Error()) - continue - } - - // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming - // addresses should list the address, in string - // format. It is implied that this should be an IP - // address, as it would be impossible to connect to it - // otherwise. - laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port) - if err != nil { - ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) - continue - } - raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort) - if err != nil { - ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) - continue - } - - case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com": - var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload - if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { - ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error()) - continue - } - laddr = &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: payload.SocketPath, - Net: "unix", - } - raddr = &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: "@", - Net: "unix", - } - default: - panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType)) - } - if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok { - // Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming - // connections. - ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address") - continue - } - - } -} - -// remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its -// listener. -func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) { - l.Lock() - defer l.Unlock() - for i, f := range l.entries { - if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() { - l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...) - close(f.c) - return - } - } -} - -// closeAll closes and clears all forwards. -func (l *forwardList) closeAll() { - l.Lock() - defer l.Unlock() - for _, f := range l.entries { - close(f.c) - } - l.entries = nil -} - -func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { - l.Lock() - defer l.Unlock() - for _, f := range l.entries { - if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() { - f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr} - return true - } - } - return false -} - -type tcpListener struct { - laddr *net.TCPAddr - - conn *Client - in <-chan forward -} - -// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. -func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { - s, ok := <-l.in - if !ok { - return nil, io.EOF - } - ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - go DiscardRequests(incoming) - - return &chanConn{ - Channel: ch, - laddr: l.laddr, - raddr: s.raddr, - }, nil -} - -// Close closes the listener. -func (l *tcpListener) Close() error { - m := channelForwardMsg{ - l.laddr.IP.String(), - uint32(l.laddr.Port), - } - - // this also closes the listener. - l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr) - ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) - if err == nil && !ok { - err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed") - } - return err -} - -// Addr returns the listener's network address. -func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr { - return l.laddr -} - -// DialContext initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. -// -// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before the -// connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully connected, -// any expiration of the context will not affect the connection. -// -// See func Dial for additional information. -func (c *Client) DialContext(ctx context.Context, n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - type connErr struct { - conn net.Conn - err error - } - ch := make(chan connErr) - go func() { - conn, err := c.Dial(n, addr) - select { - case ch <- connErr{conn, err}: - case <-ctx.Done(): - if conn != nil { - conn.Close() - } - } - }() - select { - case res := <-ch: - return res.conn, res.err - case <-ctx.Done(): - return nil, ctx.Err() - } -} - -// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. -// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr(). -func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - var ch Channel - switch n { - case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": - // Parse the address into host and numeric port. - host, portString, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - port, err := strconv.ParseUint(portString, 10, 16) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - ch, err = c.dial(net.IPv4zero.String(), 0, host, int(port)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // Use a zero address for local and remote address. - zeroAddr := &net.TCPAddr{ - IP: net.IPv4zero, - Port: 0, - } - return &chanConn{ - Channel: ch, - laddr: zeroAddr, - raddr: zeroAddr, - }, nil - case "unix": - var err error - ch, err = c.dialStreamLocal(addr) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return &chanConn{ - Channel: ch, - laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: "@", - Net: "unix", - }, - raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ - Name: addr, - Net: "unix", - }, - }, nil - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) - } -} - -// DialTCP connects to the remote address raddr on the network net, -// which must be "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6". If laddr is not nil, it is used -// as the local address for the connection. -func (c *Client) DialTCP(n string, laddr, raddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Conn, error) { - if laddr == nil { - laddr = &net.TCPAddr{ - IP: net.IPv4zero, - Port: 0, - } - } - ch, err := c.dial(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port, raddr.IP.String(), raddr.Port) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return &chanConn{ - Channel: ch, - laddr: laddr, - raddr: raddr, - }, nil -} - -// RFC 4254 7.2 -type channelOpenDirectMsg struct { - raddr string - rport uint32 - laddr string - lport uint32 -} - -func (c *Client) dial(laddr string, lport int, raddr string, rport int) (Channel, error) { - msg := channelOpenDirectMsg{ - raddr: raddr, - rport: uint32(rport), - laddr: laddr, - lport: uint32(lport), - } - ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-tcpip", Marshal(&msg)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - go DiscardRequests(in) - return ch, err -} - -type tcpChan struct { - Channel // the backing channel -} - -// chanConn fulfills the net.Conn interface without -// the tcpChan having to hold laddr or raddr directly. -type chanConn struct { - Channel - laddr, raddr net.Addr -} - -// LocalAddr returns the local network address. -func (t *chanConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { - return t.laddr -} - -// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. -func (t *chanConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { - return t.raddr -} - -// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated -// with the connection. -func (t *chanConn) SetDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { - if err := t.SetReadDeadline(deadline); err != nil { - return err - } - return t.SetWriteDeadline(deadline) -} - -// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline. -// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. -// After the deadline, the error from Read will implement net.Error -// with Timeout() == true. -func (t *chanConn) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { - // for compatibility with previous version, - // the error message contains "tcpChan" - return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") -} - -// SetWriteDeadline exists to satisfy the net.Conn interface -// but is not implemented by this type. It always returns an error. -func (t *chanConn) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { - return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go deleted file mode 100644 index 0424d2d37..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,380 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package ssh - -import ( - "bufio" - "bytes" - "errors" - "io" - "log" -) - -// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the -// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing. -const debugTransport = false - -const ( - gcm128CipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" - gcm256CipherID = "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" - aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc" - tripledescbcID = "3des-cbc" -) - -// packetConn represents a transport that implements packet based -// operations. -type packetConn interface { - // Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer. - writePacket(packet []byte) error - - // Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking, - // i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is - // always non-empty. - readPacket() ([]byte, error) - - // Close closes the write-side of the connection. - Close() error -} - -// transport is the keyingTransport that implements the SSH packet -// protocol. -type transport struct { - reader connectionState - writer connectionState - - bufReader *bufio.Reader - bufWriter *bufio.Writer - rand io.Reader - isClient bool - io.Closer - - strictMode bool - initialKEXDone bool -} - -// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC -// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only. -type packetCipher interface { - // writeCipherPacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The - // contents of the packet are generally scrambled. - writeCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error - - // readCipherPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The - // returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of - // readPacket. - readCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) -} - -// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the -// connection. This is necessary because each direction has its own -// keys, and can even have its own algorithms -type connectionState struct { - packetCipher - seqNum uint32 - dir direction - pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher -} - -func (t *transport) setStrictMode() error { - if t.reader.seqNum != 1 { - return errors.New("ssh: sequence number != 1 when strict KEX mode requested") - } - t.strictMode = true - return nil -} - -func (t *transport) setInitialKEXDone() { - t.initialKEXDone = true -} - -// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in -// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet -// respectively. -func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error { - ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult) - if err != nil { - return err - } - t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph - - ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult) - if err != nil { - return err - } - t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph - - return nil -} - -func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { - if len(p) == 0 { - return - } - who := "server" - if t.isClient { - who = "client" - } - what := "read" - if write { - what = "write" - } - - log.Println(what, who, p[0]) -} - -// Read and decrypt next packet. -func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { - for { - p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader, t.strictMode) - if err != nil { - break - } - // in strict mode we pass through DEBUG and IGNORE packets only during the initial KEX - if len(p) == 0 || (t.strictMode && !t.initialKEXDone) || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { - break - } - } - if debugTransport { - t.printPacket(p, false) - } - - return p, err -} - -func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader, strictMode bool) ([]byte, error) { - packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r) - s.seqNum++ - if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 { - err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet") - } - - if len(packet) > 0 { - switch packet[0] { - case msgNewKeys: - select { - case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: - s.packetCipher = cipher - if strictMode { - s.seqNum = 0 - } - default: - return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message") - } - - case msgDisconnect: - // Transform a disconnect message into an - // error. Since this is lowest level at which - // we interpret message types, doing it here - // ensures that we don't have to handle it - // elsewhere. - var msg disconnectMsg - if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return nil, &msg - } - } - - // The packet may point to an internal buffer, so copy the - // packet out here. - fresh := make([]byte, len(packet)) - copy(fresh, packet) - - return fresh, err -} - -func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error { - if debugTransport { - t.printPacket(packet, true) - } - return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet, t.strictMode) -} - -func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte, strictMode bool) error { - changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys - - err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet) - if err != nil { - return err - } - if err = w.Flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - s.seqNum++ - if changeKeys { - select { - case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: - s.packetCipher = cipher - if strictMode { - s.seqNum = 0 - } - default: - panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys") - } - } - return err -} - -func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transport { - t := &transport{ - bufReader: bufio.NewReader(rwc), - bufWriter: bufio.NewWriter(rwc), - rand: rand, - reader: connectionState{ - packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, - pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), - }, - writer: connectionState{ - packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, - pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), - }, - Closer: rwc, - } - t.isClient = isClient - - if isClient { - t.reader.dir = serverKeys - t.writer.dir = clientKeys - } else { - t.reader.dir = clientKeys - t.writer.dir = serverKeys - } - - return t -} - -type direction struct { - ivTag []byte - keyTag []byte - macKeyTag []byte -} - -var ( - serverKeys = direction{[]byte{'B'}, []byte{'D'}, []byte{'F'}} - clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}} -) - -// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as -// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys -// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys). -func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) { - cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] - - iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) - key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) - - generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) - generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) - - var macKey []byte - if !aeadCiphers[algs.Cipher] { - macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] - macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize) - generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) - } - - return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs) -} - -// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H -// and sessionId, as specified in RFC 4253, section 7.2. -func generateKeyMaterial(out, tag []byte, r *kexResult) { - var digestsSoFar []byte - - h := r.Hash.New() - for len(out) > 0 { - h.Reset() - h.Write(r.K) - h.Write(r.H) - - if len(digestsSoFar) == 0 { - h.Write(tag) - h.Write(r.SessionID) - } else { - h.Write(digestsSoFar) - } - - digest := h.Sum(nil) - n := copy(out, digest) - out = out[n:] - if len(out) > 0 { - digestsSoFar = append(digestsSoFar, digest...) - } - } -} - -const packageVersion = "SSH-2.0-Go" - -// Sends and receives a version line. The versionLine string should -// be US ASCII, start with "SSH-2.0-", and should not include a -// newline. exchangeVersions returns the other side's version line. -func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err error) { - // Contrary to the RFC, we do not ignore lines that don't - // start with "SSH-2.0-" to make the library usable with - // nonconforming servers. - for _, c := range versionLine { - // The spec disallows non US-ASCII chars, and - // specifically forbids null chars. - if c < 32 { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk character in version line") - } - } - if _, err = rw.Write(append(versionLine, '\r', '\n')); err != nil { - return - } - - them, err = readVersion(rw) - return them, err -} - -// maxVersionStringBytes is the maximum number of bytes that we'll -// accept as a version string. RFC 4253 section 4.2 limits this at 255 -// chars -const maxVersionStringBytes = 255 - -// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2. -func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64) - var ok bool - var buf [1]byte - - for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ { - _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n - // but several SSH servers actually only send a \n. - if buf[0] == '\n' { - if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) { - // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines - // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that - // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total). - versionString = versionString[:0] - continue - } - ok = true - break - } - - // non ASCII chars are disallowed, but we are lenient, - // since Go doesn't use null-terminated strings. - - // The RFC allows a comment after a space, however, - // all of it (version and comments) goes into the - // session hash. - versionString = append(versionString, buf[0]) - } - - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("ssh: overflow reading version string") - } - - // There might be a '\r' on the end which we should remove. - if len(versionString) > 0 && versionString[len(versionString)-1] == '\r' { - versionString = versionString[:len(versionString)-1] - } - return versionString, nil -} |